Believe it or not, EWPC is about teaching leadership. As “human beings are a lot more sensitive to their environment than they may seem,” I would like to learn from the bystanders whether EWPC has tipped or not in the Energy Central Network environment.
Does EWPC have a “Bystander Problem”?
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
In order to get support for EWPC, I wrote the now best selling Conspiracy Theory Against Mr. X (562 views, until Nov 22nd, 2007). So now I think is time to ask what that means in terms of leadership.
“The Tipping Point: how little things can make a big difference,” by Malcolm Gladwell, carries the story of Kitty Genovese, which I contend is similar to that of EWPC in Energy Central Network environment.
Gladwell tells that “… Kitty was chased by her assailant and attacked three times on the street, over the course of half an hour, as thirty-eight of her neighbors watch from the windows. During that time, however, none of the thirty-eight witnesses called the police.”
Two New York City psychologists, Bibb Latane and John Darley named the above situation the “bystander problem,” explaining that “when people are in a group… responsibility for acting is diffused. They assume that someone else will make the call, or they assume that because no one else is acting, the apparent problem… isn’t really a problem.”
In the case of EWPC, during the past two years Mr. G has attacked without mercy EWPC, and no one else have come with help, even though an inordinate amount of people have seen it.
Gladwell ends the brief story by saying that “human beings are a lot more sensitive to their environment than they may seem.”
This is a good test for EWPC now that it seems to have tipped in www.energyblogs.com with 6 of the 10 “Most Commented” and the top 6 and the 8th place of the 10 “Most Viewed” articles, but no one has firmly committed (Mr. Causey issued a nice comment) his/her support to EWPC.
I would like to learn from the bystander whether EWPC has tipped or not in the Energy Central Network environment. Believe it or not, EWPC is about teaching leadership.
jueves, noviembre 22, 2007
miércoles, noviembre 21, 2007
EEI-ting Your Own Lunch
Edison Electric Institute members have empowered the government to take control of the power industry. They should stop dreaming, work hard to ban regulation and to let the market decide by following Hewlett Packard’s advice of “eating your own lunch.”
EEI-ting Your Own Lunch
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
In the book “Inside the Tornado,” Goeffrey Moore writes “There is no more challenging management task than, as the folks of H-P like to put it, “eating your own lunch.”
The power industry is in the process to be transformed by the information revolution. By hiding behind “native load,” generators and utilities have empowered the government to control the power industry.
In the article All the issues crux of the matter, explaining that government bureaucracy (and state-controlled enterprises are extensions of that bureaucracy) is inherently the worst possible way to solve any problem, Warren Causey writes:
EEI membership should take serious consideration to the EWPC articles EEI California Dreamin’, To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio and “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio.
EEI-ting Your Own Lunch
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
In the book “Inside the Tornado,” Goeffrey Moore writes “There is no more challenging management task than, as the folks of H-P like to put it, “eating your own lunch.”
The power industry is in the process to be transformed by the information revolution. By hiding behind “native load,” generators and utilities have empowered the government to control the power industry.
In the article All the issues crux of the matter, explaining that government bureaucracy (and state-controlled enterprises are extensions of that bureaucracy) is inherently the worst possible way to solve any problem, Warren Causey writes:
With regard to good ideas dying at the utility/commission staff interfaces, I don’t disagree at all. In fact, I consider that as proof of the argument in my original post, and as both the crux of the issue and the fly in the ointment of Dr. Silverio’s, and other bloggers’, restructuring proposals. My educational training actually is in history and that’s why I consider this a fascinating time-period in which to live.
Over the last couple of generations, the U.S. has become increasingly socialist (regardless of the party in power) and people increasingly expect the government regulate everything and solve every problem. The issue with that is that government bureaucracy (and state-controlled enterprises are extensions of that
bureaucracy) is inherently the worst possible way to solve any problem. You can ask the Russians what a long, slow dive into an empty swimming pool feels like. Of course don’t pay to much attention to what they say because now they seem intent on climbing, dazed, back up onto the board and trying it again.
When you introduce government planning into any operation at any level of government (local planning commissions and their interventions into private property are a nightmare) and remove or distort economic incentives, you produce a horse designed by a committee—it looks a lot like a camel. Add politics (most state regulators are elected and national politicians’ raison d’etre is to get elected regardless of the consequences) and the possibility of allowing free markets to work out problems via trial-and-error disappears.
EEI membership should take serious consideration to the EWPC articles EEI California Dreamin’, To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio and “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio.
martes, noviembre 20, 2007
Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC
EWPC sense of urgency is reinforced. As the market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm, EWPC will enable the possibility to a superior development path for the power industry. However, putting EWPC into practice to reap most of the benefits requires high caliber professional advice.
Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Gould,
Thank you very much for asking one right question, the one in the first crucial point that reinforces the increased sense of urgency about EWPC. The balance of your comments, however, has distortions and unnecessary repetitions.
In that “crucial point” you are describing the possibility of systemic risk – system adequacy problem - which is one of the main jobs of the system engineer (planner and operator) to be performed in coordination with generators, transporters and retailers. Today's regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation, based on inactive and inelastic demand (and an externality), and lacking customer oriented service, are not prepared to handle the managerial complexity involved.
To handle such complexity, we need to deploy 2GRs before "... electricity should become the mode to replace transportation fuels (PHEV's, H2, etc.)." Several market segments will develop, for example price takers, responsive demand (source of demand elasticity) and long term contracts. As 2GRs come up with the long term contractual commitments of ( i.e. industrial and commercial) customers that desire to buy the right of future electricity service at a fixed price, including those that have serve to finance base load power plants (i.e. via futures market), 2GRs will provide the system operator much more accurate demand forecasts. Such forecasts are better because demand in no longer an externality.
By updating power system planning procedures to EWPC with those quite accurate forecasts, the “projected demand” will NEVER “exceed available supply by a larger margin than the available demand control?” System reserves, in the proper mix of the “elastic” demand side and the supply side, should be adequate to run a stable system.
“How will your grid operator "guarantee" it's existence in all combinations of circumstances?” By proper long run power system planning system adequacy development. The statement “a new 1500 MW nuclear station when demand for it may be only at 100 MW,” is the result of a planning mistake or a misunderstanding of power system operation procedures.
That is why EWPC is the winner of the first phase of competition are precisely highly interrelated "absolute requirements" 1) integration of active demand and 2) that distribution and transmission are fully integrated geographically. Those requirements enable a superior solution path to the PROFIT ZONE through fully functional retail and wholesale competition. The obsolete regulation paradigm shifted the industry to the NO PROFIT ZONE and the deregulation experiments place it in an even more inferior path of development.
As for price caps, they are easily sold to voters. Under EWPC each customer has the right to choose its own price caps in the service plan of their 2GR as explained in No Need for Regulated Price Caps - I and No Need for Regulated Price Caps - II.
Distorting and naming the “absolute requirements” of EWPC as “two minor differences,” is no serious, just as it is also the “the added point” which are repeated again, and again, because Mr. G NEVER followed the links on EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either. Comparing the Ontario single generation retailer actions to those of the 2GRs adds insult to injury.
Finally, I repeat the summary of the article Take EWPC Lead & Reap Large Benefits: “The US Congress, the European Commission, the state of Ohio, and the Dominican Republic, are some the most likely candidates to start the paradigm shift to EWPC, ending demand forever as an externality. It has been shown that the days of the obsolete VIUs paradigm are counted. A paradigm shift to EWPC is the next source of business innovations, jobs with a lot of future and increasing exports. Those governments that take the lead, and avoid the risks of market implementation failure by retaining high caliber professional team advice, will reap most of the benefits.”
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Gould,
Thank you very much for asking one right question, the one in the first crucial point that reinforces the increased sense of urgency about EWPC. The balance of your comments, however, has distortions and unnecessary repetitions.
In that “crucial point” you are describing the possibility of systemic risk – system adequacy problem - which is one of the main jobs of the system engineer (planner and operator) to be performed in coordination with generators, transporters and retailers. Today's regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation, based on inactive and inelastic demand (and an externality), and lacking customer oriented service, are not prepared to handle the managerial complexity involved.
To handle such complexity, we need to deploy 2GRs before "... electricity should become the mode to replace transportation fuels (PHEV's, H2, etc.)." Several market segments will develop, for example price takers, responsive demand (source of demand elasticity) and long term contracts. As 2GRs come up with the long term contractual commitments of ( i.e. industrial and commercial) customers that desire to buy the right of future electricity service at a fixed price, including those that have serve to finance base load power plants (i.e. via futures market), 2GRs will provide the system operator much more accurate demand forecasts. Such forecasts are better because demand in no longer an externality.
By updating power system planning procedures to EWPC with those quite accurate forecasts, the “projected demand” will NEVER “exceed available supply by a larger margin than the available demand control?” System reserves, in the proper mix of the “elastic” demand side and the supply side, should be adequate to run a stable system.
“How will your grid operator "guarantee" it's existence in all combinations of circumstances?” By proper long run power system planning system adequacy development. The statement “a new 1500 MW nuclear station when demand for it may be only at 100 MW,” is the result of a planning mistake or a misunderstanding of power system operation procedures.
That is why EWPC is the winner of the first phase of competition are precisely highly interrelated "absolute requirements" 1) integration of active demand and 2) that distribution and transmission are fully integrated geographically. Those requirements enable a superior solution path to the PROFIT ZONE through fully functional retail and wholesale competition. The obsolete regulation paradigm shifted the industry to the NO PROFIT ZONE and the deregulation experiments place it in an even more inferior path of development.
As for price caps, they are easily sold to voters. Under EWPC each customer has the right to choose its own price caps in the service plan of their 2GR as explained in No Need for Regulated Price Caps - I and No Need for Regulated Price Caps - II.
Distorting and naming the “absolute requirements” of EWPC as “two minor differences,” is no serious, just as it is also the “the added point” which are repeated again, and again, because Mr. G NEVER followed the links on EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either. Comparing the Ontario single generation retailer actions to those of the 2GRs adds insult to injury.
Finally, I repeat the summary of the article Take EWPC Lead & Reap Large Benefits: “The US Congress, the European Commission, the state of Ohio, and the Dominican Republic, are some the most likely candidates to start the paradigm shift to EWPC, ending demand forever as an externality. It has been shown that the days of the obsolete VIUs paradigm are counted. A paradigm shift to EWPC is the next source of business innovations, jobs with a lot of future and increasing exports. Those governments that take the lead, and avoid the risks of market implementation failure by retaining high caliber professional team advice, will reap most of the benefits.”
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
domingo, noviembre 18, 2007
EEI California Dreamin’
The U.S. power industry is dreaming that it is safe, when in fact the leaves are brown and the sky is gray as the industry is in the NO PROFIT ZONE. To get it safe and warm into the PROFIT ZONE, EEI should lead the regulation ban, on such a winter’s day, to let the commercial market decide.
EEI California Dreamin’
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Rosenstock
Albeit minimizing the importance of a well documented proposed “ban of regulation [except on transportation]” (see To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio) to “let the [commercial] market decide” (see “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio), thank you very much for at least acknowledging the ban. I think it is a defensive, but nonetheless, good start.
Highlighting the positive, the ban’s objective, and to let the market decide, is to “…provide the potential for modernizing the whole productive structure and for raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” of the power industry. In other words, the goal is to shift the industry from the NO PROFIT ZONE to the PROFIT ZONE, so that the EEI membership avoids what the railroads, the nuke industry, and Detroit, went through or are going through.
The need for the shift is in the EWPC article Customer Wallet Cleaning Problem and Solution, where you can “… learn that the vertically integrated utilities paradigm has been in a NO PROFIT ZONE for quite some time, letting utilities make a profit under regulation only by the ‘consumer having his wallet cleaned out by ever increasing power costs.’ To get the power industry in the PROFIT ZONE, there is a need to restructure with the aim to admit business model innovations to develop.”
Going back to the beginning, in the Executive Summary of the full paper, Van Doren and Taylor write: “Electricity restructuring was initiated in the 1990s to remedy the problem of relatively high electricity costs in the Northeast and California... Economist wanted reform to eliminate regulatory incentives to overbuild generating capacity and spur the introduction of real time prices."
What happen after that is partially (more below) documented in the EWPC article The BIG California LIE, which in brief says: “The BIG LIE is that retail competition is impossible in electric markets. The implementation of a competitive retail market was the center of the debate in California. Instead of cooperating to implement it, the three big California utilities, that didn't care about the end-customers, acted very irresponsibly. EWPC is the paradigm shift to show that retail competition is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to turn the electricity industry into a vibrant value added business for all stakeholders.”
That explains why you “don’t know any regulators who would really like that idea.” We all should questioned if behind the irresponsibility there was a conspiracy that seems to have been “successful” so far. Please read the EWPC article A Vertical Integration Conspiracy Theory for the US Judiciary to learn about it.
You are right, “there are many politicians who seem to want more price controls and regulation on electricity,” because they are unaware of both the BIG LIE and the potential conspiracy, while also unaware of the recent emergence of EWPC.
To learn more about what happen in California, please read the following EWPC articles (excerpts are included below each title):
Divine Dispensation of Electric Markets is Gone
The Sixth Disruptive Technology
Let EWPC Come to Fruition
EEI California Dreamin’
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
All the leaves are brown … And the sky is grey … I've been for a walk … On a winter's day … I'd be safe and warm … If i was in l.a … California dreamin' … On such a winter's day …
Dear Mr. Rosenstock
Albeit minimizing the importance of a well documented proposed “ban of regulation [except on transportation]” (see To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio) to “let the [commercial] market decide” (see “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio), thank you very much for at least acknowledging the ban. I think it is a defensive, but nonetheless, good start.
Highlighting the positive, the ban’s objective, and to let the market decide, is to “…provide the potential for modernizing the whole productive structure and for raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” of the power industry. In other words, the goal is to shift the industry from the NO PROFIT ZONE to the PROFIT ZONE, so that the EEI membership avoids what the railroads, the nuke industry, and Detroit, went through or are going through.
The need for the shift is in the EWPC article Customer Wallet Cleaning Problem and Solution, where you can “… learn that the vertically integrated utilities paradigm has been in a NO PROFIT ZONE for quite some time, letting utilities make a profit under regulation only by the ‘consumer having his wallet cleaned out by ever increasing power costs.’ To get the power industry in the PROFIT ZONE, there is a need to restructure with the aim to admit business model innovations to develop.”
Going back to the beginning, in the Executive Summary of the full paper, Van Doren and Taylor write: “Electricity restructuring was initiated in the 1990s to remedy the problem of relatively high electricity costs in the Northeast and California... Economist wanted reform to eliminate regulatory incentives to overbuild generating capacity and spur the introduction of real time prices."
What happen after that is partially (more below) documented in the EWPC article The BIG California LIE, which in brief says: “The BIG LIE is that retail competition is impossible in electric markets. The implementation of a competitive retail market was the center of the debate in California. Instead of cooperating to implement it, the three big California utilities, that didn't care about the end-customers, acted very irresponsibly. EWPC is the paradigm shift to show that retail competition is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to turn the electricity industry into a vibrant value added business for all stakeholders.”
That explains why you “don’t know any regulators who would really like that idea.” We all should questioned if behind the irresponsibility there was a conspiracy that seems to have been “successful” so far. Please read the EWPC article A Vertical Integration Conspiracy Theory for the US Judiciary to learn about it.
You are right, “there are many politicians who seem to want more price controls and regulation on electricity,” because they are unaware of both the BIG LIE and the potential conspiracy, while also unaware of the recent emergence of EWPC.
To learn more about what happen in California, please read the following EWPC articles (excerpts are included below each title):
Divine Dispensation of Electric Markets is Gone
… the “Law of the Situation: the railroads did not understand,” (see my post of 9.11.07 above) that applies to VIUs, from which I extract, “Some people [IOUs for example] still believe there’s a divine dispensation that their markets are theirs - and no one else’s - now and forevermore. It is an old dream that dies hard, yet no businessman in a free society can control a market when the customers decide to go somewhere else [under EWPC for example]. All the king’s horses and all the king’s man are helpless in the face of a better product. Our commercial history is filled with examples of companies that failed to change in a changing world, and became tombstones in the corporate graveyard.”
When energy costs were low, the business model of winning rate cases to the regulator didn’t bother the customers. But since the oil embargo in the 70s, customers are ever more interested in competitive prices, as free society recognized that IOUs cannot control anymore the electricity markets. I have followed Donella Meadows advise (see link Let's Get Out of Back Rooms to a Generative Dialogue) to end the divine dispensation to the IOUs. But after many things have occurred during more than 30 years, with the obsolete VIUs controlled market, customers like those of the state of Ohio want and effective and efficient re-regulation process.
The Sixth Disruptive Technology
The above difficulties are also explained in a different way by Jack A. Casazza, as the scrambled egg, that can’t be unscrambled. That would mean that The BIG California LIE was supposed to get away with a much larger scam than the Enron’s scam, as vested interests extended the obsolete VIUs paradigm well beyond its useful life, by tilting the competitive balance in an equilibria away from the best economic outcome for society. That is what is fueling a backward movement away from real retail liberation in Europe now. It is to the best equilibria that EWPC is concerned. As Einstein said; "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."
Let EWPC Come to Fruition
Just like you [another person], I am also a long time critic of deregulation that agrees with many of the professor’s points. However, instead on placing myself on the problem side, as a power engineer I have been, since 1995, concentrated on the solution side. By “Working on ideas outside” engineering, I “can enjoy the enthusiasm built on partial ignorance,” as my hero and role model Uno Lamm suggested. Please refer to “Uno Lamm: Inventor and Activist,” by Catherine Wollard, published in March 1988 on the IEEE Spectrum, here and below.
It is such a solution that evolved into EWPC, which makes the deregulation debate totally unnecessary. In fact, such debate was a completely waste of time, which could had been avoided if The BIG California LIE (hit link to read the article about that LIE) had not been enabled, as retail competition “is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to turn the electricity industry into a vibrant value added business for all stakeholders.”
In addition, in the BIG LIE article I repeated that there is a great need to consider A Vertical Integration Conspiracy Theory for the US Judiciary (please hit link also) to provide an ordered framework with which to understand that chaotic event and process.
Finally, unlike the case the HVDC Pacific Intertie, in which “it was estimated that the people in Los Angeles saved $600,000 a day when Columbia River power began to flow south,” the same California IOUs were unable to come up with their BIG LIE. Like Uno Lamm, I understand that “’Among Americans, when the heat of combat is over, and a decision has been reached,’ he says, ‘all the bitterness disappears, and people work hard to bring the final decision to fruition in the best possible way.” That has been a central tenet in my work on the development of EWPC.
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either
Just as EWPC is not the UK Model, it is not the Ontario market model either. However, probably with a hidden purpose, Mr. G keeps confusing the de-regulation market model of Ontario with the EWPC market paradigm. Is that serious behavior? It seems that although he is a very intelligent and important man, Mr. G. has a very difficult time following links.
EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Gould,
Thank you for your intelligent and important questions, which I will respond with care and diligence.
However, please don’t use phrases like “anyone can take you in any way seriously…,” as they don’t follow the “most important rule of the EnergyPulse media,” set by Mr. Y. So, don’t forget to read what Mr. Y said about Mr. G in the Conspiracy Theory Against Mr. X, particularly where is says: “It doesn't surprise me AT ALL that you didn't follow the link, you NEVER follow a link…” So once again follow the links below.
With much respect, please find my last response to Mr. Giegler, which could have been found by following the link, under the article Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2. The response was:
Following Einstein’s (Mr. Y’s role model) quote “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not one bit simpler,” the essential requirements of EWPC, that differ from existing de-regulation that you mentioned is “retail competition with active demand (UK had no active demand) and ultraquality transportation (UK has separate transmission and distribution and no ultraquality identified). That is the essence." as can be seen by following the link to the recent article EWPC is NOT the UK Model (referred, from here on, as the first article). It follows that to get ultraquality transportation, transmission and distribution should be tightly integrated.
However, the Ontario, Canada, paradigm as you explained on 11.16.07 under the article Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, has these characteristics: “The separation of distribution from generation, transmission and (retail if used) into a regulated monopoly on geographic boundaries should be considered an absolute requirement for competitive electrical systems.”
According to your opinion, under de-regulation and inactive loads, the separation of transmission and distribution is assumed as an absolute requirement. However, under EWPC with active loads the separation is a big mistake, as the optimization of the transportation system (that enables the optimization of the system as a whole under EWPC) does not result from the optimization of transmission plus the optimization of distribution by themselves.
The optimization of the system as a whole, can also be seen in the first article where “I wrote of the discovery that ‘To optimize the transportation system, it is required to consider total social (demand, transport, supply) welfare needs, and not just the optimization of transmission, distribution, or both, by themselves.’”
The discovery (not invention) mentioned above is the ultraquality imperative that the vertically integrated utilities (VIUs) paradigm and the EWPC paradigm have, but which Ontario, Canada and the UK models don’t. The whole VIU paradigm controlled market can be divided into two markets, one of which, the controlled transportation market retains the ultraquality imperative, by planning, operating and controlling the transportation system to keep the characteristics of the whole (both the controlled transportation market and the competitive commercial market).
The response to “Why would any retailer risk the financial investment to implement real demand control on their customers when the resulting benefits will accrue not to them or their customers, but to all connected customers including those of their competitive retailers?,” can be found in the comments to the article A Little Silicon is Necessary but NOT Sufficient (please hit the link and follow it to read them).
I like to add, that the qustion itself comes from a misunderstanding of the theory and practice of spot pricing of electricity, which may or may not have been implemented under de-regulation. Under EWPC, as an extension of Schweppe et al regulated energy marketplace, spot prices are not the result of real demand control, but forecasted prices resulting from security constraint unit commitment (generation and demand) simulations.
As I wrote yesterday (see above) all that is needed to develop a market with financial credibility is a professional market with high reliability and without price spikes (a fully functional market). By lacking those two elements, IMEUC needs fallback to government / rate-payer guarantees. Read the details in the whole article To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio, to try to understand “The idea that regulation is the only paradigm that ensures generation investments is flawed.”
To understand the last comment of your post, readers are advised to read, as an example, A Paradigm Shift to EWPC (don’t forget to follow the link) to see my response to a similar complaint by Len that said “My problem with EWPC are myriad eg. it's precisely identical to every existing failed attempt at de-regulation in N. America. And it's promoter flatly refuses to answer any difficult questions about it. Questions which I have posed before, such as:…”
See also Len Ask: What Is Transportation?, 2nd Time: Ontario is Far From EWPC...
So the final boomerang question is: Is Mr. G serious about EWPC or just fooling around?
EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Gould,
Thank you for your intelligent and important questions, which I will respond with care and diligence.
However, please don’t use phrases like “anyone can take you in any way seriously…,” as they don’t follow the “most important rule of the EnergyPulse media,” set by Mr. Y. So, don’t forget to read what Mr. Y said about Mr. G in the Conspiracy Theory Against Mr. X, particularly where is says: “It doesn't surprise me AT ALL that you didn't follow the link, you NEVER follow a link…” So once again follow the links below.
With much respect, please find my last response to Mr. Giegler, which could have been found by following the link, under the article Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2. The response was:
There is no need for simulation at all... The R1E2 concept makes the VIUs and the EWPC paradigms indistinct in term of the non-triviality of electric power systems, which is missing from IMEUC and all deregulation experiments. [this discovery is mentioned below] … The added efficiency of EWPC with respect to the VIUs paradigm comes from demand integration and the elimination of prices controls. Said in other words, the VIUs paradigm can't no longer maximize welfare for the future, as that process started back in the 70s.
Following Einstein’s (Mr. Y’s role model) quote “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not one bit simpler,” the essential requirements of EWPC, that differ from existing de-regulation that you mentioned is “retail competition with active demand (UK had no active demand) and ultraquality transportation (UK has separate transmission and distribution and no ultraquality identified). That is the essence." as can be seen by following the link to the recent article EWPC is NOT the UK Model (referred, from here on, as the first article). It follows that to get ultraquality transportation, transmission and distribution should be tightly integrated.
However, the Ontario, Canada, paradigm as you explained on 11.16.07 under the article Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, has these characteristics: “The separation of distribution from generation, transmission and (retail if used) into a regulated monopoly on geographic boundaries should be considered an absolute requirement for competitive electrical systems.”
According to your opinion, under de-regulation and inactive loads, the separation of transmission and distribution is assumed as an absolute requirement. However, under EWPC with active loads the separation is a big mistake, as the optimization of the transportation system (that enables the optimization of the system as a whole under EWPC) does not result from the optimization of transmission plus the optimization of distribution by themselves.
The optimization of the system as a whole, can also be seen in the first article where “I wrote of the discovery that ‘To optimize the transportation system, it is required to consider total social (demand, transport, supply) welfare needs, and not just the optimization of transmission, distribution, or both, by themselves.’”
The discovery (not invention) mentioned above is the ultraquality imperative that the vertically integrated utilities (VIUs) paradigm and the EWPC paradigm have, but which Ontario, Canada and the UK models don’t. The whole VIU paradigm controlled market can be divided into two markets, one of which, the controlled transportation market retains the ultraquality imperative, by planning, operating and controlling the transportation system to keep the characteristics of the whole (both the controlled transportation market and the competitive commercial market).
The response to “Why would any retailer risk the financial investment to implement real demand control on their customers when the resulting benefits will accrue not to them or their customers, but to all connected customers including those of their competitive retailers?,” can be found in the comments to the article A Little Silicon is Necessary but NOT Sufficient (please hit the link and follow it to read them).
I like to add, that the qustion itself comes from a misunderstanding of the theory and practice of spot pricing of electricity, which may or may not have been implemented under de-regulation. Under EWPC, as an extension of Schweppe et al regulated energy marketplace, spot prices are not the result of real demand control, but forecasted prices resulting from security constraint unit commitment (generation and demand) simulations.
As I wrote yesterday (see above) all that is needed to develop a market with financial credibility is a professional market with high reliability and without price spikes (a fully functional market). By lacking those two elements, IMEUC needs fallback to government / rate-payer guarantees. Read the details in the whole article To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio, to try to understand “The idea that regulation is the only paradigm that ensures generation investments is flawed.”
To understand the last comment of your post, readers are advised to read, as an example, A Paradigm Shift to EWPC (don’t forget to follow the link) to see my response to a similar complaint by Len that said “My problem with EWPC are myriad eg. it's precisely identical to every existing failed attempt at de-regulation in N. America. And it's promoter flatly refuses to answer any difficult questions about it. Questions which I have posed before, such as:…”
See also Len Ask: What Is Transportation?, 2nd Time: Ontario is Far From EWPC...
So the final boomerang question is: Is Mr. G serious about EWPC or just fooling around?
viernes, noviembre 16, 2007
To EEI: “Let's Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio
Should we ban regulation? YES! Go for a paradigm shift to “moving energy” with the EWPC winning market architecture and design breakthrough. The next opportunity then is in Ohio. Now we can agree with EEI to let the market decide for the bulb, but just after they agree to ban regulation.
To EEI: “Let’s Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
This is intended as the practice article that complements “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio. For all practical purposes deregulation is already banned. Now we will show that regulation (with or without independent generators) should also be banned, to let the market decide.
Should we ban the bulb? No conclusive evidence can be found, in the above posts, between banning the bulb and letting the market decide (see Should We Ban the Bulb?, If not in EnergyPulse). The evidence is found in regulation, where incumbent utilities and generators have perverse incentives against banning the bulb. This may be the same as saying that the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) has perverse incentives under regulation against banning the bulb, since utilities and generators have the political power in the EEI.
For example, banning the bulb of 60 watts to be replaced with 15 watts CFL’s reduces lighting demand to an incredible 25%. Corresponding retail sales are reduced and profits too. The real problem under regulation, however, is with the precedence it creates to politicians that will have the door wide open to ban other investments in energy efficiency devices once the bulb is banned.
See now how the precedence also affects today’s generators. Utilities enter long term contracts with generators, negotiated under the obsolete business model of winning rate cases to regulators. Those contracts once negotiated extend utilities monopoly power to generation investments for the long term. So generators incentives are also perverse under regulation to avoid competition.
The obsolete business model of winning rate cases to the regulator will finally end, giving way to new innovative business models, based on new technologies to shift the industry and make customers better off, while letting investors earned enough profits under a stable environment. “These new technologies provide the potential for modernizing the whole productive structure and for raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” as Carlota Perez discovered from the historic impact of 4 previous technological revolutions.
In his Speaker Notes at the World Economic Forum, in May 2007, Michael Power writes a clear message to characterize the old business and the new business we are entering in the fifth technological revolution: "Electricity consumers becoming part-time producers – “pro-sumers” – and utilities shifting from “energy-making business” to “energy-moving business”… analogous to banks or telecom firms."
Since utilities and generators are clearly in the old "energy-making business," the perverse incentives come from regulation. Since one of its essential elements is active demand, EWPC is about the "energy moving business," where competition, in wholesale and retail, among (without incumbent) retailers and generators, depends of satisfying end customers needs for low cost and/or added value of service plans, with economic transactions about “moving energy.”
The idea that regulation is the only paradigm that ensures generation investments is flawed. As can be seen in EWPC is NOT the UK Model, “Ultraquality transportation is the key requirement to develop A Futures Market under EWPC (hit link please), which the UK model lacks. That is why the UK model, as you (Adrian Lloyd) say “has failed to deliver adequate investment in new generation…” It has also failed to deliver “demand side participation,” because it only considered the 4 possible End-States at the outset.”
What that means in practical terms is that EWPC also ensures generation investments. However, as EWPC will also allow the replacement of financial capital with production capital as the industry becomes one again a predictable environment, which is now no longer possible with regulation, it is now advisable to ban deregulation. A simple explanation can be found in the practical message We Need Demand Elasticity that also reaffirms EWPC as the market winning paradigm, with high system reliability and without price spikes.
Hence, to help “raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” EEI leadership should tell their membership Jack's Welch’s “… story about a retreat he had with the managers of the nuclear engineering group. This was after the 1979 meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear-power station, yet their business plans still assumed that they would continue to sell more nuclear-plants in the United States. He said to them, ‘I can’t imagine we’re ever going to sell another nuclear-power plant, so go back and make this plan work without new reactors.’ They went back and developed a plan based on selling services to existing reactors.” See “Crafting a Message that Sticks,” in the Nov. 2007, McKinsey Quarterly.
The suggestion to EEI leadership is that EWPC strategy may transform the industry to satisfy even the worst case "environmental" scenario of zero net additions of generation, through heavy investments in energy efficiency to complement coal stations retirements. I also suggest to EEI leadership the need to reflect on what happen with the auto industry and better yet into that of the Divine Dispensation of Electric Markets is Gone, which in brief says: “As a result of David killing Goliath, US Congress has the great opportunity to introduce EWPC to the USA. In addition, the state of Ohio has the first opportunity to reap the benefits of retail competition, by developing 2GRs and integrating active demand to power system planning, operation and control. The Dominican Republic has one of the best positions to implement EWPC, but needs to place the Very Short Electricity Law in the waste basket.”
Should we ban regulation? YES! Go for a paradigm shift to “moving energy” with the EWPC winning market architecture and design breakthrough. The next opportunity then is in Ohio. Now we can agree with EEI to let the market decide for the bulb, but just after they agree to ban regulation.
To EEI: “Let’s Ban Regulation,” Starting in Ohio
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
This is intended as the practice article that complements “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio. For all practical purposes deregulation is already banned. Now we will show that regulation (with or without independent generators) should also be banned, to let the market decide.
Should we ban the bulb? No conclusive evidence can be found, in the above posts, between banning the bulb and letting the market decide (see Should We Ban the Bulb?, If not in EnergyPulse). The evidence is found in regulation, where incumbent utilities and generators have perverse incentives against banning the bulb. This may be the same as saying that the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) has perverse incentives under regulation against banning the bulb, since utilities and generators have the political power in the EEI.
For example, banning the bulb of 60 watts to be replaced with 15 watts CFL’s reduces lighting demand to an incredible 25%. Corresponding retail sales are reduced and profits too. The real problem under regulation, however, is with the precedence it creates to politicians that will have the door wide open to ban other investments in energy efficiency devices once the bulb is banned.
See now how the precedence also affects today’s generators. Utilities enter long term contracts with generators, negotiated under the obsolete business model of winning rate cases to regulators. Those contracts once negotiated extend utilities monopoly power to generation investments for the long term. So generators incentives are also perverse under regulation to avoid competition.
The obsolete business model of winning rate cases to the regulator will finally end, giving way to new innovative business models, based on new technologies to shift the industry and make customers better off, while letting investors earned enough profits under a stable environment. “These new technologies provide the potential for modernizing the whole productive structure and for raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” as Carlota Perez discovered from the historic impact of 4 previous technological revolutions.
In his Speaker Notes at the World Economic Forum, in May 2007, Michael Power writes a clear message to characterize the old business and the new business we are entering in the fifth technological revolution: "Electricity consumers becoming part-time producers – “pro-sumers” – and utilities shifting from “energy-making business” to “energy-moving business”… analogous to banks or telecom firms."
Since utilities and generators are clearly in the old "energy-making business," the perverse incentives come from regulation. Since one of its essential elements is active demand, EWPC is about the "energy moving business," where competition, in wholesale and retail, among (without incumbent) retailers and generators, depends of satisfying end customers needs for low cost and/or added value of service plans, with economic transactions about “moving energy.”
The idea that regulation is the only paradigm that ensures generation investments is flawed. As can be seen in EWPC is NOT the UK Model, “Ultraquality transportation is the key requirement to develop A Futures Market under EWPC (hit link please), which the UK model lacks. That is why the UK model, as you (Adrian Lloyd) say “has failed to deliver adequate investment in new generation…” It has also failed to deliver “demand side participation,” because it only considered the 4 possible End-States at the outset.”
What that means in practical terms is that EWPC also ensures generation investments. However, as EWPC will also allow the replacement of financial capital with production capital as the industry becomes one again a predictable environment, which is now no longer possible with regulation, it is now advisable to ban deregulation. A simple explanation can be found in the practical message We Need Demand Elasticity that also reaffirms EWPC as the market winning paradigm, with high system reliability and without price spikes.
Hence, to help “raising the general level of productivity and quality to a higher plateau,” EEI leadership should tell their membership Jack's Welch’s “… story about a retreat he had with the managers of the nuclear engineering group. This was after the 1979 meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear-power station, yet their business plans still assumed that they would continue to sell more nuclear-plants in the United States. He said to them, ‘I can’t imagine we’re ever going to sell another nuclear-power plant, so go back and make this plan work without new reactors.’ They went back and developed a plan based on selling services to existing reactors.” See “Crafting a Message that Sticks,” in the Nov. 2007, McKinsey Quarterly.
The suggestion to EEI leadership is that EWPC strategy may transform the industry to satisfy even the worst case "environmental" scenario of zero net additions of generation, through heavy investments in energy efficiency to complement coal stations retirements. I also suggest to EEI leadership the need to reflect on what happen with the auto industry and better yet into that of the Divine Dispensation of Electric Markets is Gone, which in brief says: “As a result of David killing Goliath, US Congress has the great opportunity to introduce EWPC to the USA. In addition, the state of Ohio has the first opportunity to reap the benefits of retail competition, by developing 2GRs and integrating active demand to power system planning, operation and control. The Dominican Republic has one of the best positions to implement EWPC, but needs to place the Very Short Electricity Law in the waste basket.”
Should we ban regulation? YES! Go for a paradigm shift to “moving energy” with the EWPC winning market architecture and design breakthrough. The next opportunity then is in Ohio. Now we can agree with EEI to let the market decide for the bulb, but just after they agree to ban regulation.
Una Crítica Eléctrica al Discurso Presidencial
Una Crítica Eléctrica al Discurso Presidencial
Por José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, Ph.D.
Consultor Sistémico: Electricidad
16 de noviembre, 2007.
Esta crítica es una crítica constructiva del discurso del Presidente Fernández en lo que respecta al sector eléctrico. Ante los incesantes aumentos del precio del petróleo, aparece de nuevo la eficiencia energética como uno de los elementos vitales. Con la medida aparecen incentivos a la importación libre de impuestos de equipos eficientes. Una dificultad aparente al éxito de la medida es el acceso al financiamiento.
La dificultad es la siguiente: por un lado, las empresas que tienen acceso a financiamiento y disponen de un caso de negocios para invertir en eficiencia energética pueden haberlo hecho ya; por el otro, las empresas restantes que no tienen acceso a financiamiento y que pueden tener un caso de negocios si tuvieren dicho acceso, no invertirán. Una sugerencia es medir esta variable por medio de una encuesta con la mayor brevedad, mucho antes de la campaña de relaciones públicas que se está gestando.
La situación anterior se da mucho más en las PYMES, pero también se da en la mayoría de los hogares. Hace por tanto falta un medio que facilite el acceso a financiamiento a la eficiencia energética.
El impacto de una vigorosa y eficaz campaña de eficiencia energética aparenta estar en contra de la industria eléctrica tal y como está estructurada, pudiendo dicha campaña hasta ser torpedeada por los grandes intereses. Una reducción del orden del 15 al 25 por ciento de la demanda en los medidores del sector eléctrico podría afectar aun más los planes de expansión actualmente previstos con el llamado Plan Integral del Sector Eléctrico. El problema estructural es que la generación está posicionada en las mentes de los que toman decisiones y en el público en general como el elemento más relevante. Este es el paradigma de los “negocios que producen energía.”
Adicionalmente, el titular del periódico El día, del 15 de noviembre, es “EdeEste gestiona venta de acciones al Gobierno: El socio privado busca por esa vía dejar sin efecto las demandas que ha hecho.” Si las distribuidoras fuesen privadas estarían quebradas y su valor sería solamente aquel de rescate. Pero como son mixtas, la situación es totalmente distinta.
Ambos problemas, el de la falta de financiamiento para la eficiencia energética, y el del impacto en el sector eléctrico de un plan exitoso de eficiencia energética, son parte del problema estructural del sector eléctrico.
Haciendo un cambio estructural hacia la Electricidad Sin Control de Precios (EWPC, por sus siglas en Inglés), la situación cambia totalmente. El cambio de paradigma es de una industria en que los consumidores pueden ser productores a tiempo parcial, algo en que los dominicanos le llevamos la delantera a muchos países.
Lo que nos hace falta es que los consumidores participen del sistema interconectado, haciendo que la filosofía del sector eléctrico pase de “negocios que producen energía” a “negocios que mueven energía,” análogo a la banca o las telecomunicaciones. Es así como el impacto de las nuevas tecnologías de información, telecomunicación y control transformará los sectores eléctricos mundiales.
El centro en la EWPC lo ocupa el mercado centralizado de transporte integrado, que es la entidad que permite que la energía se mueva en la cadena de valor del mercado libre (sin control de precios) de generación, comercialización, cliente, bajo una regulación prudencial. Este nuevo modelo, de dos mercados, uno controlado y otro libre, que transformará la industria mundial, es el modelo hacia el cual las circunstancias nos está empujando desde hace más de una década para que seamos los pioneros, como consta en el trabajo “La Necesidad de una Política Integral de Electricidad para la República Dominicana,” de julio de 1996 y que ha emergido en los últimos dos años como la EWPC.
Así, la mayor parte del derroche de gasolina, gasoil, y ahora gas, en instalaciones excesivamente pequeñas e ineficientes será desplazado por generadores con ciclo combinados que aprovechen el calor que también se desperdicia a nivel industrial, pero que también se derrocha en las grandes centrales.
El valor de las distribuidoras comercializadoras (D/C) actuales se eleva substancialmente con el cambio estructural a la ESCP, ya que su efecto anti-sistema (el valor de la “D/C” es menor que la suma del valor de “D” y el valor de la “C”) desaparece. El valor de la “D” es mayor porque pasará a ser parte integral del sistema de transporte, el cual puede ser sujeto de un concurso internacional para atraer a las empresas transportistas de clase mundial a fin de implementar un sistema de transporte de ultracalidad.
El valor de la “C” está en su potencial de innovación, incluyendo su capacidad de integrar la demanda a la planificación del sistema interconectado. Son estas comercializadoras al detalle las que podrán entrar en convenios a largo plazo con los clientes para financiar las inversiones en eficiencia energética.
Ese transporte de ultracalidad es la clave para desarrollar un mercado de futuros de electricidad, que a su vez asegura las inversiones en generación y el desarrollo de las comercializadoras privadas, las cuales se reforzarán mutuamente generando un círculo virtuoso. Nunca hubo un mejor momento para crear valor en la República Dominicana a través de las innovaciones latentes de la EWPC como uno de los principales candidatos de su principal marca-país.
Los conceptos de la EWPC ocupan desde hace unas semanas los 5 primeros lugares del sitio web http://www.energyblogs.com/ del Energy Central Network, en el cual se dan cita los principales expertos internacionales del sector eléctrico.
Por José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, Ph.D.
Consultor Sistémico: Electricidad
16 de noviembre, 2007.
Esta crítica es una crítica constructiva del discurso del Presidente Fernández en lo que respecta al sector eléctrico. Ante los incesantes aumentos del precio del petróleo, aparece de nuevo la eficiencia energética como uno de los elementos vitales. Con la medida aparecen incentivos a la importación libre de impuestos de equipos eficientes. Una dificultad aparente al éxito de la medida es el acceso al financiamiento.
La dificultad es la siguiente: por un lado, las empresas que tienen acceso a financiamiento y disponen de un caso de negocios para invertir en eficiencia energética pueden haberlo hecho ya; por el otro, las empresas restantes que no tienen acceso a financiamiento y que pueden tener un caso de negocios si tuvieren dicho acceso, no invertirán. Una sugerencia es medir esta variable por medio de una encuesta con la mayor brevedad, mucho antes de la campaña de relaciones públicas que se está gestando.
La situación anterior se da mucho más en las PYMES, pero también se da en la mayoría de los hogares. Hace por tanto falta un medio que facilite el acceso a financiamiento a la eficiencia energética.
El impacto de una vigorosa y eficaz campaña de eficiencia energética aparenta estar en contra de la industria eléctrica tal y como está estructurada, pudiendo dicha campaña hasta ser torpedeada por los grandes intereses. Una reducción del orden del 15 al 25 por ciento de la demanda en los medidores del sector eléctrico podría afectar aun más los planes de expansión actualmente previstos con el llamado Plan Integral del Sector Eléctrico. El problema estructural es que la generación está posicionada en las mentes de los que toman decisiones y en el público en general como el elemento más relevante. Este es el paradigma de los “negocios que producen energía.”
Adicionalmente, el titular del periódico El día, del 15 de noviembre, es “EdeEste gestiona venta de acciones al Gobierno: El socio privado busca por esa vía dejar sin efecto las demandas que ha hecho.” Si las distribuidoras fuesen privadas estarían quebradas y su valor sería solamente aquel de rescate. Pero como son mixtas, la situación es totalmente distinta.
Ambos problemas, el de la falta de financiamiento para la eficiencia energética, y el del impacto en el sector eléctrico de un plan exitoso de eficiencia energética, son parte del problema estructural del sector eléctrico.
Haciendo un cambio estructural hacia la Electricidad Sin Control de Precios (EWPC, por sus siglas en Inglés), la situación cambia totalmente. El cambio de paradigma es de una industria en que los consumidores pueden ser productores a tiempo parcial, algo en que los dominicanos le llevamos la delantera a muchos países.
Lo que nos hace falta es que los consumidores participen del sistema interconectado, haciendo que la filosofía del sector eléctrico pase de “negocios que producen energía” a “negocios que mueven energía,” análogo a la banca o las telecomunicaciones. Es así como el impacto de las nuevas tecnologías de información, telecomunicación y control transformará los sectores eléctricos mundiales.
El centro en la EWPC lo ocupa el mercado centralizado de transporte integrado, que es la entidad que permite que la energía se mueva en la cadena de valor del mercado libre (sin control de precios) de generación, comercialización, cliente, bajo una regulación prudencial. Este nuevo modelo, de dos mercados, uno controlado y otro libre, que transformará la industria mundial, es el modelo hacia el cual las circunstancias nos está empujando desde hace más de una década para que seamos los pioneros, como consta en el trabajo “La Necesidad de una Política Integral de Electricidad para la República Dominicana,” de julio de 1996 y que ha emergido en los últimos dos años como la EWPC.
Así, la mayor parte del derroche de gasolina, gasoil, y ahora gas, en instalaciones excesivamente pequeñas e ineficientes será desplazado por generadores con ciclo combinados que aprovechen el calor que también se desperdicia a nivel industrial, pero que también se derrocha en las grandes centrales.
El valor de las distribuidoras comercializadoras (D/C) actuales se eleva substancialmente con el cambio estructural a la ESCP, ya que su efecto anti-sistema (el valor de la “D/C” es menor que la suma del valor de “D” y el valor de la “C”) desaparece. El valor de la “D” es mayor porque pasará a ser parte integral del sistema de transporte, el cual puede ser sujeto de un concurso internacional para atraer a las empresas transportistas de clase mundial a fin de implementar un sistema de transporte de ultracalidad.
El valor de la “C” está en su potencial de innovación, incluyendo su capacidad de integrar la demanda a la planificación del sistema interconectado. Son estas comercializadoras al detalle las que podrán entrar en convenios a largo plazo con los clientes para financiar las inversiones en eficiencia energética.
Ese transporte de ultracalidad es la clave para desarrollar un mercado de futuros de electricidad, que a su vez asegura las inversiones en generación y el desarrollo de las comercializadoras privadas, las cuales se reforzarán mutuamente generando un círculo virtuoso. Nunca hubo un mejor momento para crear valor en la República Dominicana a través de las innovaciones latentes de la EWPC como uno de los principales candidatos de su principal marca-país.
Los conceptos de la EWPC ocupan desde hace unas semanas los 5 primeros lugares del sitio web http://www.energyblogs.com/ del Energy Central Network, en el cual se dan cita los principales expertos internacionales del sector eléctrico.
jueves, noviembre 15, 2007
EWPC is NOT the UK Model
In EWPC there are 8 possible End-State (UK was developed on 4), only one of which is the generic market model paradigm: retail competition with active demand (UK had no active demand) and ultraquality transportation (UK has separate transmission and distribution and no ultraquality identified). That is the essence."
EWPC is NOT the UK Model
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Adrian: thanks for your comments. I hope you get to see this very brief response that goes right to the essence.
If you didn't have the time to read the "Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC," you will see that EWPC it is NOT the UK model, but a new market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm that emerged in the last two years. This is the summary of my discovery as simple, but not simpler, as it can be said:
There are "8 possible End-State (UK was developed on 4), only one of which is the generic market model paradigm: retail competition with active demand (UK had no active demand) and ultraquality transportation (UK has separate transmission and distribution and no ultraquality identified). That is the essence."
Ultraquality transportation is the key requirement to develop A Futures Market under EWPC (hit link please), which the UK model lacks. That is why the UK model, as you say “has failed to deliver adequate investment in new generation…” It has also failed to deliver “demand side participation,” because it only considered the 4 possible End-States at the outset.
Please don’t confuse EWPC with the UK model. EWPC is an extension of Fred Schweppe et al Spot Pricing of Electricity. Under EWPC, system reliability is first and foremost. Instead of first generation (and incumbent) retailers, as the UK has, EWPC has Second Generation Retailer - 2GR (no incumbents) that participate in long run power system planning to integrate demand.
The important example of the Dominican Republic is not that of the vegetables, which we certainly have. I have tried hard, as Len can attest, to have Dominican like electric retailers. The example is that of customer differentiation, giving the opportunity to integrate demand and to practice true spot pricing of electricity. The opportunity is to integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control. It is about the opportunities available on demand side risk management.
In Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2, I wrote of the discovery that “To optimize the transportation system, it is required to consider total social (demand, transport, supply) welfare needs, and not just the optimization of transmission, distribution, or both, by themselves.” I used to say that electricity was not a commodity (I did in 1995 at an IEEE meeting). But once you have ultraquality transportation in the least cost controlled grid, electricity becomes the best commodity in an open market.
EWPC is NOT the UK Model
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Adrian: thanks for your comments. I hope you get to see this very brief response that goes right to the essence.
If you didn't have the time to read the "Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC," you will see that EWPC it is NOT the UK model, but a new market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm that emerged in the last two years. This is the summary of my discovery as simple, but not simpler, as it can be said:
There are "8 possible End-State (UK was developed on 4), only one of which is the generic market model paradigm: retail competition with active demand (UK had no active demand) and ultraquality transportation (UK has separate transmission and distribution and no ultraquality identified). That is the essence."
Ultraquality transportation is the key requirement to develop A Futures Market under EWPC (hit link please), which the UK model lacks. That is why the UK model, as you say “has failed to deliver adequate investment in new generation…” It has also failed to deliver “demand side participation,” because it only considered the 4 possible End-States at the outset.
Please don’t confuse EWPC with the UK model. EWPC is an extension of Fred Schweppe et al Spot Pricing of Electricity. Under EWPC, system reliability is first and foremost. Instead of first generation (and incumbent) retailers, as the UK has, EWPC has Second Generation Retailer - 2GR (no incumbents) that participate in long run power system planning to integrate demand.
The important example of the Dominican Republic is not that of the vegetables, which we certainly have. I have tried hard, as Len can attest, to have Dominican like electric retailers. The example is that of customer differentiation, giving the opportunity to integrate demand and to practice true spot pricing of electricity. The opportunity is to integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control. It is about the opportunities available on demand side risk management.
In Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2, I wrote of the discovery that “To optimize the transportation system, it is required to consider total social (demand, transport, supply) welfare needs, and not just the optimization of transmission, distribution, or both, by themselves.” I used to say that electricity was not a commodity (I did in 1995 at an IEEE meeting). But once you have ultraquality transportation in the least cost controlled grid, electricity becomes the best commodity in an open market.
A New Response to Adrian Lloyd
Adrian Lloyd’s is happy to listen. His opinions, which he may change, as he is a well versed and important person, are responded below.
This is how EWPC completes the answers Adrian Lloyd comments:
1) Be against isolated distributed generation. Mixed feelings!
2) Suggest that the grid is for one way traffic from central station to customers. Bad!
3) Saying that the power system should be operated in the Normal Operating State. Good!
4) Power quality needs to be solved. Good!
5) There is problem with variable generation. Good!
6) Wants to know: Who pays? Consider all the costs. No more subsidies. Good!
Reference and context: Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, by Brian Braginton-Smith, Executive Director, Sustainable Resources Group.
This is how EWPC completes the answers Adrian Lloyd comments:
1) Be against isolated distributed generation. Mixed feelings!
For the 3rd time, “… Existing national power grids won't disappear.
”In addition, many customers can remain integrated to the grid without
being interconnected. That is how most customers operate their distributed
resources in the Dominican Republic, with which they will be able to provide
Demand Response services to the grid.
2) Suggest that the grid is for one way traffic from central station to customers. Bad!
Supply side only risk management needs generating reserves (sometimes in the order of 35% of capacity) with some of them to operate a few hours in the year to service customers reliably. One way traffic used to be the way with inactive demand as an externality. Active demand should be integrated to power system planning, operation and control to increase power industry efficiency.
Also read under the article EWPC As The New Internet my response to Malcolm "Problem is that millions of distributed generators will results in no income for the people that supply and operate the grid. No money no maintenance, no maintenance no grid and the scheme falls apart."
3) Saying that the power system should be operated in the Normal Operating State. Good!
That is satisfied with the essential requirement of transportation ultraquality under EWPC. Read the article Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC please.
4) Power quality needs to be solved. Good!
Same response as in item 3.
5) There is problem with variable generation. Good!
Read the article Integrating Uncertain Generation to the Grid posted above please.
6) Wants to know: Who pays? Consider all the costs. No more subsidies. Good!
Leave that to the open market value chain and not to the Government or the utilities. I like to stress from the above article Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation, that the question “Who pays?” is always answered by those that control the political process, as debates get locked, and to get them unlocked the hierarchical force of the authorities is employed. Please read also Slicing the Last of the Regulated Monopolies to complete the response.
Reference and context: Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, by Brian Braginton-Smith, Executive Director, Sustainable Resources Group.
Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation
Another partial response to respond to Adrian Lloyd in this upgrade to Nov. 15, 2007, most viewed article. EWPC is the answer to the difficult question on how to finance and develop uncertain generation projects for all stakeholders to win. The underlying problem is found on the successive extensions of the inefficient price controls of the vertically integrated utilities paradigm that leads to simple and stupid behavior.
Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
In the article Optimize Transmission Assets for New Wind Farms but Who Pays?, Mr. HIMADRI BANERJI brings a difficult question on how to finance and develop wind [changed to Uncertain Generation without any loss of generality] projects. The problem, however, comes from the lesson that Dee Hock, CEO Emeritus VISA International, gave us: “Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex and intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple and stupid behavior.”
The problem Mr. Banerji is bringing has its origin in the vertically integrated utilities (VIUs) paradigm, whose incremental extensions give rise to very complex rules and regulations that result in simple and stupid behavior. It is well known that price controls are inefficient and lack transparency. Lack of transparency is one side of a coin, the other side being corruption. So the question “Who pays?” is always answered by those that control the political process, as debates get locked, and to get them unlocked the hierarchical force of the authorities is employed. Please read Slicing the Last of the Regulated Monopolies.
Electricity Without Price Controls is a market architecture and design paradigm shift away from the VIUs paradigm based on “simple, clear purpose and principles,” as can be seen in the article Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC. Under EWPC, both questions – who should pay and how to develop an optimal transportation (T&D) grid, as many RR projects are to be connected to distribution lines, are answered without getting into debates.
Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation . . . continued . . .
Optimal transportation should be the result of expansion planning where all potential RR projects (see also Integrating Uncertain Generation to the Grid ) are taken into consideration at the same time for a give planning horizon. Such expansion planning is to be done in the environment suggested in the article Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2.
With a transportation utility that is financed by tolls the problem of “Who Pays?” is solved. A simple explanation of how to optimize the transportation system is given in the context of the article Demand Integration Under EWPC, as follows:
Generators and Second Generator Retailers interchange with the System Engineer their proposed investments and other key information to allow the System Engineer develop the transportation utility expansion plans for the long run, in order to optimize the future grid by minimizing total system costs (not just the transportation costs) in order for 2GRs to enable a potential maximum social welfare in the national economic context, and not just the financial viewpoint of the utility as the VIUs paradigm calls for.
For more details please read other articles in the Energy Central Network EWPC Blog.
Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
In the article Optimize Transmission Assets for New Wind Farms but Who Pays?, Mr. HIMADRI BANERJI brings a difficult question on how to finance and develop wind [changed to Uncertain Generation without any loss of generality] projects. The problem, however, comes from the lesson that Dee Hock, CEO Emeritus VISA International, gave us: “Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex and intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple and stupid behavior.”
The problem Mr. Banerji is bringing has its origin in the vertically integrated utilities (VIUs) paradigm, whose incremental extensions give rise to very complex rules and regulations that result in simple and stupid behavior. It is well known that price controls are inefficient and lack transparency. Lack of transparency is one side of a coin, the other side being corruption. So the question “Who pays?” is always answered by those that control the political process, as debates get locked, and to get them unlocked the hierarchical force of the authorities is employed. Please read Slicing the Last of the Regulated Monopolies.
Electricity Without Price Controls is a market architecture and design paradigm shift away from the VIUs paradigm based on “simple, clear purpose and principles,” as can be seen in the article Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC. Under EWPC, both questions – who should pay and how to develop an optimal transportation (T&D) grid, as many RR projects are to be connected to distribution lines, are answered without getting into debates.
Financing and Developing Uncertain Generation . . . continued . . .
Optimal transportation should be the result of expansion planning where all potential RR projects (see also Integrating Uncertain Generation to the Grid ) are taken into consideration at the same time for a give planning horizon. Such expansion planning is to be done in the environment suggested in the article Free Market and Central Planning, Under R1E2.
With a transportation utility that is financed by tolls the problem of “Who Pays?” is solved. A simple explanation of how to optimize the transportation system is given in the context of the article Demand Integration Under EWPC, as follows:
Generators and Second Generator Retailers interchange with the System Engineer their proposed investments and other key information to allow the System Engineer develop the transportation utility expansion plans for the long run, in order to optimize the future grid by minimizing total system costs (not just the transportation costs) in order for 2GRs to enable a potential maximum social welfare in the national economic context, and not just the financial viewpoint of the utility as the VIUs paradigm calls for.
For more details please read other articles in the Energy Central Network EWPC Blog.
Integrating Uncertain Generation to the Grid
As a partial response to Adrain Lloyd, the article Wind Integration: An Emerging Paradigm, can be paraphrased almost entirely by interchanging “wind” with “UG (uncertain generation),” from the second paragraph on, as follows:
After reading the article by Sandy Smith, Communications Coordinator, Utility Wind Integration Group, some of its references, the articles by Roger Arnold, and all of the really valuable comments on all 4 articles, I like to select what J. Charles Smith wrote in the article Winds of Change as a summary message: “For many of us, this has created the necessity of a fundamental realignment in our thinking. We must understand all the implications of this and go about the business of helping to create the future.”
The following are my generative dialogue suggestions (I am not my opinion) for a fundamental realignment in our thinking:
1) A carbon tax should be negotiated on a global setting, i.e. the World Trade Organization. Each country that does not apply the negotiated tax, will then free ride the global system.
2) Most of the discussions are indirectly supporting generation as a monopoly. Generation competition is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to go forward.
3) UG variability is an important consideration, but its uncertainty is even more important. Power system systemic risk management of system failure (system security) responds to uncertainty. Supply side management of systemic risk of system failure should be complemented by demand side management of systemic risk of system failure. See An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response and a Dominican strategy.
4) UG best performance will come from balancing areas, in which generators are widely dispersed and mostly located in the distribution system. Open transmission access is insufficient to integrate UG generation in the state of the art.
5) There is thus a need for full transportation access. Transmission and distribution reintegration requires dismantling native loads, which changes the concept of a utility to wires only utility. See NERC Compliance and Power Sector Structure.
6) Fully functional and competitive wholesale and retail markets can then allow the development of the resources of the demand side. See We Need 2GRs as the Forecast is Always Wrong.
All of the above implies an emerging EWPC is Pragmatics' Winning Market Architecture and Design. [Since that time EWPC emerged as the winning market in the first phase of competition.]
To go forward to EWPC as the End-State of the electricity industry for quite some time, I made a presentation at Carnegie Mellon University that can be found on the Grupo Millennium Hispaniola Blog, as A Generative Dialogue to Reach the End-State of the Power Industry.
After reading the article by Sandy Smith, Communications Coordinator, Utility Wind Integration Group, some of its references, the articles by Roger Arnold, and all of the really valuable comments on all 4 articles, I like to select what J. Charles Smith wrote in the article Winds of Change as a summary message: “For many of us, this has created the necessity of a fundamental realignment in our thinking. We must understand all the implications of this and go about the business of helping to create the future.”
The following are my generative dialogue suggestions (I am not my opinion) for a fundamental realignment in our thinking:
1) A carbon tax should be negotiated on a global setting, i.e. the World Trade Organization. Each country that does not apply the negotiated tax, will then free ride the global system.
2) Most of the discussions are indirectly supporting generation as a monopoly. Generation competition is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to go forward.
3) UG variability is an important consideration, but its uncertainty is even more important. Power system systemic risk management of system failure (system security) responds to uncertainty. Supply side management of systemic risk of system failure should be complemented by demand side management of systemic risk of system failure. See An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response and a Dominican strategy.
4) UG best performance will come from balancing areas, in which generators are widely dispersed and mostly located in the distribution system. Open transmission access is insufficient to integrate UG generation in the state of the art.
5) There is thus a need for full transportation access. Transmission and distribution reintegration requires dismantling native loads, which changes the concept of a utility to wires only utility. See NERC Compliance and Power Sector Structure.
6) Fully functional and competitive wholesale and retail markets can then allow the development of the resources of the demand side. See We Need 2GRs as the Forecast is Always Wrong.
All of the above implies an emerging EWPC is Pragmatics' Winning Market Architecture and Design. [Since that time EWPC emerged as the winning market in the first phase of competition.]
To go forward to EWPC as the End-State of the electricity industry for quite some time, I made a presentation at Carnegie Mellon University that can be found on the Grupo Millennium Hispaniola Blog, as A Generative Dialogue to Reach the End-State of the Power Industry.
miércoles, noviembre 14, 2007
Storage is Ready to Cross the Chasm
As experienced in the Dominican Republic, the disruptive technology of distributed storage has been ready for prime time for quite some time, lacking a shift to the EWPC paradigm. The reason it has not crossed the Chasm is because of the “native load” barrier that unnecessarily extends the life of the obsolete vertically integrated utilities paradigm.
Storage is Ready to Cross the Chasm
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
A very important invention is announced in the article New Energy Storage Options Needed! The invention, however, is not required to recognize distributed storage as an innovation that is ready to cross the Chasm of Geoffrey Moore. Al that is needed is to break the "native load" barrier by making a paradigm shift from the vertically integrated utilities to the EWPC. Once the shift is done, that invention will increase its odds substantially, as they will no longer be "overlooked - and especially by the government," as David Austin suggests with his supply side mindset. We will now see that distributed storage has been ready for quite some time.
Jack Ellis has tried to provide one example against the feasibility of distributed storage (another case of distributed resources) using an EITHER/OR argument. My response to Malcolm Rawlingson applies also in this case as will see below. The response was The BOTH/AND Assumption of EWPC (hit link please if not under the EnergyPulse here and below for more details), which in brief says: “By using both the smart grid and distributed resources, EWPC will produce reliable electricity at affordable costs, just like Toyota does with cars.”
In that same response, I also mentioned that “The BOTH/AND assumption is based on the quote which I posted above as The "Continuity" Scenario is Gone … about “The future of electric power,” that in particular says: “Existing national power grids won't disappear. They will operate like the Internet [please read EWPC As The New Internet], as part of a complex web through which people will supply electricity, by uploading, as well as downloading it."
In the [seminal] EWPC article An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response, I wrote:
The business case of Demand Response (DR) [a key disruptive technology] is enhanced under free markets, innovation, and probabilistic (risk) mindsets. DR is poised to be the demand side risk management tool to complement the traditional "LOLP" supply side risk management tool. There are two sides on the DR coin. On one side, system crashes are mitigated by a least cost mix of supply and demand risk management tools that may be applied in time and space. On the other, DR is the key to the segmentation of customers supply security (a kind of insurance). Because of its fine grain nature, DR can help mitigate delays (intended or not) of lumpy investments in generation, transmission, and distribution.
At this point, I want to highlight “probabilistic (risk) mindsets,” to explain the importance of distributed storage investment by customers that can be exploited as demand side risk management tools, in time and space.
This is part of what Mr. Ellis wrote: “Storage is an issue with distributed generation, but so is cost, and no reasonable level of incentives can erase the gap between 8 cent grid power and 25 cent distributed power.”
Mr. Ellis’ opinion seems to be correct with a long run analysis of EITHER/OR isolated service and a under deterministic supply side mindset. Under probabilistic customer oriented perspective and demand integration it is wrong as follows:
This is what we have experienced in the Dominican Republic with an unreliable utility electric service. Customers invest in accordance with their perceptions in battery inverters. The proof is in the pudding, as one company has sold so many of these inverters, that it designed a model specifically for the country. Those customers use the grid when it is available and use the inverters, which connect automatically, when the grid isn’t available. For every customer there is a perceived optimal combination (a sign of differentiation) of grid vs. storage investment that results in expected minimum costs. This was one of my intuitive insights in 1996 for what is now EWPC, which intelligent and important people in first world countries couldn’t probably imagine (until now).
Using Jack Ellis’ numbers, if the probability of service of the utility in a neighborhood is 90% (it varies widely from circuit to circuit in my country), and the unreliable service is priced at 8 cents (it is much higher in small countries) and 25 distributed, then the (expected) cost to the customer in the long run is equal to:
8 x 0.9 + 25 x 0.1 = 9.7 cents.
The gap is reduced from 17 to 1.7 cents. That is how the gap is almost erased (no need to be erased, as it only depends on customers perception of value), being one of the insights that underlies a Dominican strategy, which was published in the May-June 2006 issue of the IEEE Power&Energy Magazine.
In my [seminal] article mentioned above I wrote: “Professor Schweppe "envisioned a world of customer-based electrical generation and storage," which has been happening in the Dominican Republic, for quite some time, missing only the Demand Response System and a truly competitive retail deregulation to fulfilled the dream of a country without blackouts.”
There are then strong reasons for Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds to break the “native load” barrier that keeps the obsolete vertically integrated utilities paradigm in place. Those same reasons suggest to “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio in order to Let EWPC Come to Fruition.
In sum, as experienced in the Dominican Republic, the disruptive technology of distributed storage has been ready for prime time for quite some time, lacking a shift to the EWPC paradigm. The reason it has not crossed the Geoffrey Moore’s Chasm is because of the “native load” barrier that unnecessarily extends the obsolete vertically integrated utilities paradigm.
Reference and context: Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, by Brian Braginton-Smith, Executive Director, Sustainable Resources Group.
Storage is Ready to Cross the Chasm
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
A very important invention is announced in the article New Energy Storage Options Needed! The invention, however, is not required to recognize distributed storage as an innovation that is ready to cross the Chasm of Geoffrey Moore. Al that is needed is to break the "native load" barrier by making a paradigm shift from the vertically integrated utilities to the EWPC. Once the shift is done, that invention will increase its odds substantially, as they will no longer be "overlooked - and especially by the government," as David Austin suggests with his supply side mindset. We will now see that distributed storage has been ready for quite some time.
Jack Ellis has tried to provide one example against the feasibility of distributed storage (another case of distributed resources) using an EITHER/OR argument. My response to Malcolm Rawlingson applies also in this case as will see below. The response was The BOTH/AND Assumption of EWPC (hit link please if not under the EnergyPulse here and below for more details), which in brief says: “By using both the smart grid and distributed resources, EWPC will produce reliable electricity at affordable costs, just like Toyota does with cars.”
In that same response, I also mentioned that “The BOTH/AND assumption is based on the quote which I posted above as The "Continuity" Scenario is Gone … about “The future of electric power,” that in particular says: “Existing national power grids won't disappear. They will operate like the Internet [please read EWPC As The New Internet], as part of a complex web through which people will supply electricity, by uploading, as well as downloading it."
In the [seminal] EWPC article An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response, I wrote:
The business case of Demand Response (DR) [a key disruptive technology] is enhanced under free markets, innovation, and probabilistic (risk) mindsets. DR is poised to be the demand side risk management tool to complement the traditional "LOLP" supply side risk management tool. There are two sides on the DR coin. On one side, system crashes are mitigated by a least cost mix of supply and demand risk management tools that may be applied in time and space. On the other, DR is the key to the segmentation of customers supply security (a kind of insurance). Because of its fine grain nature, DR can help mitigate delays (intended or not) of lumpy investments in generation, transmission, and distribution.
At this point, I want to highlight “probabilistic (risk) mindsets,” to explain the importance of distributed storage investment by customers that can be exploited as demand side risk management tools, in time and space.
This is part of what Mr. Ellis wrote: “Storage is an issue with distributed generation, but so is cost, and no reasonable level of incentives can erase the gap between 8 cent grid power and 25 cent distributed power.”
Mr. Ellis’ opinion seems to be correct with a long run analysis of EITHER/OR isolated service and a under deterministic supply side mindset. Under probabilistic customer oriented perspective and demand integration it is wrong as follows:
This is what we have experienced in the Dominican Republic with an unreliable utility electric service. Customers invest in accordance with their perceptions in battery inverters. The proof is in the pudding, as one company has sold so many of these inverters, that it designed a model specifically for the country. Those customers use the grid when it is available and use the inverters, which connect automatically, when the grid isn’t available. For every customer there is a perceived optimal combination (a sign of differentiation) of grid vs. storage investment that results in expected minimum costs. This was one of my intuitive insights in 1996 for what is now EWPC, which intelligent and important people in first world countries couldn’t probably imagine (until now).
Using Jack Ellis’ numbers, if the probability of service of the utility in a neighborhood is 90% (it varies widely from circuit to circuit in my country), and the unreliable service is priced at 8 cents (it is much higher in small countries) and 25 distributed, then the (expected) cost to the customer in the long run is equal to:
8 x 0.9 + 25 x 0.1 = 9.7 cents.
The gap is reduced from 17 to 1.7 cents. That is how the gap is almost erased (no need to be erased, as it only depends on customers perception of value), being one of the insights that underlies a Dominican strategy, which was published in the May-June 2006 issue of the IEEE Power&Energy Magazine.
In my [seminal] article mentioned above I wrote: “Professor Schweppe "envisioned a world of customer-based electrical generation and storage," which has been happening in the Dominican Republic, for quite some time, missing only the Demand Response System and a truly competitive retail deregulation to fulfilled the dream of a country without blackouts.”
There are then strong reasons for Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds to break the “native load” barrier that keeps the obsolete vertically integrated utilities paradigm in place. Those same reasons suggest to “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio in order to Let EWPC Come to Fruition.
In sum, as experienced in the Dominican Republic, the disruptive technology of distributed storage has been ready for prime time for quite some time, lacking a shift to the EWPC paradigm. The reason it has not crossed the Geoffrey Moore’s Chasm is because of the “native load” barrier that unnecessarily extends the obsolete vertically integrated utilities paradigm.
Reference and context: Distributed Architectural Renewable Energy Generation, by Brian Braginton-Smith, Executive Director, Sustainable Resources Group.
martes, noviembre 13, 2007
K2007 Retailers’ Enterprise Solutions
An affordable model for retailers’ enterprise solutions business model innovations, based on Free Open Source Solutions, is reported by Bill Opalka at Knowledge 2007. The model suggests how the electric industry can become an intelligent enterprise. SAP American, IBM and Oracle Utilities shared their incumbent visions, with IBM's seeming to be closer to the EWPC.
K2007 Retailers’ Enterprise Solutions
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Bill Opalka added two posts in www.energyblogs.com. The first is Knowledge 2007 Underway (please hit the link on the left and below to read the details).
While the airlines deregulated kind of successfully, the electric industry’s barriers to innovation need to be taken down first. It is only after the introduction of the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm that the conclusions of Mr. Branson would make sense.
And the key driver in Virgin's technology is reliance on Free Open Source Solutions. FOSS provides much of the company's software and e-commerce solutions. It's very low-risk to the business, cuts costs and helps reduce head count, all major concerns of the CIO, Maguire says. Virgin, with relationships with outside partners in customer service and other functions, has an IT staff of 17, where a similar enterprise might be expected to have 100 people. Another real-world cost benefit -- its e-commerce site cost $700,000, when a similar operation might be expected to run $3.5 million to $5 million.
FOSS is the “start up” key element for the airline business model innovation that is trying to compete with enterprise solutions of the Three Giants on the Stage (Bill’s second post).
K2007 Retailers Enterprise Solutions . . . continued
In addition, IBM seems to be closer to a non-utility or customer oriented statement as follows:
I claim that the shift from “passive persistence” to “participatory network” is nothing more than the paradigm shift from the slow pace vertically integrated utility to the competitive innovators that will develop The Sixth Disruptive Technology of EWPC. EWPC aims to both operational concerns and customer decisions.
Please read the two related articles on business model innovations enterprise solutions needs.
Let the Innovations Locate the Smarts (a comment to Oracle’s strategy).
Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds (a comment to a retired CIO's article).
K2007 Retailers’ Enterprise Solutions
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Bill Opalka added two posts in www.energyblogs.com. The first is Knowledge 2007 Underway (please hit the link on the left and below to read the details).
In brief: At first glance, an upstart airline and a century-old electric utility might not seem to have much in common. Not so says the Chief Information Officer of Virgin America Airlines, who kicked off Knowledge 2007 this morning. Bill Maguire explained how IT for an airline barely 10 weeks in the sky, created by larger-than-life British entrepreneur and adventurer Richard Branson, and a utility striving to become an Intelligent Enterprise aren't all that different.
While the airlines deregulated kind of successfully, the electric industry’s barriers to innovation need to be taken down first. It is only after the introduction of the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm that the conclusions of Mr. Branson would make sense.
And the key driver in Virgin's technology is reliance on Free Open Source Solutions. FOSS provides much of the company's software and e-commerce solutions. It's very low-risk to the business, cuts costs and helps reduce head count, all major concerns of the CIO, Maguire says. Virgin, with relationships with outside partners in customer service and other functions, has an IT staff of 17, where a similar enterprise might be expected to have 100 people. Another real-world cost benefit -- its e-commerce site cost $700,000, when a similar operation might be expected to run $3.5 million to $5 million.
FOSS is the “start up” key element for the airline business model innovation that is trying to compete with enterprise solutions of the Three Giants on the Stage (Bill’s second post).
In brief: It's not often that SAP American, IBM and Oracle Utilities share the same podium, but they were all present at K2007 to give their respective visions on Enterprise Solutions -- Perspectives from the Market Leaders during the first afternoon of the conference.
K2007 Retailers Enterprise Solutions . . . continued
In addition, IBM seems to be closer to a non-utility or customer oriented statement as follows:
Gerry Metzler, a partner in IBM Global Business Services, expects the electric utility market moving over the next 10 years from the "passive persistence" model currently in vogue, to a "participatory network" in which the customer is involved in the decision-making, becoming the trailblazer in determining energy consumption. One question that remains to be answered is if the changes will derive from operational concerns or customer decisions. But there will be massive capital expenditures, whcih the industry's perceived slow pace in decision-making, as opposed to say, telecom, may provide some benefit.
I claim that the shift from “passive persistence” to “participatory network” is nothing more than the paradigm shift from the slow pace vertically integrated utility to the competitive innovators that will develop The Sixth Disruptive Technology of EWPC. EWPC aims to both operational concerns and customer decisions.
Please read the two related articles on business model innovations enterprise solutions needs.
Let the Innovations Locate the Smarts (a comment to Oracle’s strategy).
In brief: An effective smart metering system should develop under competition of business models for several market segments of the power industry. Innovations should be the jury.
Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds (a comment to a retired CIO's article).
In brief: Instead of trying to integrate the grid and the retail sides of the utilities, CIOs should take the results of an essential system analysis that supports the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm shift of the power industry.
Let the Innovations Locate the Smarts
An effective smart metering system should develop under competition of business models for several market segments of the power industry. Innovations should be the jury.
Let the Innovations Locate the Smarts
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Guerry Waters, Vice President - Industry Strategy, Oracle SPL, and all comments so far, except perhaps that of Amatsia Kashti, have taken for granted the existence of the utility now and forever. Mr Waters even go as far as saying “Utilities, as the “jury,” must determine the answer.”
I understand that all stakeholders and the general public will be better served if the answer is determined by competition in the market, and not by the utilities under debates.
In the article Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds, I wrote “Instead of trying to integrate the grid and the retail sides of the utilities, CIOs should take the results of an essential system analysis that supports the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm shift of the power industry.”
Such market competition can be developed, in several market segments, among retail side of utilities by expanding their actions from state level to federal level in the U.S. and from country level to EU level in Europe.
Jim Beyer asks an important question: “Why could someone develop an open standard for meters?” One answer is found in the article The Sixth Disruptive Technology, is as follows:
Let the Innovations Locate the Smarts
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Guerry Waters, Vice President - Industry Strategy, Oracle SPL, and all comments so far, except perhaps that of Amatsia Kashti, have taken for granted the existence of the utility now and forever. Mr Waters even go as far as saying “Utilities, as the “jury,” must determine the answer.”
I understand that all stakeholders and the general public will be better served if the answer is determined by competition in the market, and not by the utilities under debates.
In the article Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds, I wrote “Instead of trying to integrate the grid and the retail sides of the utilities, CIOs should take the results of an essential system analysis that supports the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm shift of the power industry.”
Such market competition can be developed, in several market segments, among retail side of utilities by expanding their actions from state level to federal level in the U.S. and from country level to EU level in Europe.
Jim Beyer asks an important question: “Why could someone develop an open standard for meters?” One answer is found in the article The Sixth Disruptive Technology, is as follows:
The interface standards mentioned in the article [The Critical Role of Advanced etering Infrastructure in a World Demanding More Energy] should enable the separation of transportation and retail, which no longer will be regulated with price controls, as retail will be the subject of competition. As firmware downloads may differentiate 2GRs [Second Generation Retailer - 2GR] business plans, I am happy to recall the business case of a very low cost worldwide meter that I envisioned in my article a Dominican strategy, which was published in the May-June 2006 issue of the IEEE Power&Energy Magazine, just like they are doing for the US$100.00 laptop computer and the US$40.00 or so cellphone. Such low cost meter could be very promising for power service in the Bottom of the Pyramid.Reference and context: Locating the Smarts in Smart Metering
lunes, noviembre 12, 2007
Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds
Instead of trying to integrate the grid and the retail sides of the utilities, CIOs should take the results of an essential system analysis that supports the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm shift of the power industry.
Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
W. Marie Zanavich, Vice President Information Technology / CIO, Retired, has produced a very interesting piece of work to support the integration of the grid and retail sides of the utilities, based on the cumulative learning of the past 30 years in standards and process disciplines of the IT business. She concludes that “the ‘enterprise direction’ [of the CIO] should be the only one supported.”
An alternative view of the article supports the need to restructure the power industry under the EWPC market architecture and design paradigm, as can be seen in Disruptive Technologies Convergence. With EWPC most of the technology integration present challenges identified in the article disappear. By performing an essential systems analysis, to find out the real information system requirements of the power industry, I came up with the Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC.
The biggest technology (compatibility and integration) issue originates in an intuitive and mistaken restructuring that separates transmission from distribution and that keeps distribution together with the retail operation in the utilities. Restructuring is in essence an information technology event, in which there are great efficiency opportunities on the customer side of the business, arising from the great reduction in transaction costs with the introduction of innovative business models to take the power industry out of the NO PROFIT ZONE, as explained in Let EWPC Come to Fruition.
In addition, serious difficulties on the integration of the grid with retail were explained in the article The Anti-System Utility. The problem is that the distribution side of the grid has been used to keep the retail side of the enterprise as a monopoly or as a powerful incumbent retailer. Those powerful retailers obstructs competition, as is the recent case of Ohio’s plan for re-regulation, as explained in the A New Mistaken Experiment and that are to be resolved with “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio.
Unlike the grid and retail side of the utility under transmission access, the integrated transmission and distribution grid, which is kept together under EWPC, has the same transportation function and the same culture under the same roof. That is why I also wrote the EWPC article Solving Smart Grid Cost Recovery to solve the difficulty that regulators have to approve AMI investment. I said above that most of the problems disappear, thinking of the great information technology challenges of implementing the smart grid.
Retail competition at the federal or global level, under prudential regulations, with Second Generation Retailer - 2GR developing business model innovations, will result in Retailers Enterprise Solutions as explained in Positive Returns under EWPC. AMI investments then will no longer be bets of regulators, but risks taken by 2GRs under competition.
Reference and context: Technology Integration Presents Challenges
Disintegrating the Grid and Retail Worlds
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
W. Marie Zanavich, Vice President Information Technology / CIO, Retired, has produced a very interesting piece of work to support the integration of the grid and retail sides of the utilities, based on the cumulative learning of the past 30 years in standards and process disciplines of the IT business. She concludes that “the ‘enterprise direction’ [of the CIO] should be the only one supported.”
An alternative view of the article supports the need to restructure the power industry under the EWPC market architecture and design paradigm, as can be seen in Disruptive Technologies Convergence. With EWPC most of the technology integration present challenges identified in the article disappear. By performing an essential systems analysis, to find out the real information system requirements of the power industry, I came up with the Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC.
The biggest technology (compatibility and integration) issue originates in an intuitive and mistaken restructuring that separates transmission from distribution and that keeps distribution together with the retail operation in the utilities. Restructuring is in essence an information technology event, in which there are great efficiency opportunities on the customer side of the business, arising from the great reduction in transaction costs with the introduction of innovative business models to take the power industry out of the NO PROFIT ZONE, as explained in Let EWPC Come to Fruition.
In addition, serious difficulties on the integration of the grid with retail were explained in the article The Anti-System Utility. The problem is that the distribution side of the grid has been used to keep the retail side of the enterprise as a monopoly or as a powerful incumbent retailer. Those powerful retailers obstructs competition, as is the recent case of Ohio’s plan for re-regulation, as explained in the A New Mistaken Experiment and that are to be resolved with “Let the Market Decide” in Ohio.
Unlike the grid and retail side of the utility under transmission access, the integrated transmission and distribution grid, which is kept together under EWPC, has the same transportation function and the same culture under the same roof. That is why I also wrote the EWPC article Solving Smart Grid Cost Recovery to solve the difficulty that regulators have to approve AMI investment. I said above that most of the problems disappear, thinking of the great information technology challenges of implementing the smart grid.
Retail competition at the federal or global level, under prudential regulations, with Second Generation Retailer - 2GR developing business model innovations, will result in Retailers Enterprise Solutions as explained in Positive Returns under EWPC. AMI investments then will no longer be bets of regulators, but risks taken by 2GRs under competition.
Reference and context: Technology Integration Presents Challenges
The EWPC Textbook
A textbook on electricity without price controls (EWPC) has been in the making for quite some time. The textbook will answer the paradox, “How much system reliability can you afford?” by integrating preceding work, which will include a whole chapter in physical and financial risk management.
The EWPC Textbook
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Thank you Fred Banks, Len, Michael, Fred Plett, Jim, Steve, Peter, Joseph, and many other important and intelligent persons, like yourselves, that have questioned or helped the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm concepts, under this article or in other physical or electronic venues.
I am happy to tell all of you, and the general public, that I have decided to write the textbook “EWPC Theory and Practice,” since I have now come full circle with the key insight of William C. Hayes Editorial, in the Electrical World magazine of April 1st, 1978, “How much system reliability can you afford?,” which signalled very clearly the need for a paradigm shift of the power industry.
This morning, after almost 30 years of keen observations and hard work in the power industry, I woke up with a strong message that is going to be the center of the EWPC book, which fully answers that engineering, economic, social, and financial paradox, that “brought the utility industry to a cross roads,” as Mr. Hayes wrote.
Most of the concepts of the textbook are already in the GMH Blog and in www.EnergyPulse.net, while the most recent are in www.energyblogs.com, needing a strong editorial and design effort to transform it into a coherent textbook.
From what I gather from Fred insistence, on the need of a textbook that covers electric derivatives, there is a need for a textbook (not necessarily financial) to cover both the physical and financial risk management aspects of EWPC. One whole chapter of the textbook will be dedicated to it. Since my Ph.D. training is in Information Theory, where random variables and random processes are everyday work, I will take that challenge very seriously.
Readers are advised to read very carefully the recent rebuttals posted, before making any conclusions.
Best regards,
José Antonio
The EWPC Textbook
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Thank you Fred Banks, Len, Michael, Fred Plett, Jim, Steve, Peter, Joseph, and many other important and intelligent persons, like yourselves, that have questioned or helped the EWPC market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm concepts, under this article or in other physical or electronic venues.
I am happy to tell all of you, and the general public, that I have decided to write the textbook “EWPC Theory and Practice,” since I have now come full circle with the key insight of William C. Hayes Editorial, in the Electrical World magazine of April 1st, 1978, “How much system reliability can you afford?,” which signalled very clearly the need for a paradigm shift of the power industry.
This morning, after almost 30 years of keen observations and hard work in the power industry, I woke up with a strong message that is going to be the center of the EWPC book, which fully answers that engineering, economic, social, and financial paradox, that “brought the utility industry to a cross roads,” as Mr. Hayes wrote.
Most of the concepts of the textbook are already in the GMH Blog and in www.EnergyPulse.net, while the most recent are in www.energyblogs.com, needing a strong editorial and design effort to transform it into a coherent textbook.
From what I gather from Fred insistence, on the need of a textbook that covers electric derivatives, there is a need for a textbook (not necessarily financial) to cover both the physical and financial risk management aspects of EWPC. One whole chapter of the textbook will be dedicated to it. Since my Ph.D. training is in Information Theory, where random variables and random processes are everyday work, I will take that challenge very seriously.
Readers are advised to read very carefully the recent rebuttals posted, before making any conclusions.
Best regards,
José Antonio
sábado, noviembre 10, 2007
Friendly Comments on Deregulation Update
This is an update of Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 4, posted on Tuesday, December 27, 2005, on the BMH blog. The update is in square "[" "]" brackets, some of which may be missing in order no to make it more complex by unnecessary repeating.
Thank you very much Mr. Martín-Giraldo for your timely comments.
I agree completely that Fred C. Schweppe supported regulation, but a very distinct kind of regulation, which I believe is completely unnecessary today. Experience with faulty [today E1R2] deregulation, experience with regulation, the development of new technologies, and additional insights into electric business, suggest serious consideration to the development of a "true" deregulated [now re-regulated] electric marketplace. The comments that follow are in addition to my earlier [which I believe is the seminal EWPC] article on An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response, as well as my comments dispersed on EnergyPulse.
I believe there has been a big misunderstanding of Fred C. Schweppe proposal. Trying to clarify his proposal, lets consider four general structures for the electric business: A) a traditional vertical integrated utility; B) a faulty deregulation or re-regulation that keeps a largely irresponsive and obsolete utility business model; C) Fred C. Schweppe "Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace" with homeostatic utility controls, where the utility is the only middleman; and D) a true [again changed to re-regulated under prudential regulations] deregulated electricity market, with retailers innovative business models, without price controls, a new value chain (generator, retailer & customer), while re-regulating the wires monopoly.
As you will see, moving from the regulated Space A to the regulated Space C involves a very large undertaking, while moving from Space C to Space to D no such a large one. The regulated (Space C: see page 11 of Spot Pricing of Electricity) "energy marketplace involves the utility and its customers operating as partners… Utility implementation concerns include real-time calculation/prediction of hourly spot prices, metering-communication-billing, and system control center operation using the new control signal called price… customers who choose to exploit the energy marketplace potentials must implement the appropriate response systems (today demand response), which could range from simple manual response to sophisticated digital controls."
That explains why on page 123, Schweppe, et al, conclude "that there are many similarities between the regulated energy market place… and the deregulated system." That also explains very clearly the shortcomings ( i.e. price spikes) of, Space B, faulty deregulation.
In addition, on page xvii of Spot Pricing of Electricity, Fred C. Schweppe (et al) understood that "there is a need for fundamental changes in the way society views electric energy... In general terms: …the spot price based energy marketplace involves a variety of utility-customer transactions… These transactions may include customers selling to, as well as buying from, the utility." Read "fundamental changes" not cosmetic changes in the utilities business models.
On page xviii, they add "A spot price based energy marketplace has many benefits for both the electric utility and its customers. These benefits include improvements in operating efficiency, reductions in needed capital investments, and customer options on the type of (reliability) of electricity to be bought. A spot price based energy marketplace is a win-win situation for both the regulated utility and its customers. The customer's lifestyles improve because the customers are receiving more service from the use of electric energy per dollar spent. The utility has a more controllable, less uncertain world in which to operate." That is exactly the opposite of what has been happening, by leaving the customer out in the re-regulation efforts. Demand response will change that.
My hypothesis is that time and reality are given us the opportunity to bypass Space C and go directly to Space D. It does not make any sense today to develop a Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. It does not make any sense either to stay at Space A. Maybe my contribution, if there is one, is recognizing that a very simple restructuring, which keeps the wires utility out of the competitive business, creates an opportunity for retail marketers to develop the Deregulated [again re-regulated] Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. That I suggest is the required change in firm organization that [delete goes] satisfies the control scheme, on the need to develop the corresponding innovative business models.
I add my response to your well documented comments with the dedication of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity," that says: "Fred created spot pricing and proved, again, that "The forecast is always wrong!" (Unnumbered page, placed on what should be page v).
Schweppe was a feedback genious, which understood (see page 7) that "In the energy marketplace, there is a closed-loop feedback between the utility and its customers. The whole electric power system (generation, transmission, distribution, and customers) is controlled and operated in an integrated fashion, without removing the customers' freedom of choice. This is made possible by the diversity in costumer's characteristics, desires and needs… The benefits of well-designed, real time, utility customer feedback are clear, or will be after reading this book." My hypothesis of "true" [EWPC re-regulation] deregulation is centered on those perceptions of the customers, which introduce [as a key issue for full retail and wholesale competition to develop] the need for retail marketing and retail competition, which, unfortunately, is the "true" deregulation that the late Fred C. Schweepe had no time to [consider, nor]see.
Now I like to respond some of your comments:
· To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays.
My response:
I believe that sufficient time has past to assign the proper credits, which I am trying to integrate in a true deregulation of electricity. However, I firmly believe that the theory and practice of restructuring of electricity originated with Fred C. Schweppe leadership. The book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" is the place to respond to Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, argument: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins."
I believe that Schweppe proposed a "real" restructuring, when he said "New directions for the utility industry are being sought by many interested parties in the government, the private sector, and the universities. One such direction has been widespread interest in utility-customer cooperation through innovative rates characterized by broader options and better use of information on utility costs and customer needs. The goal of this book is to provide a theoretically sound, yet practical foundation for the implementation of utility-customer transactions based on today's needs. Our goal is to meet four criteria:
1. "Freedom of Choice: provide customers with options on the cost and reliability of supply and how they choose to use electric energy."
2. Economic Efficiency: Motivate customers to adjust their own electric energy usage patterns to match utility marginal costs.
3. Equity: Reduce customer cross-subsidies…
4. Utility Control, Operation and planning: Consider the engineering requirements for controlling, operating and planning an electric power system."
Commenting the criteria in reverse order:
Item 4: is what Mr. Jack Casazza, yourself, myself, and others have been asking all along, which were forgotten in the "deregulation" frenzy. [This is what I have reduced to the simple, but not simplistic, R1E2 policy.]
Item 3: had a note [on my book]: "there are other definitions of equity." I characterize a supply security (or quality) cross-subsidy, just to cross-subsidize, for example, the computer manufacturer, as Thomas Tanton has rightly pointed out. Average rates to customer classes forbid that.
Item 2: motivation underscores the need for retail marketing, which utility minded people find unnecessary. I have to admit that Mr. Schweppe didn't got that far [ and should have].
Item 1: This is the key element on the differentiation of customers. Technology for a complete market is already here. In the End-State (which is within the next five years) [WOW! 5 years – interesting opinion] price controls become completely unnecessary, given my article and the comments have made in the EnergyPulse discussions.
Your comment:
Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment.
My response:
While the words seem correct, the intent is not. As was seeing from my first response, Fred C. Schweppe advocated a much more different regulation than the re-regulation that California experimented. In fact, Schwepe had suggested very big restructuring effort, with the following 4 above goals. Had they follow Fred C. Schweppe spot pricing "regulation" model; the experiment would have been completely successful. That is why you need to add the sentence "The reader might be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long…"
Your comment:
In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.)
My response:
I suggest you to read my response to Bob Lieberman in what I believe is The Birth of the Global Electric Retailer.
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD
On 12/27/05, Power Encounter <powerencounter@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear Mr. Vanderhorst-Silverio,
I have the following comments to do:
1. Fred Schewppe supported regulation. In Chapter 5. "A Possible Future: Deregulation", page 111 of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" by Fred C. Schweppe, Michael C. Caramanis, Richard D. Tabors and Roger E. Bohn (Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988 ISBN 0-89838-260-2), we can read: "This chapter shows how the establishment of a spot price based energy marketplace in a regulated environment (which we do advocate) can evolve towards or into a deregulated system. The reader may be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long (although it may be bumpy)." To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays. Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment. In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.).
2. Since its inception, the control scheme of a power system is hierarchical. Id est: a vertical one. This vertical control scheme observes a time scale which comply with the power system states: electromagnetic, transient, and steady states, and short term and long term planning. And this vertical scheme control obeys the organization of a vertical integrated utility as well. With restructuring and unbundling the utility lost verticality and become horizontal. To enlarge my view in this point it could be interesting for instance you pay a view to the Economics book "Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications", by Oliver E. Williamson, Free Press. 1983 ISBN: 0-02934-780-7). There has been a change in the firm organisation, but there has NOT been the corresponding change in the control scheme. Now, the point here is whether the classical control scheme affords horizontal utilities. The facts seem to tell no. Then, how to add to the present vertical control scheme a new full horizontal one such the required by "demand response" without provoking clashing?. Neither the multi-agent systems technology is still ready, nor the Agent-based Computational Economics has been developed. See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aelect.htm .
3. In present times I remember a quote of Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, that argued French politician who once said: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins".
Posted in Energy Pulse.
Sincerely yours
J Martín-Giraldo
On 12/24/05, José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD wrote:
Estimado Dr. Martín-Giráldo,
Perdone mi insistencia sobre mi propuesta de un Mercado eléctrico liberalizado verdadero, con el cual su contribución espero. Cambio al inglés ahora.
Professor Ferdinand E. Banks wrote a timely article in EnergyPulse entitled A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation, to which I made an initial comment and posed some questions regarding my hipothesis of a true electric deregulation. Prof. Banks has said, among other things that: "Almost as important, I think that the arguments of Jack Casazza, and the people at the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center are unbeatable. They also have all the evidence on their side, which helps. (And here I can suggest examining the blog of Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo.) I certainly respect the knowledge and interest of Vanderhorst-Silverio in this matter, and I hope that his ideas receive a wide circulation, but in terms of the economic theory that I study and teach, I would really be surprised if I were able to endorse those suggesting that there is an acceptable deregulation agenda out there somewhere if only we take the time to find it. "
Thanking Prof. Banks for his suggestion that my ideas receive a wide circulation, I responded in part as follows:
"Recently, I have sent an email to Mr. Casazza, and have gone to Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo, Power Encounters blog, where I posted comments in Spanish about 1) a misunderstanding of Fred C Schweppe's Homeostatic Utility Control in the literature review he posted; 2) my blog in which I have posted well over 900 notes, most of them in Spanish, related to what I believe is my meaningful aim of true deregulation (which started on 1995); and 3) CME Industry Center (CMEIC) admission of incomplete (=faulty) deregulation and lack of physical demand side risk management, and referring him to the link of my comments under the article " Strategic Perspectives on Utility Enterprise Solutions," by Warren Causey on EnergyPulse."
"I have received no reply from them yet. I agree that under the old paradigm, CMEIC and Mr. Casazza are unbeatable, because they are based on "facts" of the faulty deregulation. However, I humbly think that under COE [Customer Oriented Electricity was what I now call EWPC] hypothesis many of the arguments just don't hold. However, I received a kind reply from Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, but I am not allowed to forward it yet (the email has some legalese at the bottom)."
"I will send all of them, including the CMEIC the link of this article to see if they may have answers to the questions I asked you. "
Deseándole una feliz Navidad y esperando sus comentarios, bien sea en su bitácora digital, en EnergyPulse o por esta misma vía.
Muy cordialmente,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD
Interdependent Consultant on Electricity
BS ´68, MS ´71 & PhD ´72, all from Cornell University
Valued IEEE Member for 35 Years
javs@ieee.org
Research and practice areas, and interests: systems architecture, systems thinking, retail marketing, customer orientation, information systems requirements and design, market rules, contract assistance.
Thank you very much Mr. Martín-Giraldo for your timely comments.
I agree completely that Fred C. Schweppe supported regulation, but a very distinct kind of regulation, which I believe is completely unnecessary today. Experience with faulty [today E1R2] deregulation, experience with regulation, the development of new technologies, and additional insights into electric business, suggest serious consideration to the development of a "true" deregulated [now re-regulated] electric marketplace. The comments that follow are in addition to my earlier [which I believe is the seminal EWPC] article on An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response, as well as my comments dispersed on EnergyPulse.
I believe there has been a big misunderstanding of Fred C. Schweppe proposal. Trying to clarify his proposal, lets consider four general structures for the electric business: A) a traditional vertical integrated utility; B) a faulty deregulation or re-regulation that keeps a largely irresponsive and obsolete utility business model; C) Fred C. Schweppe "Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace" with homeostatic utility controls, where the utility is the only middleman; and D) a true [again changed to re-regulated under prudential regulations] deregulated electricity market, with retailers innovative business models, without price controls, a new value chain (generator, retailer & customer), while re-regulating the wires monopoly.
As you will see, moving from the regulated Space A to the regulated Space C involves a very large undertaking, while moving from Space C to Space to D no such a large one. The regulated (Space C: see page 11 of Spot Pricing of Electricity) "energy marketplace involves the utility and its customers operating as partners… Utility implementation concerns include real-time calculation/prediction of hourly spot prices, metering-communication-billing, and system control center operation using the new control signal called price… customers who choose to exploit the energy marketplace potentials must implement the appropriate response systems (today demand response), which could range from simple manual response to sophisticated digital controls."
That explains why on page 123, Schweppe, et al, conclude "that there are many similarities between the regulated energy market place… and the deregulated system." That also explains very clearly the shortcomings ( i.e. price spikes) of, Space B, faulty deregulation.
In addition, on page xvii of Spot Pricing of Electricity, Fred C. Schweppe (et al) understood that "there is a need for fundamental changes in the way society views electric energy... In general terms: …the spot price based energy marketplace involves a variety of utility-customer transactions… These transactions may include customers selling to, as well as buying from, the utility." Read "fundamental changes" not cosmetic changes in the utilities business models.
On page xviii, they add "A spot price based energy marketplace has many benefits for both the electric utility and its customers. These benefits include improvements in operating efficiency, reductions in needed capital investments, and customer options on the type of (reliability) of electricity to be bought. A spot price based energy marketplace is a win-win situation for both the regulated utility and its customers. The customer's lifestyles improve because the customers are receiving more service from the use of electric energy per dollar spent. The utility has a more controllable, less uncertain world in which to operate." That is exactly the opposite of what has been happening, by leaving the customer out in the re-regulation efforts. Demand response will change that.
My hypothesis is that time and reality are given us the opportunity to bypass Space C and go directly to Space D. It does not make any sense today to develop a Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. It does not make any sense either to stay at Space A. Maybe my contribution, if there is one, is recognizing that a very simple restructuring, which keeps the wires utility out of the competitive business, creates an opportunity for retail marketers to develop the Deregulated [again re-regulated] Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. That I suggest is the required change in firm organization that [delete goes] satisfies the control scheme, on the need to develop the corresponding innovative business models.
I add my response to your well documented comments with the dedication of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity," that says: "Fred created spot pricing and proved, again, that "The forecast is always wrong!" (Unnumbered page, placed on what should be page v).
Schweppe was a feedback genious, which understood (see page 7) that "In the energy marketplace, there is a closed-loop feedback between the utility and its customers. The whole electric power system (generation, transmission, distribution, and customers) is controlled and operated in an integrated fashion, without removing the customers' freedom of choice. This is made possible by the diversity in costumer's characteristics, desires and needs… The benefits of well-designed, real time, utility customer feedback are clear, or will be after reading this book." My hypothesis of "true" [EWPC re-regulation] deregulation is centered on those perceptions of the customers, which introduce [as a key issue for full retail and wholesale competition to develop] the need for retail marketing and retail competition, which, unfortunately, is the "true" deregulation that the late Fred C. Schweepe had no time to [consider, nor]see.
Now I like to respond some of your comments:
· To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays.
My response:
I believe that sufficient time has past to assign the proper credits, which I am trying to integrate in a true deregulation of electricity. However, I firmly believe that the theory and practice of restructuring of electricity originated with Fred C. Schweppe leadership. The book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" is the place to respond to Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, argument: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins."
I believe that Schweppe proposed a "real" restructuring, when he said "New directions for the utility industry are being sought by many interested parties in the government, the private sector, and the universities. One such direction has been widespread interest in utility-customer cooperation through innovative rates characterized by broader options and better use of information on utility costs and customer needs. The goal of this book is to provide a theoretically sound, yet practical foundation for the implementation of utility-customer transactions based on today's needs. Our goal is to meet four criteria:
1. "Freedom of Choice: provide customers with options on the cost and reliability of supply and how they choose to use electric energy."
2. Economic Efficiency: Motivate customers to adjust their own electric energy usage patterns to match utility marginal costs.
3. Equity: Reduce customer cross-subsidies…
4. Utility Control, Operation and planning: Consider the engineering requirements for controlling, operating and planning an electric power system."
Commenting the criteria in reverse order:
Item 4: is what Mr. Jack Casazza, yourself, myself, and others have been asking all along, which were forgotten in the "deregulation" frenzy. [This is what I have reduced to the simple, but not simplistic, R1E2 policy.]
Item 3: had a note [on my book]: "there are other definitions of equity." I characterize a supply security (or quality) cross-subsidy, just to cross-subsidize, for example, the computer manufacturer, as Thomas Tanton has rightly pointed out. Average rates to customer classes forbid that.
Item 2: motivation underscores the need for retail marketing, which utility minded people find unnecessary. I have to admit that Mr. Schweppe didn't got that far [ and should have].
Item 1: This is the key element on the differentiation of customers. Technology for a complete market is already here. In the End-State (which is within the next five years) [WOW! 5 years – interesting opinion] price controls become completely unnecessary, given my article and the comments have made in the EnergyPulse discussions.
Your comment:
Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment.
My response:
While the words seem correct, the intent is not. As was seeing from my first response, Fred C. Schweppe advocated a much more different regulation than the re-regulation that California experimented. In fact, Schwepe had suggested very big restructuring effort, with the following 4 above goals. Had they follow Fred C. Schweppe spot pricing "regulation" model; the experiment would have been completely successful. That is why you need to add the sentence "The reader might be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long…"
Your comment:
In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.)
My response:
I suggest you to read my response to Bob Lieberman in what I believe is The Birth of the Global Electric Retailer.
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD
On 12/27/05, Power Encounter <powerencounter@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear Mr. Vanderhorst-Silverio,
I have the following comments to do:
1. Fred Schewppe supported regulation. In Chapter 5. "A Possible Future: Deregulation", page 111 of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" by Fred C. Schweppe, Michael C. Caramanis, Richard D. Tabors and Roger E. Bohn (Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988 ISBN 0-89838-260-2), we can read: "This chapter shows how the establishment of a spot price based energy marketplace in a regulated environment (which we do advocate) can evolve towards or into a deregulated system. The reader may be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long (although it may be bumpy)." To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays. Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment. In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.).
2. Since its inception, the control scheme of a power system is hierarchical. Id est: a vertical one. This vertical control scheme observes a time scale which comply with the power system states: electromagnetic, transient, and steady states, and short term and long term planning. And this vertical scheme control obeys the organization of a vertical integrated utility as well. With restructuring and unbundling the utility lost verticality and become horizontal. To enlarge my view in this point it could be interesting for instance you pay a view to the Economics book "Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications", by Oliver E. Williamson, Free Press. 1983 ISBN: 0-02934-780-7). There has been a change in the firm organisation, but there has NOT been the corresponding change in the control scheme. Now, the point here is whether the classical control scheme affords horizontal utilities. The facts seem to tell no. Then, how to add to the present vertical control scheme a new full horizontal one such the required by "demand response" without provoking clashing?. Neither the multi-agent systems technology is still ready, nor the Agent-based Computational Economics has been developed. See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aelect.htm .
3. In present times I remember a quote of Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, that argued French politician who once said: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins".
Posted in Energy Pulse.
Sincerely yours
J Martín-Giraldo
On 12/24/05, José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD wrote:
Estimado Dr. Martín-Giráldo,
Perdone mi insistencia sobre mi propuesta de un Mercado eléctrico liberalizado verdadero, con el cual su contribución espero. Cambio al inglés ahora.
Professor Ferdinand E. Banks wrote a timely article in EnergyPulse entitled A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation, to which I made an initial comment and posed some questions regarding my hipothesis of a true electric deregulation. Prof. Banks has said, among other things that: "Almost as important, I think that the arguments of Jack Casazza, and the people at the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center are unbeatable. They also have all the evidence on their side, which helps. (And here I can suggest examining the blog of Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo.) I certainly respect the knowledge and interest of Vanderhorst-Silverio in this matter, and I hope that his ideas receive a wide circulation, but in terms of the economic theory that I study and teach, I would really be surprised if I were able to endorse those suggesting that there is an acceptable deregulation agenda out there somewhere if only we take the time to find it. "
Thanking Prof. Banks for his suggestion that my ideas receive a wide circulation, I responded in part as follows:
"Recently, I have sent an email to Mr. Casazza, and have gone to Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo, Power Encounters blog, where I posted comments in Spanish about 1) a misunderstanding of Fred C Schweppe's Homeostatic Utility Control in the literature review he posted; 2) my blog in which I have posted well over 900 notes, most of them in Spanish, related to what I believe is my meaningful aim of true deregulation (which started on 1995); and 3) CME Industry Center (CMEIC) admission of incomplete (=faulty) deregulation and lack of physical demand side risk management, and referring him to the link of my comments under the article " Strategic Perspectives on Utility Enterprise Solutions," by Warren Causey on EnergyPulse."
"I have received no reply from them yet. I agree that under the old paradigm, CMEIC and Mr. Casazza are unbeatable, because they are based on "facts" of the faulty deregulation. However, I humbly think that under COE [Customer Oriented Electricity was what I now call EWPC] hypothesis many of the arguments just don't hold. However, I received a kind reply from Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, but I am not allowed to forward it yet (the email has some legalese at the bottom)."
"I will send all of them, including the CMEIC the link of this article to see if they may have answers to the questions I asked you. "
Deseándole una feliz Navidad y esperando sus comentarios, bien sea en su bitácora digital, en EnergyPulse o por esta misma vía.
Muy cordialmente,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD
Interdependent Consultant on Electricity
BS ´68, MS ´71 & PhD ´72, all from Cornell University
Valued IEEE Member for 35 Years
javs@ieee.org
Research and practice areas, and interests: systems architecture, systems thinking, retail marketing, customer orientation, information systems requirements and design, market rules, contract assistance.
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