domingo, enero 01, 2006

True Deregulation of Electricity to Make Poverty History - Liberación Verdadera de Electricidad para Hacer Historia la Pobreza

Dear VIP,

Go directly to the Index below.

Happy New Year 2006,

José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD

Estimada y estimados VIPs

Vayan directamente abajo al índice.

Feliz Año Nuevo 2006,

José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD

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GRUPO MILLENNIUM HISPANIOLA

BLOG INDEX FROM DECEMBER 22, 2005, JANUARY 1st 2006.

INDICE DE LA BITACORA DIGITAL DEL 22 DE DICIEMBRE, 2005, AL 1ro ENERO 2006

1. Editorial del GMH: Pasando la Pobreza a la Historia en Electricidad

1 Jan 2006

El New York Times (NYT) editorializa hoy, 1ro. de enero del 2006, con el titular “Making Poverty History,” que traduzco como “pasando la pobreza a la historia.” Dicen que el 2005 fue el año de los grandes discursos de los líderes ...

2. Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate Parte 3

30 Dec 2005 by José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD

The following comment has been posted on EnergyPulse, under Professor Ferdinand E. Banks article A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation. This is my second response. Now I will offer two humble comments about Mr. Jack ...

3. Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate Parte 2

29 Dec 2005

JA Casazza, President American Education Institute Former Utility Executive IEEE Life Fellow Recipient of IEEE's Herman Halperin Award and Citation of Honor Recipient of CIGRE Philip Sporn Award for Development of Electric Power Systems ...

4. Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate

29 Dec 2005

Mr. Jack Casazza, President American Education Institute Distinguished Fellow of the IEEE Thank you very much Jack for your very valuable, although free, contribution and advice. I am honored for the pleasure of your remarks, ...

5. IMF insists on eliminating subsidies

29 Dec 2005

According to the IMF the Dominican government has two options to compensate for the resources that it will lose when it abolishes the exchange commission tax on dollars used to import anything into the Dominican Republic: one is to ...

6. Retail Market Deregulation Dialogue on EnergyPulse Part 4

29 Dec 2005

I have made an updated remmark to Mr. Jack Ellis comments to Free All Wisconsin Utilities to Make Money Helping Customer's Save Energy. A couple of thoughts regarding this article and the comments that followed: ...

7. Retail Market Deregulation Dialogue on EnergyPulse Part 3

27 Dec 2005

An updated comment to Free All Wisconsin Utilities to Make Money Helping Customer's Save Energy. I have added new comments on the true deregulation to A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation. One of them is in response ...

8. Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 4

27 Dec 2005

Thank you very much Mr. Martín-Giraldo for your timely comments. I agree completely that Fred C. Schweppe supported regulation, but a very distinct kind of regulation, which I believe is completely unnecessary today. ...

9. Eficiencia Energética: Opción de Menor Costo de Electricidad

24 Dec 2005

De acuerdo a la Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) de los Estados Unidos la eficiencia energética salía a 3 centavos de dólar el kilovatio-hora en el año 2002. No cabe duda que es el medio idóneo para reducir los costos de ...

10. Re: Felicidades

24 Dec 2005

Muchas felicidades a ti Luis también en Noche Buena y Navidad y tu linda familia dominco-mexicana. Igualmente, muchas felicidades también a todos los copiados. Espero que el año que viene los dominicanos dejemos de lado las diferencias ...

11. Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 3

24 Dec 2005

Esta es la parte común de las comunicaciones que envié a los expertos en electridad que mencioné en la respuesta al Profesor Banks. Professor Ferdinand E. Banks wrote a timely article in EnergyPulse entitled A Few More Unfriendly ...

12. Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 2

24 Dec 2005

Thanks Prof. Banks for your humble response. I certainly can only claim to know about deregulation in the Dominican Republic myself, which is one of the worst cases in the world. Our educational system is lousy, and our power system has ...

13. Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation

23 Dec 2005

Profesor Ferdinand Banks ha escrito el artículo A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation en EnergyPulse que yo he aprovechado para defender mi hipótesis de una liberación verdadera del sector eléctrico. ...

14. Teorizando con Francisco Méndez sobre Palos a Ciegas

22 Dec 2005

Muy estimado Francisco, Anoche, en la reunión de la CDEEE, usaste el término despectivo teorizar para referirte a las propuestas que he venido realizando a través de la Bitácora Digital del GMH. Luego de pensar cuidadosamente la razón ...

Editorial del GMH: Pasando la Pobreza a la Historia en Electricidad

El New York Times (NYT) editorializa hoy, 1ro. de enero del 2006, con el titular “Making Poverty History,” que traduzco como “pasando la pobreza a la historia.” Dicen que el 2005 fue el año de los grandes discursos de los líderes globales: Blair, Annan, Bush... culminando con el acuerdo de la OMC de eliminar los subsidios agrícolas en el 2013. El NYT espera fervientemente que en el 2006 las palabras finas se transformen en acción, como parte del plan de Desarrollo del Milenio para pasar la pobreza a la historia. Concluyen diciendo que el tiempo para hablar ya pasó, haciendo su resolución de año nuevo el dar seguimiento a cuantas de las promesas del año pasado pasen a ser algo más que palabras.

El proceso de gestación del Grupo Millennium Hispaniola se inició el 31 de marzo del 2005, con la disponibilidad del borrador final del “Millennium Ecosystem Assesstment,” y mi apreciación de que daba “mucha municiones a los que proponen energías limpias y el empleo de tecnologías de información para desarrollar un mundo sostenible que mitigue pronto la pobreza.”

Creí propicio impulsar “la idea de desarrollar cuatro escenarios del milenio para el país,” que siguen pendientes… para facilitar “la discusión estratégica de muchas de las iniciativas que están sobre el tapete, tales como, centrales a carbón para abaratar el precio de la electricidad, la unidad del sector empresarial, la agenda nacional de desarrollo, una nueva organización y constitución política, un desarrollo del comercio exterior con multinacionales dominicanas (esta última es mía), y muchas otras más que representan los intereses de un país mucho mejor.”

A partir del 15 de mayo del 2005, el GMH fomentó un dialogue centrado en la liberación del mercado minorista de electricidad que se inició para llenar las necesidades del país y que recientemente ha pasado a ser también ofrecida como solución global. En verdad, esa es la razón por la que vislumbré un desarrollo de multinacionales dominicanas desde 1996, cuando identifiqué las oportunidades que teníamos y parece que seguimos teniendo en un mercadeo al detalle de electricidad que sería también inclusivo, innovador y renovado.

La reestructuración del mercado eléctrico para transformarlo en un negocio común y corriente, separando las actividades monopólicas de las competitivas, es un potente medio para ir pasando la pobreza a la historia. Dicha reestructuración se basa en un tratamiento integral del sector eléctrico, que resulta en una cadena de valor: mayorista, minorista, cliente. Los minoristas compiten unos con otros, ofreciendo planes de servicio diferenciados por seguridad de suministro, en el que los clientes pueden elegir el que le resulte de menor costo a largo plazo.

Todas y cada unas de las objeciones que Donella Meadows (que sintetizan fielmente el problema de la liberación fallida del mercado eléctrico) identificó en su artículo Electricity “Restructuring and Faith in the Market” son invertidas y resueltas. Sugerimos también examinar los comentarios recientes que aparecen en A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation y Free All Wisconsin Utilities to Make Money Helping Customers Save Energy. Donella decía en el 2001 que la meta de la reestructuración no era reducir las tarifas residenciales. Sin embargo, nuestro diseño le ofrece a cada cliente (no solamente al residencial) su opción de mínimo costo a largo plazo. Los clientes con menor seguridad de suministro, no necesitan pagar precios promedios para subsidiar a los que tienen alta necesidad de seguridad de suministro. Los subsidios cruzados en seguridad de suministro son mucho más pronunciados entre los clientes comerciales e industriales.

Donella también decía que los principales problemas eran la tecnología y la industria. En tecnología, los ciclos combinados y las celdas de combustibles, que hoy se resumen en la generación distribuida, permiten a las industrias autogenerar a menor costo y con menos impacto ambiental. Una a una las industrias se estaban separando de la red, dejando a las empresas públicas en pánico con sus grandes y obsoletas centrales todavía sin depreciar. Para que no se vayan les ofrecen precios más baratos y el resultado son precios más elevados para los demás clientes.

La verdadera liberación del mercado que proponemos reconoce ambas realidades, al proponer la integración coordinada de los recursos distribuidos en el lado de la demanda. Aquí, de todas formas, la distorsión en los precios del mercado mayorista impuesta por el gobierno ya ha hecho que muchas unidades generadoras no resulten despachables. Prometiendo precios más bajos en el futuro al público en general, a sabiendas que no los van a cumplir (en vista del progreso en la tecnología), el gobierno sigue adelante con proyectos IPPs a carbón que van a complicar mucho más esta situación en el futuro.

Donella dijo que la mejor estrategia – eficiencia energética - se estaba dejando fuera. La reestructuración a base de competencia a corto y largo plazo con la liberación verdadera del mercado descansa en diseños de negocios en el mercado minorista que aprovechan a fondo la eficiencia energética y la respuesta de la demanda. No se trata simplemente de competencia en el corto plazo, ni tampoco de precios altamente fluctuantes en el mercado mayorista.

En efecto, para hacer la transición a un futuro eléctrico distribuido, coincidimos con las sugerencias de Donella al diseñar la verdadera liberación del mercado eléctrico basándonos en una visión clara y con futuro, fuera de los aposentos (de eso se trató mi insistencia sobre La Tarea Pendiente). Pensemos en el bienestar del sistema completo y no simplemente en el bienestar de las partes, como los clientes industriales más grandes, las empresas capitalizadas o simplemente en el bienestar de la CDEEE. Todos los subsidios deben ser eliminados. No dejamos a la clase media y a los pobres desamparados, al reconocer que necesitan obtener valor agregado de la electricidad, lo cual se empieza a resolver con simplemente asegurar que se compense los apagones a los que pagan la electricidad.

Las Naciones Unidades, las entidades multilaterales y los países donantes pueden pasar de las palabras a la acción, apoyando abiertamente y sufragando directamente las actividades del Grupo Millennium Hispaniola. Si ustedes toman el liderazgo, el gobierno del Presidente Fernández entenderá la íntima relación que existe con sus planes de una estrategia hacia la sociedad de la información. Con ese gran apoyo, los agentes del mercado, los demás partidos políticos y las asociaciones empresariales los seguirán.

El desarrollo e implantación de una liberalización verdadera del mercado eléctrico de la República Dominicana, con el apoyo de toda la sociedad, servirá de ejemplo para todos los países del mundo. El desarrollo del mercado de la base de la pirámide del sector eléctrico se habrá iniciado y con ello estará pasando la pobreza a la historia en la electricidad.

© José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD. 2006.

viernes, diciembre 30, 2005

Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate Parte 3

The following comment has been posted on EnergyPulse, under Professor Ferdinand E. Banks article A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation.

This is my second response. Now I will offer two humble comments about Mr. Jack Casazza's suggestions and the world context.

1) In general terms, Jack Casazza suggests repairing Space B (faulty deregulation) with coordination agreements to assure that coordination of the system to produce long and short run minimum costs. To do that I have found that the best signal to private agents is that customer's interruptions should be compensated under any circumstance. Behind that, by Coase's Theorem, the electricity market is borne, since customers supply security needs now vary widely under each customer class. If that means bridging the gap between the insurance industry and the power industry, then it should be done.

2) If I understand correctly, Jack is concentrating on either/or thinking (concentrate on the system, that the results will follow). As comment 1 introduces important changes to the market, repairs to the market are needed as well. As Toyota showed in the automobile industry, in the power industry we should go for increase quality (and reliability) and reduced costs. To do that we need both efficient markets (no regulator can represent the customer better than himself – shout for no price control) and outstanding systems planning and operation. I suggest we go for both. I believe that calls for the development of true deregulation, as outlined in Space D above, without going into Space C. If a coordination agreement is to be done, do it on both counts, to reduce as much as possible the value destruction to the economy and society.

jueves, diciembre 29, 2005

Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate Parte 2

J.A. Casazza, President American Education Institute
Former Utility Executive
IEEE Life Fellow
Recipient of IEEE's Herman Halperin Award and Citation of Honor
Recipient of CIGRE Philip Sporn Award for Development of Electric Power Systems

Jack no es un simple académico; es un experto en apagones generales.
Es también el líder de PEST - POWER ENGINEERS SUPPORTING TRUTH.

On 12/29/05, Bernardo Castellanos wrote:

Estimados Todos

Hay que felicitar a Jose Antonio por su persistencia, consistencia y tenacidad en promover su idea de desregulacion del mercado minorista. En su empeño ha establecido contactos con autoridades academicas del sector electrico como los profesores Banks y Cassaza. El email mas abajo escrito por el profesor cassaza no tiene desperdicios y deberia servir de punto de reflexion con miras hacia el futuro del sector electrico

Saludos

Bernardo

On 12/29/05, Jack Casazza wrote:

Dear Jose Antonio...

Ver Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate

Jack Casazza Recommendation: Cooperate and Coordinate

Mr. Jack Casazza,
President
American Education Institute
Distinguished Fellow of the IEEE

Thank you very much Jack for your very valuable, although free, contribution and advice. I am honored for the pleasure of your remarks, which I believe will be taken very well by all of the stakeholders of the power sector of the Dominican Republic and the world.

While I plan to use them for other contexts, the initial and most relevant context is a message, about the deregulation that has taken place here, to all of the power sector agents in the Dominican Republic, its government officials, the multilateral institutions that are aiding us, and our private sector representatives.

I can tell you first hand that our faulty deregulation has made more damage than many other places, because of the lack of institutions that has kept the vicious circle of financial unsustainability alive. The damage here has led to 20 to 25% rotating blackouts, basically by the widespread misunderstanding of many experts that the electric power sector ends at the customer's meters.

Under an IMF program, the Dominican government bought the idea from an expert economist contracted by the World Bank (WB), that (suggested incorrectly) financial sustainability meant to ration customers according to how much is collected from the circuits, without suggesting (I believe) to compensate paying customers. The lack of compensation has distorted even more the situation, increasing unnecessarily the need for subsidies in the year 2005 from 350 million dollars programmed to near 600 million dollars executed. A much stronger vicious circle underlies the situation now.

The government has scheduled over 800 million dollars for subsidies in 2006, which the WB and the IMF have not accepted. Starting before 2005, I advised freely in many occasions that paying customers should be compensated to complete the necessary feedback to turn the vicious circle into a virtuous circle. I believe that the value destruction in our economy is the largest per capita in the world, the power infrastructure cost us more than two or three times what it should cost. Most of the value destruction is not captured by any party, as it becomes lost food and materials, a lot of noise, and smoke, and inefficiently burnt fuels, etc., because of the lack of coordination of un-programmed rotating blackouts.

The most important aspect of coordination is to balance risk of system crashes and the cost to the economy in a well designed system. As a system planner, at the beginning of the 80s, I learned first hand from Puerto Rican planners, which had made a terrible mistake of installing 2 oversized units, how to use probability theory (LOLP ideas) to plan the expansion of generation and transmission system. Later at the end of the 80s I made an expansion plan myself. I have been recently synthesizing that idea as supply side risk management.

As you know perfectly well, the same basic ideas apply to power system operation, using contingency planning to avoid risk of system crashes. A robustly designed system has no substitute. However, deregulation investor looking to gain market power was moved to develop oversize units. For example we have a 300 MW unit for a system operating at 1,200 MW after 25% "demand management." Total lack of coordination has increases as a result.

Recently the Dominican government had a plan to develop 2, 1 x 600 MW coal based remote sites. After complains I made, they change to 2, 2 x 300 MW coal based remote sites. I believe they are still too large for our system, but no probabilistic minimum cost simulations have been made by the government office in charge.

In our country we use incremental cost for generation dispatch (short run marginal energy cost). However, oversized units, and many transmission restrictions, and very high costs generating units have made dispatch very inefficient. In addition, the lack of short run marginal supply security cost, I believe, is the reason why gaming the market was and is so easy, here, and everywhere. Professor Schweppe recommended that, but as far I know nobody took it into account.

We have an institution named the "Coordinating Body (CB)," which is not doing at the right level the coordinating and cooperating job it should be doing. It was borne with a contract signed by all market agents, under private decision making which the regulator may overturn. I was on the board of director of the initial CB administration, but were unable to sell my cooperation and coordination suggestions most of the time.

Today the CB is controlled by the government and its politics, although the agents as contractual parties are free to take your bright suggestions an amend it. Although I may be wrong, I perceive that the new foreign managers of the CB, instead of being the leaders, as the first foreign managers try to, are following and "respecting" the regulations, which needs a lot of updating. I hope the agents and the government takes your wise advice and greatly reduces the harm done by the lack of coordination and cooperation.

On September 2004, I decided to become an Interdependent Consultant on Electricity. The reason of being "interdependent" is, as Steven R. Covey says, because interdependence is much more valuable than independence. Interdependence is systemic, not based on simple cause and effects, just like coordination and cooperation are. I have been available, but have not landed one consulting job yet from the CB.

I was contracted on 1996 to offer a solution to the power sector problems of the Dominican Republic. My conclusion was that electricity could be transformed into a business just like most businesses (wholesale, retail, customers), and that Dominicans had the opportunity to become leaders on underdeveloped countries on retail marketers of electricity. In 1998, I identified the emergence of a vibrant retail marketing cluster. This year I made the following presentation to the PLMA, which can turn around the electricity business of the country, by making it very reliable with the complement of demand side risk management to the supply side risk management.

I completely understand your message to concentrate on the power system, but I tell you that I am actually doing a balance effort on both counts. A true deregulation as I am suggesting takes care entirely of the coordination and cooperation difficulties of faulty deregulation. Retailers become in essence very knowledgeable customers that participate in both the wholesale and retail markets, for the long run (centered on energy efficiency) and short run (centered on demand response). The T&D Companies concentrate their effort with the help of CB on the implementation of the new regulations, for planning and operating the system.



Thank you again,

José Antonio

CC: Power system agents
Government of the Dominican Republic
Multilateral institutions
Private sector representatives

On 12/29/05, Jack Casazza wrote:



Dear Jose Antonio,

I have been reading the discussions between you, Prof. Banks and others and did not comment previously because I did not have anything to add. I thought perhaps I could be helpful at this time by providing a few comments, as follows:

- The restructuring and deregulation of the electric power industry was a serious mistake in the USA and in many countries, harming the general public.

- Competition has produced some benefits, particularly in the improvement in the operation of generation plants, but caused a severe decline in the coordination needed between the participants in the planning, design and operation of the generation and transmission systems of electric power grids. The reduction in the number of companies involved can produce some future savings.

- Generation dispatch is based on quoted prices rather that incremental production costs, increasing total production costs.

- Present and long range costs have been increased significantly since each company made decisions based on its own profits and not what was best for the overall grid in the long run, i.e., the overall public interest. (In the USA past studies have shown that the savings from coordination exceeded $20 billion a year before restructuring. Many of these prior benefits have been lost.)

- In most cases the changes that have been made in the industry structure and procedures cannot be undone, so we have to proceed by trying to use what is good from restructuring and removing or correcting the many harmful things that have resulted.

- I believe the greatest harm has been the loss of cooperation and coordination between those involved in the power industry. A way to correct this learned from the past is through "coordination contracts" signed by the participating companies that provide for the planning, design and operation to be performed as if they constituted a single company. In such contracts the long range lowest total cost solution and lowest cost operation procedures were selected even if it meant that one company had to spend extra funds or give up some profits, as long as it resulted in a lower overall cost or was necessary to preserve reliability, even if in another system. These contracts provided for the compensation of a company for its extra costs or profits foregone plus a share of the overall benefits resulting to the public. (I have negotiated such contracts as far back as 50 years ago.)

There is much more analysis needed, but perhaps the comments above will get you thinking about the power system, not the markets.

Best regards,

Jack Casazza

Note to others receiving this message. Please feel free to quote or use it as you wish.

Jack Casazza

Retail Market Deregulation Dialogue on EnergyPulse Part 4

I have made an updated remmark to Mr. Jack Ellis comments to Free All Wisconsin Utilities to Make Money Helping Customer's Save Energy.

A couple of thoughts regarding this article and the comments that followed:

First, I think it's fine for both utilities and third parties to be allowed to provide energy efficiency and demand response services.

However, there ought to be a level playing field. Utilities should not be guaranteed a return on their investments. Instead, they should be required to recover any investments they make in the same way an unregulated firm would. Competition among a mix of unregulated suppliers and regulated utilities will ensure a continual flow of new ideas and technologies, whereas granting utilities yet another de-facto monopoly will stifle innovation and slow the pace of advances in this area.

I normally dislike subsidies, especially when they are disguised as "incentives". However, until retail customers are exposed to wholesale prices in ways that provide the market-based signals many of us advocate, modest subsidies that help focus customers on reducing consumption when prices indicate an impending short-term supply shortage are appropriate.

Wholesale market prices need to reflect all costs associated with supply. In some RTOs, most notably PJM, generators receive hundreds of millions of dollars in payments outside the formal auction mechanism to compensate them for startup, no-load, lost opportunity and other, similar costs. These need to be incorporated in generator bids rather than being paid "under the table".

Finally, I respectfully demand to have the last word on this subject :)


I disagree with Jack on letting a combination of regulated utilities (monopolies) and third parties (competitive) to provide energy efficiency (EE) and demand response (DR) services. Those EE and DR services are random and require a long term commitment on the part of competitive service providers. There are boom years where those services will not be needed, making it very unfair competition for third parties. Very bad experience in other countries where incumbent utilities or their "deregulated" arms, "competed" with third parties have been very negative for third parties.

I suggest that since you dislike subsidies, as I also do, to eliminate alltogether price controls, leading to true deregulation of the electric market. In that sense, please take a look at the new comments I made on true deregulation to the article A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation, in response to Mr. Martin-Giraldo remmarks.

José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD
Interdependent Consultant on Electricity
Grupo Millennium Hispaniola
Dominican Republic

miércoles, diciembre 28, 2005

IMF insists on eliminating subsidies


According to the IMF the Dominican government has two options to compensate for the resources that it will lose when it abolishes the exchange commission tax on dollars used to import anything into the Dominican Republic: one is to continue collecting the tax all year long, and the second is to eliminate the subsidies on propane and electricity.
A 'source' close to the government has told El Caribe that the IMF thinks that the government has to take a more "drastic" approach to the question of subsidies and that it should seriously think about ending them altogether. The source said that with the postponement of DR-CAFTA, the government has six months to keep up the exchange commission tax and obtain the finances it needs to balance out its income, but the source also questions what will happen when the time comes to enter the treaty. The source added that the government will have to ! find some way to get the money, and it is looking at cutting out the subsidies as one way to do it. While the IMF has not formally asked the Dominican Republic to eliminate the subsidies, it is obvious to the source that this will be a major theme for discussion this coming year. One of the goals set out by the IMF Stand-by agreement is the reduction of the electricity sector deficit, which is expected to reach US$800 million or RD$27.2 billion in 2006. However, this past Monday, CDEEE administrator Radhames Segura told reporters that the government had no plans to remove the subsidy. He pointed out that the subsidy was, indeed, a very important issue for the government, especially in view of the fact that what was originally set as a US$350 million subsidy, turned into a UD$502.3 million subsidy.

martes, diciembre 27, 2005

Retail Market Deregulation Dialogue on EnergyPulse Part 3

An updated comment to Free All Wisconsin Utilities to Make Money Helping Customer's Save Energy.

I have added new comments on the true deregulation to A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation. One of them is in response to Mr. Martin-Giraldo is centered on:

I believe there has been a big misunderstanding of Fred C. Schweppe proposal. Trying to clarify his proposal, lets consider four general structures for the electric business: A) a traditional vertical integrated utility; B) a faulty deregulation or re-regulation that keeps a largely irresponsive and obsolete utility business model; C) Fred C. Schweppe "Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace" with homeostatic utility controls, where the utility is the only middleman; and D) a true deregulated electricity market, with retailers innovative business models, without price controls, a new value chain (generator, retailer & customer), while re-regulating the wires monopoly.

While agreeing with Harry and Kevin on the need to do without subsidies or regulation, I urge Don specially to look at it. There is no longer a need to have retail price control regulation. The theory and practice is available to support the development of innovations in retail marketing of electricity.

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 4

Thank you very much Mr. Martín-Giraldo for your timely comments.

I agree completely that Fred C. Schweppe supported regulation, but a very distinct kind of regulation, which I believe is completely unnecessary today. Experience with faulty deregulation, experience with regulation, the development of new technologies, and additional insights into electric business, suggest serious consideration to the development of a "true" deregulated electric marketplace. The comments that follow are in addition to my earlier article on An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response, as well as my comments dispersed on EnergyPulse.

I believe there has been a big misunderstanding of Fred C. Schweppe proposal. Trying to clarify his proposal, lets consider four general structures for the electric business: A) a traditional vertical integrated utility; B) a faulty deregulation or re-regulation that keeps a largely irresponsive and obsolete utility business model; C) Fred C. Schweppe "Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace" with homeostatic utility controls, where the utility is the only middleman; and D) a true deregulated electricity market, with retailers innovative business models, without price controls, a new value chain (generator, retailer & customer), while re-regulating the wires monopoly.

As you will see, moving from the regulated Space A to the regulated Space C involves a very large undertaking, while moving from Space C to Space to D no such a large one. The regulated (Space C: see page 11 of Spot Pricing of Electricity) "energy marketplace involves the utility and its customers operating as partners… Utility implementation concerns include real-time calculation/prediction of hourly spot prices, metering-communication-billing, and system control center operation using the new control signal called price… customers who choose to exploit the energy marketplace potentials must implement the appropriate response systems (today demand response), which could range from simple manual response to sophisticated digital controls."

That explains why on page 123, Schweppe, et al, conclude "that there are many similarities between the regulated energy market place… and the deregulated system." That also explains very clearly the shortcomings ( i.e. price spikes) of, Space B, faulty deregulation.

In addition, on page xvii of Spot Pricing of Electricity, Fred C. Schweppe (et al) understood that "there is a need for fundamental changes in the way society views electric energy... In general terms: …the spot price based energy marketplace involves a variety of utility-customer transactions… These transactions may include customers selling to, as well as buying from, the utility." Read "fundamental changes" not cosmetic changes in the utilities business models.

On page xviii, they add "A spot price based energy marketplace has many benefits for both the electric utility and its customers. These benefits include improvements in operating efficiency, reductions in needed capital investments, and customer options on the type of (reliability) of electricity to be bought. A spot price based energy marketplace is a win-win situation for both the regulated utility and its customers. The customer's lifestyles improve because the customers are receiving more service from the use of electric energy per dollar spent. The utility has a more controllable, less uncertain world in which to operate." That is exactly the opposite of what has been happening, by leaving the customer out in the re-regulation efforts. Demand response will change that.

My hypothesis is that time and reality are given us the opportunity to bypass Space C and go directly to Space D. It does not make any sense today to develop a Regulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. It does not make any sense either to stay at Space A. Maybe my contribution, if there is one, is recognizing that a very simple restructuring, which keeps the wires utility out of the competitive business, creates an opportunity for retail marketers to develop the Deregulated Spot Price Based Energy Marketplace. That I suggest is the required change in firm organization that goes satisfies the control scheme, on the need to develop the corresponding innovative business models.

I add my response to your well documented comments with the dedication of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity," that says: "Fred created spot pricing and proved, again, that "The forecast is always wrong!" (Unnumbered page, placed on what should be page v).

Schweppe was a feedback genious, which understood (see page 7) that "In the energy marketplace, there is a closed-loop feedback between the utility and its customers. The whole electric power system (generation, transmission, distribution, and customers) is controlled and operated in an integrated fashion, without removing the customers' freedom of choice. This is made possible by the diversity in costumer's characteristics, desires and needs… The benefits of well-designed, real time, utility customer feedback are clear, or will be after reading this book." My hypothesis of "true" deregulation is centered on those perceptions of the customers, which introduce the need for retail marketing and retail competition, which, unfortunately, is the "true" deregulation that the late Fred C. Schweepe had no time to see.

Now I like to respond some of your comments:

· To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays.

My response:

I believe that sufficient time has past to assign the proper credits, which I am trying to integrate in a true deregulation of electricity. However, I firmly believe that the theory and practice of restructuring of electricity originated with Fred C. Schweppe leadership. The book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" is the place to respond to Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, argument: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins."

I believe that Schweppe proposed a "real" restructuring, when he said "New directions for the utility industry are being sought by many interested parties in the government, the private sector, and the universities. One such direction has been widespread interest in utility-customer cooperation through innovative rates characterized by broader options and better use of information on utility costs and customer needs. The goal of this book is to provide a theoretically sound, yet practical foundation for the implementation of utility-customer transactions based on today's needs. Our goal is to meet four criteria:

  1. "Freedom of Choice: provide customers with options on the cost and reliability of supply and how they choose to use electric energy."
  2. Economic Efficiency: Motivate customers to adjust their own electric energy usage patterns to match utility marginal costs.
  3. Equity: Reduce customer cross-subsidies…
  4. Utility Control, Operation and planning: Consider the engineering requirements for controlling, operating and planning an electric power system."
Commenting the criteria in reverse order:

Item 4: is what Mr. Jack Casazza, yourself, myself, and others have been asking all along, which were forgotten in the "deregulation" frenzy.

Item 3: had a note: "there are other definitions of equity." I characterize a supply security (or quality) cross-subsidy, just to cross-subsidize, for example, the computer manufacturer, as Thomas Tanton has rightly pointed out. Average rates to customer classes forbid that.

Item 2: motivation underscores the need for retail marketing, which utility minded people find unnecessary. I have to admit that Mr. Schweppe didn't got that far.

Item 1: This is the key element on the differentiation of customers. Technology for a complete market is already here. In the End-State (which is within the next five years) price controls become completely unnecessary, given my article and the comments have made in the EnergyPulse discussions.

Your comment:

  • Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment.
My response:

While the words seem correct, the intent is not. As was seeing from my first response, Fred C. Schweppe advocated a much more different regulation than the re-regulation that California experimented. In fact, Schwepe had suggested very big restructuring effort, with the following 4 above goals. Had they follow Fred C. Schweppe spot pricing "regulation" model; the experiment would have been completely successful. That is why you need to add the sentence "The reader might be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long…"

Your comment:

  • In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.)
My response:


I suggest you to read my response to Bob Lieberman in what I believe is
The Birth of the Global Electric Retailer.


Best regards,

José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD



On 12/27/05, Power Encounter <powerencounter@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear Mr. Vanderhorst-Silverio,
I have the following comments to do:

  1. Fred Schewppe supported regulation. In Chapter 5. "A Possible Future: Deregulation", page 111 of the book "Spot Pricing of Electricity" by Fred C. Schweppe, Michael C. Caramanis, Richard D. Tabors and Roger E. Bohn (Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988 ISBN 0-89838-260-2), we can read: "This chapter shows how the establishment of a spot price based energy marketplace in a regulated environment (which we do advocate) can evolve towards or into a deregulated system. The reader may be surprised to learn that the trip from regulation to deregulation need not be very long (although it may be bumpy)." To me is important to remark that the origins of restructuring are not in the thought of Schweppe, although many people could think so nowadays. Why?. Please pay attention to the first sentence between parenthesis: "Which we do advocate". Schweppe advocated regulation. By extension, this means there is not necessarily a relationship between "deregulation" and "demand response", thus "demand response" could take place in a restructured or non-restructured environment. In my opinion it is more easy "demand response", (or load management, demand side management, market transformation or whatever name adopted along last 30 years you want to call it), takes place in a regulated environment and carried out by a vertical integrated utility under the once very popular IRP (Integrated Resource Planning.).

  2. Since its inception, the control scheme of a power system is hierarchical. Id est: a vertical one. This vertical control scheme observes a time scale which comply with the power system states: electromagnetic, transient, and steady states, and short term and long term planning. And this vertical scheme control obeys the organization of a vertical integrated utility as well. With restructuring and unbundling the utility lost verticality and become horizontal. To enlarge my view in this point it could be interesting for instance you pay a view to the Economics book "Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications", by Oliver E. Williamson, Free Press. 1983 ISBN: 0-02934-780-7). There has been a change in the firm organisation, but there has NOT been the corresponding change in the control scheme. Now, the point here is whether the classical control scheme affords horizontal utilities. The facts seem to tell no. Then, how to add to the present vertical control scheme a new full horizontal one such the required by "demand response" without provoking clashing?. Neither the multi-agent systems technology is still ready, nor the Agent-based Computational Economics has been developed. See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aelect.htm .

  3. In present times I remember a quote of Charles Maurice de Tayllerand-Périgord, that argued French politician who once said: "When something become dark to you, go to the origins".

Posted in Energy Pulse.
Sincerely yours
J Martín-Giraldo


On 12/24/05, José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD <mailto:vanderhorstsr@gmail.com> wrote:

Estimado Dr. Martín-Giráldo,

Perdone mi insistencia sobre mi propuesta de un Mercado eléctrico liberalizado verdadero, con el cual su contribución espero. Cambio al inglés ahora.

Professor Ferdinand E. Banks wrote a timely article in EnergyPulse entitled A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation, to which I made an initial comment and posed some questions regarding my hipothesis of a true electric deregulation. Prof. Banks has said, among other things that: "Almost as important, I think that the arguments of Jack Casazza, and the people at the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center are unbeatable. They also have all the evidence on their side, which helps. (And here I can suggest examining the blog of Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo.) I certainly respect the knowledge and interest of Vanderhorst-Silverio in this matter, and I hope that his ideas receive a wide circulation, but in terms of the economic theory that I study and teach, I would really be surprised if I were able to endorse those suggesting that there is an acceptable deregulation agenda out there somewhere if only we take the time to find it. "


Thanking Prof. Banks for his suggestion that my ideas receive a wide circulation, I responded in part as follows:

"Recently, I have sent an email to Mr. Casazza, and have gone to Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo, Power Encounters blog, where I posted comments in Spanish about 1) a misunderstanding of Fred C Schweppe's Homeostatic Utility Control in the literature review he posted; 2) my blog in which I have posted well over 900 notes, most of them in Spanish, related to what I believe is my meaningful aim of true deregulation (which started on 1995); and 3) CME Industry Center (CMEIC) admission of incomplete (=faulty) deregulation and lack of physical demand side risk management, and referring him to the link of my comments under the article "Strategic Perspectives on Utility Enterprise Solutions," by Warren Causey on EnergyPulse."

"I have received no reply from them yet. I agree that under the old paradigm, CMEIC and Mr. Casazza are unbeatable, because they are based on "facts" of the faulty deregulation. However, I humbly think that under COE hypothesis many of the arguments just don't hold. However, I received a kind reply from Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, but I am not allowed to forward it yet (the email has some legalese at the bottom)."

"I will send all of them, including the CMEIC the link of this article to see if they may have answers to the questions I asked you. "

Deseándole una feliz Navidad y esperando sus comentarios, bien sea en su bitácora digital, en EnergyPulse o por esta misma vía.

Muy cordialmente,

José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD

Interdependent Consultant on Electricity

BS ´68, MS ´71 & PhD ´72, all from Cornell University

Valued IEEE Member for 35 Years

javs@ieee.org

Research and practice areas, and interests: systems architecture, systems thinking, retail marketing, customer orientation, information systems requirements and design, market rules, contract assistance.

sábado, diciembre 24, 2005

Eficiencia Energética: Opción de Menor Costo de Electricidad

De acuerdo a la Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) de los Estados Unidos la eficiencia energética salía a 3 centavos de dólar el kilovatio-hora en el año 2002. No cabe duda que es el medio idóneo para reducir los costos de electricidad para la economía dominicana. El tiempo para lograr los beneficios es también mucho menor. ¿Porqué insisten en invertir en centrales a carbón, si tenemos una opción de mucho menor costo? En el 2006 la factibilidad es mucho mejor, dado los precios relativos de los combustibles eran mucho menores.Miren a la lámina 5 de la siguiente presentación.

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 3

Esta es la parte común de las comunicaciones que envié a los expertos en electridad que mencioné en la respuesta al Profesor Banks.

Professor Ferdinand E. Banks wrote a timely article in EnergyPulse entitled A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation, to which I made an initial comment and posed some questions regarding my hipothesis of a true electric deregulation. Prof. Banks has said, among other things that:


Almost as important, I think that the arguments of Jack Casazza, and the people at the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center are unbeatable.They also have all the evidence on their side, which helps. (And here I can suggest examining the blog of Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo.) I certainly respect the knowledge and interest of Vanderhorst-Silverio in this matter, and I hope that his ideas receive a wide circulation, but in terms of the economic theory that I study and teach, I would really be surprised if I were able to endorse those suggesting that there is an acceptable deregulation agenda out there somewhere if only we take the time to find it.

Thanking Prof. Banks for his suggestion that my ideas receive a wide circulation, I responded in part as follows:

Recently, I have sent an email to Mr. Casazza, and have gone to Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo, Power Encounters blog, where I posted comments in Spanish about 1) a misunderstanding of Fred C Schweppe's Homeostatic Utility Control in the literature review he posted; 2) my blog in which I have posted well over 900 notes, most of them in Spanish, related to what I believe is my meaningful aim of true deregulation (which started on 1995); and 3) CME Industry Center (CMEIC) admission of incomplete (=faulty) deregulation and lack of physical demand side risk management, and referring him to the link of my comments under the article "Strategic Perspectives on Utility Enterprise Solutions," by Warren Causey on EnergyPulse.

I have received no reply from them yet. I agree that under the old paradigm, CMEIC and Mr. Casazza are unbeatable, because they are based on "facts" of the faulty deregulation. However, I humbly think taht under COE hypothesis many of the arguments just don't hold. However, I received a kind reply from Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, but I am not allowed to forward it yet (the email has some legalese at the bottom).

I will send all of them, including the CMEIC the link of this article to see if
they may have answers to the questions I asked you.

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 2

Re: Felicidades

Muchas felicidades a ti Luis también en Noche Buena y Navidad y tu linda familia dominco-mexicana. Igualmente, muchas felicidades también a todos los copiados.

Espero que el año que viene los dominicanos dejemos de lado las diferencias y adoptemos un visión compartida del sector eléctrico, que sirva tanto para las empresas y las oficinas públicas, como para las residencias.

Muy cariñosamente,

José Antonio


On 12/24/05, Luis H. Arthur. S. <luarthur@verizon.net.do> wrote:
Desde mi exilio con luz, les deseo a todos una feliz Noche Buena y Navidad, y un ano prospero en realizaciones personales y nacionales, para Uds. todos y sus familiares.
Nos volveremos ver si Dios Quiere, por el tiempo que el decida.
Luis

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--
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhDInterdependent Consultant on ElectricityBS ´68, MS ´71 & PhD ´72, all from Cornell UniversityValued IEEE Member for 35 mailto:Years.javs@ieee.orgResearchand practice areas, and interests: systems architecture, systems thinking, retail marketing, customer orientation, information systems requirements and design, market rules, contract assistance.

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation Part 2

Thanks Prof. Banks for your humble response.

I certainly can only claim to know about deregulation in the Dominican Republic myself, which is one of the worst cases in the world. Our educational system is lousy, and our power system has been expensive and unreliable for many years. Our power sector is right now is under systemic collapse, totally unsustainable, and kept going only on very large, and unsustainable subsidies and 20-25% rotating interruptions ordered by the World Bank and the IMF. Most customers with economic capacity have backup systems. However, I am not an anti-deregulation ideologist, because I firmly believe that our power sector can be turned around with true deregulation, as can be inferred from my presentation at the Spring 2005 Peak Load Management Alliance Conference.

Recently, I have sent an email to Mr. Casazza, and have gone to Jesus M. Martin-Giraldo, Power Encounters blog, where I posted comments in Spanish about 1) a misunderstanding of Fred C Schweppe's Homeostatic Utility Control in the literature review he posted; 2) my blog in which I have posted well over 900 notes, most of them in Spanish, related to what I believe is my meaningful aim of true deregulation (which started on 1995); and 3) CME Industry Center (CMEIC) admission of incomplete (=faulty) deregulation and lack of physical demand side risk management, and referring him to the link of my comments under the article "Strategic Perspectives on Utility Enterprise Solutions," by Warren Causey on EnergyPulse.

I have received no reply from them yet. I agree that under the old paradigm, CMEIC and Mr. Casazza are unbeatable, because they are based on "facts" of the faulty deregulation. However, I humbly think taht under COE hypothesis many of the arguments just don't hold. However, I received a kind reply from Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, but I am not allowed to forward it yet (the email has some legalese at the bottom).

I will send all of them, including the CMEIC the link of this article to see if they may have answers to the questions I asked you.

Best regards,

José Antonio

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation

viernes, diciembre 23, 2005

Some Friendly Comments on True Electric Deregulation

Profesor Ferdinand Banks ha escrito el artículo A Few More Unfriendly Comments on Electric Deregulation en EnergyPulse que yo he aprovechado para defender mi hipótesis de una liberación verdadera del sector eléctrico. Esto es lo que le escribí:

Thank you, Professor Banks, for outlining the dark side of power sector restructuring (faulty deregulation). As I told you before, I have auto financed my research on Customer Oriented Electricity (COE), which becomes an entirely new paradigm that addresses the core problem identified by Jack Casazza in "Pick Your Poison." As an engineer, under the vertically integrated paradigm, I completely agreed with Jack’s article under faulty deregulation. By the way, I have followed his good work and papers with interest for some time. I agree also with Prof Banks: How did the farce happen?

However, under COE, even with oligopolies on the wholesale market, true retail competition can be organized to pursue economic efficiency (I don’t claim to be an economist), leading to maximum welfare. Please take a look at my comments (and their hyperlinks) under the following article, where I explain uniqueness of the electric industry, price reductions only after a while, the need for a new value chain, physical hedging (related to item 3 and 4 academic arguments at the end of Prof. Banks article), etc. As you can see my work is not based on ideology, but on careful insights, systems architecture and design. Below I add additional comments as an antidote to the faulty deregulation poison, which by all means are not based on ideology at all.

Jack’s assumption that there can be no product (actually service) differentiation is true under a deterministic world, but false on a probabilistic one. Every customer has a perceived supply security requirement (which can vary) that minimizes his/her costs of electricity in the long run. By developing and applying demand response technology, an opportunity to develop new competing business designs innovations can be implemented to satisfy long run least cost power sector development and benefit from increases in scale (item 1 of Prof. Banks academic arguments: is discussed in my last comment to said article). Actually, under systemic competitiveness that would change from least cost to maximum value added.

Under the old paradigm, I also agree with Jack that “Busy signals are not acceptable when a user flicks a switch to light a room.” However, under the new paradigm demand response becomes a condition of service, meaning that customers with low supply security requirements need to respond more frequently, but don’t have to pay (for something they don’t need) the same average rates as customers with high supply security requirements. The result is (or will eventually be) positive, when transaction costs are lower than the value destruction produced by the average rates (see my comments under the article, about some utilities that have justify the investment on other benefits).

On today’s faulty deregulations, short run spot prices do not signal correctly the lack of reserves permitting gaming. On true deregulation, competitive retailers will develop strategies to control price spikes from developing in the first place. They will do that by deploying demand response and energy efficiency investments (item 2 of Prof. Banks academic arguments).

Mr. Casazza though that customers purchasing small generators was due simply because low reliability. Today is known that the penetration of distributed resources is due to disruptive technologies that replaces in many cases efficiently costly peaking units located far from load centers, as well as to represent very well the differentiated requirements of customers supply security (reliability).

Clearly, places that have deregulated already (with agreements of the weird sort, as Professor Banks calls them) will find very difficult and costly to change to true deregulation (and very real choice) of electricity. Under true deregulation efficient generators will be able carry high power factors, but will be unable to earn the huge profits they got under faulty deregulation. So I agree with Professor Banks that to be the case for those countries he mentioned unable to migrate to true deregulation.

Closing questions to Professor Banks:

1. Do you think that Jack’s comment “The changes resulting in these massive errors were a reaction to many years of unfair regulation by often-incompetent regulators, many of whom were concerned with their political and professional futures rather than protection of the consumers” is going to go away anytime soon? It seems that Southern Company isn’t the rule. I prefer to do without with utilities winning cases to regulators under vertical integration, and limiting it only to the wires investments monopoly regulation.
2. Do you see the possibility to organize true retail competition (no price controls) under prudential regulation, even when there are generating oligopolies?
3. What do you see lacking in the approach I suggest?
4. As some retail marketers will become global companies that compete in several local markets, can they become the target for fusions and acquisitions to develop oligopolies? Do you anticipate how to mitigate it?
5. I see retail marketers’ economies of scope, by taking charge of other services, like telephone, gas, water, and even insurance. Can this be a means for mitigation under question 2?
6. Knowing that value added electricity will come from knowledge intensive coordination of highly distributed activities (some optimal percentage of demand side risk management), instead of physical investment on peaking reserves to be used just a few hours a year (100% supply side risk management). Do you still think that vertical integration is a real vision for the future?

Those are my friendly comments on true retail deregulation.

Merry Christmas to you all.

© José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD. 2005.