Hi Dave, Len, Todd and interested readers,
These are my humbled conclusions, open to be enhanced, about the article, which complement my initial post Solution to AMI's Intelligrid Dilemma:
1) Smart meters are necessary, but not sufficient. To reduce customer transaction costs under complex trade arrangements to reasonable values, small consumers need to select a retailer of choice, which should be bound to operate under very clear [global] prudential regulations that also apply to generators to protect all customers, generators and retailers with fair competition regulations.
2) For the intelligrid to be the ultimate goal, it needs to follow a superior path to the End-State of the power industry to ensure the physical and human resources needed for the next 30 years. Such path is available with the market design and architecture based on Electricity Without Price Controls (EWPC), a work in progress.
To support in part such conclusions and to answer your statement: “… how separate organizations will do their part to facilitate the process is still under debate throughout the industry,” a synthetic one page explanation can be found on the post EWPC is Pragmatics' Winning Market Architecture and Design. Skeptics, like Fred Banks in the post Let's Get Out of Back Rooms to a Generative Dialogue, may not agree with those conclusions. For those technologies enthusiast, visionaries, and pragmatics, who believe, this should end the debate and be followed by a generative dialogue to reach the End-State of the electricity industry.
I thank all skeptics and especially Len Gould for his great interest in EWPC since the end of 2005, when my first and only energypulse.net article An Alternative Business Case for Demand Response was published.
States, provinces and countries where many industrial and commercial users are facing intense global competition and that have not deregulated are the main candidates for EWPC to replace financial capital with production capital (refer to slide 31). Future contracts of reliable deliveries are the key work performed by 2GRs, which may serve as marketers, brokers and aggregators.
I suggest that it is time to find funding for a worldwide generative dialogue with teeth. Help from readers’ suggestions on how to materialize is sought. Please comment, forward it to friends that might be interested to get involved in the project initiative and/or write in private to me at javs@ieee.org.
P.D.: For those interested in a response to the latest observations by Len, please read the post We Need 2GRs as the Forecast is Always Wrong.
domingo, agosto 05, 2007
EWPC is Pragmatics' Winning Market Architecture and Design
Under the energypulse.net article Just How Smart IS Your Smart Meter? Why Achieving the Intelligrid Should be Your Ultimate Goal, the explanation of the conclusions given on 8.5.07 is based on my presentation given at Carnegie Mellon University in March 2007. Readers can download only one copy of the CMU presentation “A Generative Dialogue to Reach the End-State of the Electricity Industry,” for personal use, from the left column of this blog.
The idea of retail competition in electricity (referred in slide 8 of the presentation) can be found in the July 1996 issue of the IEEE Spectrum, which has on the cover “Power Brokers: utilities brace for new competition.” In the article “Unlocking the GRID, starting on page 20,” Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth of NERA, explained in “a guide to the perplexed,” that retail competition answers yes to the following 3 questions: 1) Are there competing generators, 2) Do retailers have a choice, and 3) Do final consumers have a choice.
Explaining the model of “… retail competition or direct access,” the authors write: “In this case, all customers choose their suppliers. There is open access to transmission and distribution wires. The distribution is separate from the retail activity, and the latter is competitive. This, in broad outline, is the proposed California model…” Please refer to slides 29 and 30 to learn that the California model was changed from what it was supposed to be based on welfare economics and complete markets, to one to slow the progress as can be seen on slide 32. The shift from incomplete market deregulation with price controls to re-regulation without price controls under prudential regulation (EWPC) was born on slide 33.
The authors added, “Retail competition makes the most of competitive forces by, in principle, bringing all final consumers into the market. But it also greatly increases transaction costs by requiring more complex trade arrangements and metering. For small users, the costs may easily outweigh the benefits. Not only are metering costs comparatively higher for small customers, but the benefits of one stop shopping are lost – a problem that has also arisen in the telephone industry. Precise responsibility for poor service may be difficult to pinpoint when the local distribution company is not also the retailer.”
Missing from the explanation are the warnings (refer to slide 15) that Fred C. Schweppe et al had written in the book “Spot Pricing of Electricity,” which explain the failure of the California model:
1) “We believe the deregulation which considers only the supply side of the supply-side equation is dangerous and could have very negative results.”
2) “A second mayor difference between this chapter (the only chapter on deregulation in the whole book) and most of the deregulation literature lies in our concern that the economics and physical security of power systems not be destroyed or compromised.”
The first warning is solved by active development of the resources of the demand side (refer to slide 12). The second - one stop shopping and poor service – is solved by following Schweppe’s advice to meet the criteria: “Consider the engineering requirements for controlling, operating and planning an electric power system.” I discovered that there is a need for an imperative ultraquality transportation (integrated T&D), to solve the poor service problem for retailers (see slides 9 and 10).
Second Generation Retailers (2GRs) go further than regulated retailers with one stop shopping service as they also facilitate generators funding by becoming marketers, brokers and aggregators participating in the future markets by “making electricity purchase a contract rather than a regulated service,” as explained by John Flory in 1996 (refer to slide 32).
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD.
The idea of retail competition in electricity (referred in slide 8 of the presentation) can be found in the July 1996 issue of the IEEE Spectrum, which has on the cover “Power Brokers: utilities brace for new competition.” In the article “Unlocking the GRID, starting on page 20,” Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth of NERA, explained in “a guide to the perplexed,” that retail competition answers yes to the following 3 questions: 1) Are there competing generators, 2) Do retailers have a choice, and 3) Do final consumers have a choice.
Explaining the model of “… retail competition or direct access,” the authors write: “In this case, all customers choose their suppliers. There is open access to transmission and distribution wires. The distribution is separate from the retail activity, and the latter is competitive. This, in broad outline, is the proposed California model…” Please refer to slides 29 and 30 to learn that the California model was changed from what it was supposed to be based on welfare economics and complete markets, to one to slow the progress as can be seen on slide 32. The shift from incomplete market deregulation with price controls to re-regulation without price controls under prudential regulation (EWPC) was born on slide 33.
The authors added, “Retail competition makes the most of competitive forces by, in principle, bringing all final consumers into the market. But it also greatly increases transaction costs by requiring more complex trade arrangements and metering. For small users, the costs may easily outweigh the benefits. Not only are metering costs comparatively higher for small customers, but the benefits of one stop shopping are lost – a problem that has also arisen in the telephone industry. Precise responsibility for poor service may be difficult to pinpoint when the local distribution company is not also the retailer.”
Missing from the explanation are the warnings (refer to slide 15) that Fred C. Schweppe et al had written in the book “Spot Pricing of Electricity,” which explain the failure of the California model:
1) “We believe the deregulation which considers only the supply side of the supply-side equation is dangerous and could have very negative results.”
2) “A second mayor difference between this chapter (the only chapter on deregulation in the whole book) and most of the deregulation literature lies in our concern that the economics and physical security of power systems not be destroyed or compromised.”
The first warning is solved by active development of the resources of the demand side (refer to slide 12). The second - one stop shopping and poor service – is solved by following Schweppe’s advice to meet the criteria: “Consider the engineering requirements for controlling, operating and planning an electric power system.” I discovered that there is a need for an imperative ultraquality transportation (integrated T&D), to solve the poor service problem for retailers (see slides 9 and 10).
Second Generation Retailers (2GRs) go further than regulated retailers with one stop shopping service as they also facilitate generators funding by becoming marketers, brokers and aggregators participating in the future markets by “making electricity purchase a contract rather than a regulated service,” as explained by John Flory in 1996 (refer to slide 32).
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD.
We Need 2GRs as the Forecast is Always Wrong
I am glad that Len is agreeing to the learning involved in a generative dialogue, based on the principle that “I am not my opinion.” Great!
The posthumous dedication to Fred C. Schweppe in the book “Spot Pricing of Electricity,” says: “Fred created spot pricing and proved, again, that ‘The forecast is always wrong!’” It is the response to wrong long run forecasts that leads to “power plant build up” and “involves often costly systemic delays.” It is too late when discovered. The action suggested is to develop the resources of the demand side with 2GRs starting from the long run.
In accordance with the post Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC, the essential generic market model paradigm, Schweppe’s work is extended. The synthesis is open to enhancements in learning from the emergent future.
Technologies enthusiast, visionaries, and pragmatics readers are advised to decide for themselves on the need for 2GRs. In that sense, in addition to what is said in the post in which Todd Defends Len Once Again, please consider at least:
From the post EWPC a Customer Orientation:
Integrating energy efficiency, demand response and other services with advanced metering to the homes makes a strong business case for 2GRs as the developer of integrated resources of the demand side. This is a change from a supply orientation with flip the switch service (exogenous demand) to a customer orientation.Demand can thus become endogenous in power system planning, operation and control, completing a (demand vs. supply) fully functional market, with both wholesale and retail competition performed with 2GRs in the value chain from generation to customers. That is another angle of what I been calling EWPC.
And from the post The Purpose Retailers Serve Customers:
Retail-marketers then take control of the strategic Enterprise Solutions [customer facing systems], developing innovative business models [investments by customers and/or retailers in AMI, DR, distributed generation, distributed storage, EE, etc. are not independent decisions in the long run]. As each customer selects what he perceives is the maximum value addition, the economy as a whole maximizes welfare.The last phrase states another purpose of retailers and is the essence of the long run contractual relationship of a customer and what is now known as 2GRs. For more details on my response to Len the reader is advised to go over near 19 energypulse articles in which I patiently responded that his short run electricity market model does not work, as electricity markets are unique.
To integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control, retail customers that invest to respond to real time prices need to advance their plans, to a 2GR when in the future the system is about to operate close to capacity. After investments are done system adequacy studies require what customer capacity is in place to perform when required under a contractual relationship with the 2GR. That information and more is required in advance to plan system expansion and operation. Many retail customers will not find it attractive all the red tape and cost that goes along to become themselves 2GRs, as it is just totally inefficient and ineffective. That is another purpose of retailers.
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD.
The posthumous dedication to Fred C. Schweppe in the book “Spot Pricing of Electricity,” says: “Fred created spot pricing and proved, again, that ‘The forecast is always wrong!’” It is the response to wrong long run forecasts that leads to “power plant build up” and “involves often costly systemic delays.” It is too late when discovered. The action suggested is to develop the resources of the demand side with 2GRs starting from the long run.
In accordance with the post Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC, the essential generic market model paradigm, Schweppe’s work is extended. The synthesis is open to enhancements in learning from the emergent future.
Technologies enthusiast, visionaries, and pragmatics readers are advised to decide for themselves on the need for 2GRs. In that sense, in addition to what is said in the post in which Todd Defends Len Once Again, please consider at least:
From the post EWPC a Customer Orientation:
Integrating energy efficiency, demand response and other services with advanced metering to the homes makes a strong business case for 2GRs as the developer of integrated resources of the demand side. This is a change from a supply orientation with flip the switch service (exogenous demand) to a customer orientation.Demand can thus become endogenous in power system planning, operation and control, completing a (demand vs. supply) fully functional market, with both wholesale and retail competition performed with 2GRs in the value chain from generation to customers. That is another angle of what I been calling EWPC.
And from the post The Purpose Retailers Serve Customers:
Retail-marketers then take control of the strategic Enterprise Solutions [customer facing systems], developing innovative business models [investments by customers and/or retailers in AMI, DR, distributed generation, distributed storage, EE, etc. are not independent decisions in the long run]. As each customer selects what he perceives is the maximum value addition, the economy as a whole maximizes welfare.The last phrase states another purpose of retailers and is the essence of the long run contractual relationship of a customer and what is now known as 2GRs. For more details on my response to Len the reader is advised to go over near 19 energypulse articles in which I patiently responded that his short run electricity market model does not work, as electricity markets are unique.
To integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control, retail customers that invest to respond to real time prices need to advance their plans, to a 2GR when in the future the system is about to operate close to capacity. After investments are done system adequacy studies require what customer capacity is in place to perform when required under a contractual relationship with the 2GR. That information and more is required in advance to plan system expansion and operation. Many retail customers will not find it attractive all the red tape and cost that goes along to become themselves 2GRs, as it is just totally inefficient and ineffective. That is another purpose of retailers.
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, PhD.
viernes, agosto 03, 2007
Todd Defends Len Once Again
Hi Todd,
On 4.6.06 you said "In a deregulated world, which is coming soon, the generation would be market driven and separated from T&D. The physical structure of our grid will only support regulated lines, but the spot pricing would be determined by a number of factors which include distance, contract longevity, dispatchability and the reliability terms agreed upon in the contract." Now it seems more complex than what you stated.
I like the statement "contract longetivity," because it might signal a middlemen and also "the reliability terms agreed upon in the contract," because it seems to contradicts the comment just posted.
At the end of the same post you added "I'm reminded of Len Gould's articles in here. Very good info and darned close to what I envision being the structure in 40 years. Why fight it? Early adopters profit the most, right?"
It is price controls that categorize customers on a few neat average classes. Differentiation is the opposite, to promote electricity without price controls. In that respect, please take a look at the post Please Blame the Deregulation and Regulation Fiascos Parte 35 to learn what Bob Lieberman show that the conventional wisdom (you defend) of residential response to real time prices won't work is wrong.
Power plant build up involves often costly systemic delays. A response based on short run electricity prices is a formula for adequacy problems, in which long run boom bust behavior leads to overbuiding and underbuilding capacity.
To implemented both of those requirements you need competitive 2GRs as explained on The Purpose Retailers Serve Customers.
On 4.6.06 you said "In a deregulated world, which is coming soon, the generation would be market driven and separated from T&D. The physical structure of our grid will only support regulated lines, but the spot pricing would be determined by a number of factors which include distance, contract longevity, dispatchability and the reliability terms agreed upon in the contract." Now it seems more complex than what you stated.
I like the statement "contract longetivity," because it might signal a middlemen and also "the reliability terms agreed upon in the contract," because it seems to contradicts the comment just posted.
At the end of the same post you added "I'm reminded of Len Gould's articles in here. Very good info and darned close to what I envision being the structure in 40 years. Why fight it? Early adopters profit the most, right?"
It is price controls that categorize customers on a few neat average classes. Differentiation is the opposite, to promote electricity without price controls. In that respect, please take a look at the post Please Blame the Deregulation and Regulation Fiascos Parte 35 to learn what Bob Lieberman show that the conventional wisdom (you defend) of residential response to real time prices won't work is wrong.
Power plant build up involves often costly systemic delays. A response based on short run electricity prices is a formula for adequacy problems, in which long run boom bust behavior leads to overbuiding and underbuilding capacity.
To implemented both of those requirements you need competitive 2GRs as explained on The Purpose Retailers Serve Customers.
The Purpose Retailers Serve Customers
The following is to show that Len has received, from the very beginning, many answers to his question "What purpose do the retailers serve then?" I answer because that statement is very sharp. The response is mainly for readers which have not followed the dialogues and discussions on as many 19 energypulse articles. Here is another very patient response to the question that repeats and repeats itself about an apparent dilemma on the need or not of retailers.
In the post Letter to Dr. Alfred E. Kahn is a detailed explanation on the uniqueness of the electricity markets, where I expressed elements of EWPC as it was emerging at the end of 2005. After reading it on energypulse.net, Len wrote on 12.21.05:
Jose: You're close, just not going quite far enough. You need to eliminate your "Retail marketers" by implementing intelligent software within the customer's meters which takes over the simple task of selecting either a lowest-cost supplier from among all available in a central electronic "marketplace", or alternatively choose to not purchase, and shut down some of the customer's less critical loads if the price exceeds customer-set limits.
Len’s central electronic marketplace is a middlemen which is not able to fulfill its promises. As he has accepted recently, centralized locational marginal prices (LMPs) are required. So the intelligent meters cannot take over that role to replace the proposed retail competition to develop the resources of the demand side. It is because of the uniqueness of the electricity markets that it does not work like the gasoline model. Unless customers have a contract with a supplier (could be a generator), LMPs will generate free riders that see lower LMPs without actually responding.
I the letter to Dr. Kahn, updated within brackets, you can read: “The architecture of a "true" deregulated model [now is re-regulated with prudential regulation] is centered on independent retail-marketers, and a new value chain, whose mission is to segment customers according to electricity value added services, which customers can select. The value chain is wholesale, retail, end customer, leaving the distributor as a pure transporter charging a toll [transportation integration is required]. Retail-marketers then take control of the strategic Enterprise Solutions [customer facing systems], developing innovative business models [investments by customers and/or retailers in AMI, DR, distributed generation, distributed storage, EE, etc. are not independent decisions in the long run]. As each customer selects what he perceives is the maximum value addition, the economy as a whole maximizes welfare.
The last phrase states another purpose of retailers and is the essence of the long run contractual relationship of a customer and what is now known as 2GRs. For more details on my response to Len the reader is advised to go over near 19 energypulse articles in which I patiently responded that his short run electricity market model does not work, as electricity markets are unique.
Retailers replace the two middlemen of the vertical integrated industry: the utility and the regulator which negotiate prices for the customer.
To integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control, retail customers that invest to respond to real time prices need to advance their plans, to a 2GR when in the future the system is about to operate close to capacity. After investments are done system adequacy studies require what customer capacity is in place to perform when required under a contractual relationship with the 2GR. That information and more is required in advance to plan system expansion and operation. Many retail customers will not find it attractive all the red tape and cost that goes along to become themselves 2GRs, as it is just totally inefficient and ineffective. That is another purpose of retailers.
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD.
In the post Letter to Dr. Alfred E. Kahn is a detailed explanation on the uniqueness of the electricity markets, where I expressed elements of EWPC as it was emerging at the end of 2005. After reading it on energypulse.net, Len wrote on 12.21.05:
Jose: You're close, just not going quite far enough. You need to eliminate your "Retail marketers" by implementing intelligent software within the customer's meters which takes over the simple task of selecting either a lowest-cost supplier from among all available in a central electronic "marketplace", or alternatively choose to not purchase, and shut down some of the customer's less critical loads if the price exceeds customer-set limits.
Len’s central electronic marketplace is a middlemen which is not able to fulfill its promises. As he has accepted recently, centralized locational marginal prices (LMPs) are required. So the intelligent meters cannot take over that role to replace the proposed retail competition to develop the resources of the demand side. It is because of the uniqueness of the electricity markets that it does not work like the gasoline model. Unless customers have a contract with a supplier (could be a generator), LMPs will generate free riders that see lower LMPs without actually responding.
I the letter to Dr. Kahn, updated within brackets, you can read: “The architecture of a "true" deregulated model [now is re-regulated with prudential regulation] is centered on independent retail-marketers, and a new value chain, whose mission is to segment customers according to electricity value added services, which customers can select. The value chain is wholesale, retail, end customer, leaving the distributor as a pure transporter charging a toll [transportation integration is required]. Retail-marketers then take control of the strategic Enterprise Solutions [customer facing systems], developing innovative business models [investments by customers and/or retailers in AMI, DR, distributed generation, distributed storage, EE, etc. are not independent decisions in the long run]. As each customer selects what he perceives is the maximum value addition, the economy as a whole maximizes welfare.
The last phrase states another purpose of retailers and is the essence of the long run contractual relationship of a customer and what is now known as 2GRs. For more details on my response to Len the reader is advised to go over near 19 energypulse articles in which I patiently responded that his short run electricity market model does not work, as electricity markets are unique.
Retailers replace the two middlemen of the vertical integrated industry: the utility and the regulator which negotiate prices for the customer.
To integrate demand into power system planning, operation and control, retail customers that invest to respond to real time prices need to advance their plans, to a 2GR when in the future the system is about to operate close to capacity. After investments are done system adequacy studies require what customer capacity is in place to perform when required under a contractual relationship with the 2GR. That information and more is required in advance to plan system expansion and operation. Many retail customers will not find it attractive all the red tape and cost that goes along to become themselves 2GRs, as it is just totally inefficient and ineffective. That is another purpose of retailers.
© 2007. All rights reserved by José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD.
miércoles, agosto 01, 2007
Presidente Fernández Tiene Ultima Oportunidad
Los precios del petróleo están llegando a los 80 dólares el barril y el Presidente Fernández tiene en sus manos la promulgación de una LGE muy Corta que incentiva el uso del petróleo. Hace pocos días escribí la nota Cambiemos Reglas Incentivan uso Petróleo y creo que se puede vetar la LGE para concentrar atención a esa triste realidad.
Las recomendaciones de una nueva cadena global de valor, mayorista (generador), minorista (comercialización al detalle), innovación (en comercialización, en transporte y en diseño de mercado normalizado, etc.), logistica de transporte y facilitación de mercado de clase mundial (transportistas) y suministro de materia prima (combustibles y lubricantes principalmente), consignada en el Plan Nacional de Competitividad Sistémica, pero no contemplada en la LGE Muy Corta, impedirá introducir los aspectos de innovación que precisamente crean el espacio para enfrentar los incrementos en los precios del petróleo.
Como resultado de la LGE Muy Corta se prevén contratos a largo plazo entre las distribuidoras-comercializadoras que simplemente traspasan los precios de los contratos de los generadores. Hoy nos eneteramos que en Chile están haciendo contratos a largo plazo de 15 años con su Ley Corta.
Ahora que necesitamos innovar tendremos las manos atadas, a menos que el Presidente Fernández lo reconsidere. Hay tiempo todavía para evitar contratos a largo plazo de 15 años como los que se están realizando en Chile con su Ley Corta.
Las recomendaciones de una nueva cadena global de valor, mayorista (generador), minorista (comercialización al detalle), innovación (en comercialización, en transporte y en diseño de mercado normalizado, etc.), logistica de transporte y facilitación de mercado de clase mundial (transportistas) y suministro de materia prima (combustibles y lubricantes principalmente), consignada en el Plan Nacional de Competitividad Sistémica, pero no contemplada en la LGE Muy Corta, impedirá introducir los aspectos de innovación que precisamente crean el espacio para enfrentar los incrementos en los precios del petróleo.
Como resultado de la LGE Muy Corta se prevén contratos a largo plazo entre las distribuidoras-comercializadoras que simplemente traspasan los precios de los contratos de los generadores. Hoy nos eneteramos que en Chile están haciendo contratos a largo plazo de 15 años con su Ley Corta.
Ahora que necesitamos innovar tendremos las manos atadas, a menos que el Presidente Fernández lo reconsidere. Hay tiempo todavía para evitar contratos a largo plazo de 15 años como los que se están realizando en Chile con su Ley Corta.
lunes, julio 30, 2007
Cambiemos Reglas Incentivan uso Petróleo
El petróleo está muy caro y hay acciones de liderazgo que se pueden tomar, como aparece en la nota Cambia las Reglas, Cambia el Futuro. Dado que la Ley General de Electricidad recién legislada por el congreso es una Ley Muy Corta, como anticipamos en la nota Congreso Obligado a Una LGE Muy Corta, podemos dejar de hacernos ilusiones y empezar lo más pronto posible a reglamentar todo lo que se pueda para paliar la situación. Esta sería la tercera actividad del Reglamento de Aplicación en adición a las ya sugeridas en las notas Modificada la LGE, Arreglemos el Reglamento y Reglamentemos Criminalización Fraude Electricidad. ¿Qué esperamos?
domingo, julio 29, 2007
DR, IRP and EWPC
I wrote the followin post under the Energy Pulse article Do You Want to Increase Your Utility's Demand Response and Consider it as a Bigger Player in Resource Planning? - Part 1, by Michael O'Sheasy, Vice President, Retail Pricing and Solutions, Christensen Associates.
Very good first part Michael.
I have introduced a generative dialogue to learn the emergent market architecture and design of the power industry. In synchronicity to your article, I wrote before looking at your article the post EWPC a Customer Orientation which is also included in the post Solution to AMI's Intelligrid Dilemma. I will be expecting your second article with much interest.
In the first post I wrote (2GR is second generation retailers which I suggested earlier to differenciate with 1GR traditional retailers):
Best regards,
José Antonio
Very good first part Michael.
I have introduced a generative dialogue to learn the emergent market architecture and design of the power industry. In synchronicity to your article, I wrote before looking at your article the post EWPC a Customer Orientation which is also included in the post Solution to AMI's Intelligrid Dilemma. I will be expecting your second article with much interest.
In the first post I wrote (2GR is second generation retailers which I suggested earlier to differenciate with 1GR traditional retailers):
Integrating energy efficiency, demand response and other services with advanced metering to the homes makes a strong business case for 2GRs as the developer of integrated resources of the demand side. This is a change from a supply orientation with flip the switch service (exogenous demand) to a customer orientation.
Demand can thus become endogenous in power system planning, operation and control, completing a (demand vs. supply) fully functional market, with both wholesale and retail competition performed with 2GRs in the value chain from generation to customers.That is another angle of what I been calling EWPC.
Best regards,
José Antonio
Solution to AMI's Intelligrid Dilemma
I just posted a comment under the EnergyPulse article Just How Smart IS Your Smart Meter? Why Achieving the Intelligrid Should be Your Ultimate Goal, by Dave Turner, Senior Vice President, Energy Practice, Gestalt.
I find Dave's contribution visionary.
The dilemma for and against AMI innovation's timing is solved by restructuring. The "utilities have adopted a common argument against the implementation of Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI)," becomes a non-issue if Electricity Without Price Controls (EWPC) market architecture and design is the vision adopted. The concept of the utility becomes transformed to a wires only transportation utility, which will get “significant operational benefits that allow utilities to improve critical aspects of their internal operations.”
For more details on EWPC restructuring see the recent posts Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC, Second Generation Retailer - 2GR, NERC Compliance and Power Sector Structure, and EWPC a Customer Orientation, all of which are part of an Ongoing Generative Dialogue in energypulse.net.
I find Dave's contribution visionary.
The dilemma for and against AMI innovation's timing is solved by restructuring. The "utilities have adopted a common argument against the implementation of Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI)," becomes a non-issue if Electricity Without Price Controls (EWPC) market architecture and design is the vision adopted. The concept of the utility becomes transformed to a wires only transportation utility, which will get “significant operational benefits that allow utilities to improve critical aspects of their internal operations.”
For more details on EWPC restructuring see the recent posts Synthesis Proposal Agreement of EWPC, Second Generation Retailer - 2GR, NERC Compliance and Power Sector Structure, and EWPC a Customer Orientation, all of which are part of an Ongoing Generative Dialogue in energypulse.net.
EWPC a Customer Orientation
This is another post under the article The Next Innovation in Energy Efficiency - Extending Advanced Metering into the Home, by Jeff Lund, Vice President, Business Development, Echelon Corporation.
Hi Jeff and readers,
Thanks for your patience. I think the long discussion with Len, on whether retailers can be bypassed or not, has a high noise to signal ratio, which seems to be unproductive for the energypulse medium.
If retailers can or cannot be avoided remains a paradox for other readers, I want to know from a fresh perspective, but which I will not engage. I will consider the rear mirror debate (learning from the past) on retailers closed with my post of 7.28.07, going back to the possibility of a generative dialogue (learning from the emerging future).
Returning back to Jeff’s article and with a lot of respect for all readers, including Len of course, I suggest readers and the author to consider my post of 7.17.07 and my responses to Erich and Praveen, not as a position, but as to what seems to be emerging.
Integrating energy efficiency, demand response and other services with advanced metering to the homes makes a strong business case for 2GRs as the developer of integrated resources of the demand side. This is a change from a supply orientation with flip the switch service (exogenous demand) to a customer orientation.
Demand can thus become endogenous in power system planning, operation and control, completing a (demand vs. supply) fully functional market, with both wholesale and retail competition performed with 2GRs in the value chain from generation to customers.That is another angle of what I been calling EWPC.
Hi Jeff and readers,
Thanks for your patience. I think the long discussion with Len, on whether retailers can be bypassed or not, has a high noise to signal ratio, which seems to be unproductive for the energypulse medium.
If retailers can or cannot be avoided remains a paradox for other readers, I want to know from a fresh perspective, but which I will not engage. I will consider the rear mirror debate (learning from the past) on retailers closed with my post of 7.28.07, going back to the possibility of a generative dialogue (learning from the emerging future).
Returning back to Jeff’s article and with a lot of respect for all readers, including Len of course, I suggest readers and the author to consider my post of 7.17.07 and my responses to Erich and Praveen, not as a position, but as to what seems to be emerging.
Integrating energy efficiency, demand response and other services with advanced metering to the homes makes a strong business case for 2GRs as the developer of integrated resources of the demand side. This is a change from a supply orientation with flip the switch service (exogenous demand) to a customer orientation.
Demand can thus become endogenous in power system planning, operation and control, completing a (demand vs. supply) fully functional market, with both wholesale and retail competition performed with 2GRs in the value chain from generation to customers.That is another angle of what I been calling EWPC.
viernes, julio 27, 2007
Reglamentemos Criminalización Fraude Electricidad
Ahora que se está por promulgar la LGE, es importante y urgente reglamentar las actividades de criminalización del fraude. Esta es una segunda sugerencia con base a la nota Modificada la LGE, Arreglemos el Reglamento, que concentró su atención en sugerir que el Organismo Coordinador haga su principal trabajo correctamente para planear y operar el sistema eléctrico a mínimo costo incorporando los costos de racionamiento que ejecutan hoy las distribuidoras. Ese tipo de racionamiento no está reglamentado y es una omisión defectuosa y grave.
Nos conviene a todos cuidarnos de los abusos que pueden cometerse si las reglas de juego no están del todo clara en la aplicación del mandato de los legisladores.
Reiteramos que el Reglamento de Aplicación de la LGE debe apegarse lo más posible a los objetivos básicos de la propia LGE. El diálogo reglamentario debe estar completamente abierto al público, contando con la asesoría de expertos que no sean captados por los agentes del sector. La CNE tiene por delante una tarea de vital importancia, para hacer cumplir sus funciones.
jueves, julio 26, 2007
Congreso Aprueba una LGE Muy Corta
El FMI no va a conocer la tercera entrega hasta septiembre. Es una lástima que se haya desperdiciado un tiempo precioso para completar la primera parte del diálogo generativo para tomar en cuenta la nota eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores (pulsar enlace rojo para acceder a la nota) y así evitar que la modificación de la LGE fuese una muy corta.
Lamentablemente, los inversionistas, a sabiendas de que la LGE es muy corta, se protegerán de la inestabilidad inherente a una LGE sin consenso. Es decir, que el costo a largo plazo para nación será mucho mayor que lo conveniente. Solamente un milagro haría que el Presidente Fernández entre en razón y vete la modificación.
Mientras tanto, aunque como está la LGE es un camino sin salida, debemos reconocer que la Capitalización con una LGE Muy corta es un paso de avance con relación al retroceso que se estaba proponiendo. Sugerimos también pulsar el enlace rojo para acceder a la nota Modificada la LGE, Arreglemos el Reglamento. Aceptemos que la Capitalización no es un estado final de cosas y trabajemos dentro de las limitaciones que nos imponen para sacarle el mayor provecho posible.
Lamentablemente, los inversionistas, a sabiendas de que la LGE es muy corta, se protegerán de la inestabilidad inherente a una LGE sin consenso. Es decir, que el costo a largo plazo para nación será mucho mayor que lo conveniente. Solamente un milagro haría que el Presidente Fernández entre en razón y vete la modificación.
Mientras tanto, aunque como está la LGE es un camino sin salida, debemos reconocer que la Capitalización con una LGE Muy corta es un paso de avance con relación al retroceso que se estaba proponiendo. Sugerimos también pulsar el enlace rojo para acceder a la nota Modificada la LGE, Arreglemos el Reglamento. Aceptemos que la Capitalización no es un estado final de cosas y trabajemos dentro de las limitaciones que nos imponen para sacarle el mayor provecho posible.
miércoles, julio 25, 2007
Modificada la LGE, Arreglemos el Reglamento
La LGE recién modificada no era aplicada correctamente con el Reglamento de Aplicación. Ciertos cambios en dicho Reglamento pueden aumentar grandemente el valor que ofrece la electricidad a los clientes y al mismo tiempo aumentar los ingresos del sector. Uno ya mencionado recientemente en la nota A los Presidentes Fernández, Pared Pérez y Valentín es el de operar el sector lo más cercano al mínimo costo, incluyendo los costos de racionamiento a la población, lo que el Organismo Coordinador no está en capacidad de tomar en cuenta todavía.
La idea sería pasar el control de la interrupción de los circuitos al Organismo Coordinador, de forma que se publique en la prensa los resultados del proceso de optimización conjunta en la programación semanal y así pueda ofrecer un servicio más seguro a la población, al tiempo de que la administración de la demanda aporte a la seguridad del sistema interconectado.
Se puede anticipar la respuesta de algunos funcionarios y agentes del mercado, de que lo anterior no es factible llevarlo 100% a la práctica. Y tienen razón, será casi siempre menor que el 100%.
No obstante, para hacerlo factible por encima de un 95%, por ejemplo, simplemente las violaciones al programa debería conllevar penalizaciones que ciertamente facilitarían su administración, cuando una central declare una disponibilidad que no está en capacidad de cumplir. Esas penalidades se podrían emplear para compensar a los clientes con sus pagos al día.
La iniciativa debe diseñarse, ponerse en práctica y que sea la realidad la que demuestre lo contrario. En 1976 hice algo parecido y el programa se cayó luego de varios día de éxito porque los circuitos intocables se veían afectados. Creo que hoy todos son de 24 horas.
La idea sería pasar el control de la interrupción de los circuitos al Organismo Coordinador, de forma que se publique en la prensa los resultados del proceso de optimización conjunta en la programación semanal y así pueda ofrecer un servicio más seguro a la población, al tiempo de que la administración de la demanda aporte a la seguridad del sistema interconectado.
Se puede anticipar la respuesta de algunos funcionarios y agentes del mercado, de que lo anterior no es factible llevarlo 100% a la práctica. Y tienen razón, será casi siempre menor que el 100%.
No obstante, para hacerlo factible por encima de un 95%, por ejemplo, simplemente las violaciones al programa debería conllevar penalizaciones que ciertamente facilitarían su administración, cuando una central declare una disponibilidad que no está en capacidad de cumplir. Esas penalidades se podrían emplear para compensar a los clientes con sus pagos al día.
La iniciativa debe diseñarse, ponerse en práctica y que sea la realidad la que demuestre lo contrario. En 1976 hice algo parecido y el programa se cayó luego de varios día de éxito porque los circuitos intocables se veían afectados. Creo que hoy todos son de 24 horas.
NERC Compliance and Power Sector Structure
I just placed the following comment under the article The Rules Have Changed and the Stakes Are High by Tamar June, Vice President, Strategic Marketing, AssurX, Inc., posted on 7.24.07 on energypulse.net.
The rules have changed, but is the power sector structure the right one everywhere? The stakes would not be as high if structure were right, again, everywhere. Below is what I see emerging under the Electricity Without Price Controls (EWPC) paradigm:
Transportation (transmission and distribution) should remain integrated or be reintegrated to manage physical long run (system adequacy) and short run (system security) properly - that is what I termed ultraqualiity transportation. By imposing NERC standards without proper power sector restructuring a lot of value destruction is bound to happen.
As demand will no longer be exogenous, physical systemic risk should be done with the proper mix of supply side resources and demand side resources. The November 2006 large blackout of Western Europe gave a great signal on the weaknesses of having transmission separated from distribution.
Under EWPC restructuring the essential entities are: system engineer (in charge of physical systemic risk), generation, transportation and retailing. The compliance of NERC standards will no fix the structural flaws remaining.
The above is not a position. Comments are invited, under the principle that "I am not my opinion," as part of an Ongoing Generative Dialogue to learn about what power sector market design and architecture is emerging. So far there are 15 energypulse.net articles on the red link.
The rules have changed, but is the power sector structure the right one everywhere? The stakes would not be as high if structure were right, again, everywhere. Below is what I see emerging under the Electricity Without Price Controls (EWPC) paradigm:
Transportation (transmission and distribution) should remain integrated or be reintegrated to manage physical long run (system adequacy) and short run (system security) properly - that is what I termed ultraqualiity transportation. By imposing NERC standards without proper power sector restructuring a lot of value destruction is bound to happen.
As demand will no longer be exogenous, physical systemic risk should be done with the proper mix of supply side resources and demand side resources. The November 2006 large blackout of Western Europe gave a great signal on the weaknesses of having transmission separated from distribution.
Under EWPC restructuring the essential entities are: system engineer (in charge of physical systemic risk), generation, transportation and retailing. The compliance of NERC standards will no fix the structural flaws remaining.
The above is not a position. Comments are invited, under the principle that "I am not my opinion," as part of an Ongoing Generative Dialogue to learn about what power sector market design and architecture is emerging. So far there are 15 energypulse.net articles on the red link.
Ongoing Generative Dialogue
1. The Rules Have Changed and the Stakes Are High
7.24.07 Tamar June, Vice President, Strategic Marketing, AssurX, Inc.
2. The Next Innovation in Energy Efficiency - Extending Advanced Metering into the Home
7.16.07 Jeff Lund, Vice President, Business Development, Echelon Corporation
3. All Monopoly Markets created by Regulation Are a Risk
7.2.07 Thomas Lord, President, Volatility Managers, LLC
4. The Dawn of Electricity Competition: Efficient Prices and Efficient Choices
6.6.07 Nat Treadway, Managing Partner, Distributed Energy Financial Group, LLC
5. Utility Deregulation Revisited... Still a Bad Idea
3.14.07 Paul Weinberger, Partner, Technology Management
6. Playing with Fire - Part II
1.2.07 Andrew Weissman, Editor-in-Chief & Publisher, EnergyBusinessWatch.com
7. The Potential for Residential Demand Response on Transmission and Distribution Assets
12.29.06 Rick Boland, CEO and President, e-Radio USA, Inc.
8. Playing with Fire - The 10 Tcf/year Supply Gap -- Part I
12.15.06 Andrew Weissman, Editor-in-Chief & Publisher, EnergyBusinessWatch.com
9. The Future Utility Customer Service Model
12.11.06 Jamie Wimberly, CEO, Distributed Energy Financial Group and Peter Shaw, Director of Customer Strategy, Navigant Consulting
10. Technology Transforming Distribution
12.1.06 Charles Newton, President, Newton-Evans Research Company, Inc.
11. Demand Side Management & Time of Use Billing in Indian Utilities
11.30.06 Ashish Sethia, Consultant
12. The Power Will Be There But Will It Get to Market?
11.28.06 Michael Morrison, National Energy and Infrastructure Industry Group Manager, Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP and David McFadden, Chair, National Energy and Infrastructure Industry Group, Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
13. TXU Displacing Older Generation With Advanced Technologies
11.27.06 Bill Opalka, Editor-in-Chief, Topic Centers, Energy Central
14. AMI Services Solutions for Alberta's Deregulated Market
11.21.06 Nick Clark, Managing Partner, UTILITYnet
15. Condemned to the Fourth Quartile?
11.20.06 Matt Chwalowski, Principal Consultant, PA Consulting
7.24.07 Tamar June, Vice President, Strategic Marketing, AssurX, Inc.
2. The Next Innovation in Energy Efficiency - Extending Advanced Metering into the Home
7.16.07 Jeff Lund, Vice President, Business Development, Echelon Corporation
3. All Monopoly Markets created by Regulation Are a Risk
7.2.07 Thomas Lord, President, Volatility Managers, LLC
4. The Dawn of Electricity Competition: Efficient Prices and Efficient Choices
6.6.07 Nat Treadway, Managing Partner, Distributed Energy Financial Group, LLC
5. Utility Deregulation Revisited... Still a Bad Idea
3.14.07 Paul Weinberger, Partner, Technology Management
6. Playing with Fire - Part II
1.2.07 Andrew Weissman, Editor-in-Chief & Publisher, EnergyBusinessWatch.com
7. The Potential for Residential Demand Response on Transmission and Distribution Assets
12.29.06 Rick Boland, CEO and President, e-Radio USA, Inc.
8. Playing with Fire - The 10 Tcf/year Supply Gap -- Part I
12.15.06 Andrew Weissman, Editor-in-Chief & Publisher, EnergyBusinessWatch.com
9. The Future Utility Customer Service Model
12.11.06 Jamie Wimberly, CEO, Distributed Energy Financial Group and Peter Shaw, Director of Customer Strategy, Navigant Consulting
10. Technology Transforming Distribution
12.1.06 Charles Newton, President, Newton-Evans Research Company, Inc.
11. Demand Side Management & Time of Use Billing in Indian Utilities
11.30.06 Ashish Sethia, Consultant
12. The Power Will Be There But Will It Get to Market?
11.28.06 Michael Morrison, National Energy and Infrastructure Industry Group Manager, Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP and David McFadden, Chair, National Energy and Infrastructure Industry Group, Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
13. TXU Displacing Older Generation With Advanced Technologies
11.27.06 Bill Opalka, Editor-in-Chief, Topic Centers, Energy Central
14. AMI Services Solutions for Alberta's Deregulated Market
11.21.06 Nick Clark, Managing Partner, UTILITYnet
15. Condemned to the Fourth Quartile?
11.20.06 Matt Chwalowski, Principal Consultant, PA Consulting
martes, julio 24, 2007
Parece que la Capitalización Sigue
El PLC impuso su poder en la Cámara de Diputados para ratificar el modelo de Capitalización, quedando todavía elementos de retroceso que impuso el PRD en el 2001. Se trata de una Ley Muy Corta. Es altamente probable que el Senado la apruebe tal como se la entregan la Cámara de Diputados. Sin embargo, nos queda todavía esperanza de se actúe con liderazgo para aprovechar está magnifica oportunidad. Por tanto, ponemos a disposición de los lectores las notas que el GMH publicó en los últimos días sobre este proceso:
1) 22 de julio A los Presidentes Fernández, Pared Pérez y Valentín;
2) 20 de Julio Criminalizar Robo es Insuficiente;
3) 20 de Julio eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores;
4) 20 de Julio LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente;
5) 12 de Julio Congreso Obligado a Una LGE Muy Corta.
1) 22 de julio A los Presidentes Fernández, Pared Pérez y Valentín;
2) 20 de Julio Criminalizar Robo es Insuficiente;
3) 20 de Julio eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores;
4) 20 de Julio LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente;
5) 12 de Julio Congreso Obligado a Una LGE Muy Corta.
domingo, julio 22, 2007
A los Presidentes Fernández, Pared Pérez y Valentín
Leonel Fernández, Presidente Constitucional
Reinaldo Pared Pérez, Presidente del Senado
Julio César Valentín, Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados
Con profundo respeto a ustedes altos dignatarios, los principales dirigentes de la sociedad dominicana, les envío, por medio de hombres y mujeres de buena voluntad, un humilde mensaje que pretende orientarlos en la solución de la crisis del servicio eléctrico dominicano.
Palpando la realidad de hoy, entiendo que le debe corresponder a ustedes tres ser merecedores, y no solo al Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados, el honor conferido en el oportuno editorial del Listín Diario del 22 de julio del 2007, que aparece en la nota LD: Hora Bajar Humos FMI. El editorialista concluye que “[H]ace falta que funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos, asuman su rol de defensa de nuestros intereses, sin dobleces y sin posturas sumisas o dubitativas frente a las desmesuradas exigencias del FMI.
Creo modestamente que la defensa de nuestros intereses puede nutrirse con negociaciones basadas en la nota La Solución Definitiva a la Crisis Sistémica de Electricidad, donde expresé hace 9 meses:
Lamentablemente, parece que el diagnóstico y solución fue interceptado y desvirtuado, al menos en lo que respecta al Plan Nacional de Competitividad Sistémica, al cual se le introdujo los aspectos del Plan Gubernamental de Rescate del Sector Eléctrico que el pleno del CONEP ha criticado duramente por la falta de diálogo. En múltiples ocasiones, no solo advertí importantes defectos en la receta del FMI, sino que ofrecí soluciones al mismo. A modo de ejemplo, de la nota Plan Gubernamental de Rescate del Sector Eléctrico Parte 2 extraigo los siguientes tres párrafos:
La última receta sintomática del FMI negociada con el Gobierno es “hay mucho fraude, criminalicemos el fraude,” quedando limitada también hasta los medidores. En realidad la nueva receta es consecuente con los pilares sintomáticos 2 y 3, para reducir la presión excesiva que surte el pilar 1 para tratar de satisfacer la receta de aumento del CRI (Cash Recovery Index – Indice de Recuperación de Efectivo).
Ahora bien, la receta del CRI y la estructura de la capitalización, que separa el mercado minorista (la distribución y comercialización a los clientes regulados) del mercado mayorista, crean un grave problema a la operación a mínimo costo del sistema conjunto bajo condiciones de racionamiento. En efecto, la receta CRI a las distribuidoras comercializadoras pretende optimizar el mercado minorista del sistema de manera independiente del sistema en conjunto, con una administración unilateral de la demanda sin tomar en cuenta el impacto que produce el racionamiento en el poder adquisitivo de los afectados que son la gran mayoría.
Mientras los consultores contratados por el Organismo Coordinador para la evaluación de los procesos del mercado eléctrico dominicano recomiendan en su borrador de informe “representar adecuadamente la acción de los distribuidores…,” pasan por alto que esta es la mayor debilidad de sub-optimización del sector eléctrico, porque es incompatible con la operación a mínimo costo del sistema conjunto que dichos consultores recomiendan y que correctamente incluye los costos de racionamiento. En efecto, los consultores expresan que “[O]tra de las características que diferencia a la República Dominicana es la falta de optimización conjunta de los recursos.”
Estamos de acuerdo también con los consultores cuando afirman “[L]os modelos y modelización del mercado deberían tener en cuenta la realidad de la República Dominicana.” Lamentablemente, en el Organismo Coordinador hicieron caso omiso a mi sugerencia de la nota Re: Solicitud de Dispensa Parte 3, donde sugería revisar las bases del concurso porque “El caso dominicano es muy particular en que se opera en excesiva situación de desabastecimiento. Esas normativas fueron diseñadas para sistemas adaptados y el nuestro está totalmente desadaptado.” Esta desadaptación es debida principalmente al racionamiento impuesto por la receta del FMI.
Finalmente, por el “plazo fatal” de 10 días, cobra mucha urgencia que “funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos,”como lo son decididamente ustedes tres, pongan atención a la nota eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores.
Reinaldo Pared Pérez, Presidente del Senado
Julio César Valentín, Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados
Con profundo respeto a ustedes altos dignatarios, los principales dirigentes de la sociedad dominicana, les envío, por medio de hombres y mujeres de buena voluntad, un humilde mensaje que pretende orientarlos en la solución de la crisis del servicio eléctrico dominicano.
Palpando la realidad de hoy, entiendo que le debe corresponder a ustedes tres ser merecedores, y no solo al Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados, el honor conferido en el oportuno editorial del Listín Diario del 22 de julio del 2007, que aparece en la nota LD: Hora Bajar Humos FMI. El editorialista concluye que “[H]ace falta que funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos, asuman su rol de defensa de nuestros intereses, sin dobleces y sin posturas sumisas o dubitativas frente a las desmesuradas exigencias del FMI.
Creo modestamente que la defensa de nuestros intereses puede nutrirse con negociaciones basadas en la nota La Solución Definitiva a la Crisis Sistémica de Electricidad, donde expresé hace 9 meses:
El Presidente Fernández tiene la oportunidad que tuvo el Presidente Roosevelt, cuando enfrentó la crisis sistémica de la gran depresión financiera en los Estados Unidos y reformó el sistema financiero de esa gran nación. El diagnóstico sistémico de la gran depresión eléctrica que realicé y la solución están en poder de un consultor que pronto le entregará primero que a nadie – a eso me comprometí. Ese diagnóstico y solución está redactado para negociar de tu a tu con la banca multilateral. Como "el que espera lo mucho, espera lo poco," solicito muy humildemente suspender las acciones en el Congreso para el cambio de la Ley General de Electricidad, así como las negociaciones de los contratos con los generadores sin visión de futuro.
Lamentablemente, parece que el diagnóstico y solución fue interceptado y desvirtuado, al menos en lo que respecta al Plan Nacional de Competitividad Sistémica, al cual se le introdujo los aspectos del Plan Gubernamental de Rescate del Sector Eléctrico que el pleno del CONEP ha criticado duramente por la falta de diálogo. En múltiples ocasiones, no solo advertí importantes defectos en la receta del FMI, sino que ofrecí soluciones al mismo. A modo de ejemplo, de la nota Plan Gubernamental de Rescate del Sector Eléctrico Parte 2 extraigo los siguientes tres párrafos:
Según aprecio para la capitalización, el sector llega hasta los medidores de los clientes. Creo que el sector eléctrico es una infraestructura que debe llegar a toda la economía. En el primer caso el costo de desabastecimiento a la economía no está considerado, siendo esto el principal error del que adolece el plan gubernamental. Para rescatar el sector eléctrico entonces es imprescindible reestructurar, ya que es del sistema de capitalización de donde proviene ese serio defecto.
El supuesto Plan B era para asegurar el éxito, pero el llamado Plan Integral sería entonces un Plan C. La necesidad de ese Plan C es una excelente prueba de que hay un serio problema en el sistema es que el cambio del Plan A del gobierno (gerentes dominicanos) al Plan B del FMI (gerentes altamente experimentados) no ha surtido los resultados esperados. Para salir de la crisis es necesario reestructurar el sistema.
Además, el supuesto de que los planes A y B están basados en tres pilares fundamentales es incorrecto; están basados en tres pilares sintomáticos que miran el sector hasta los medidores: 1) faltan ingresos, aumentemos la tarifa; 2) hay muchas pérdidas, racionemos donde hay más pérdidas; 3) las cobranzas son bajas, aumentémosla. No hay nada de fundamental. Se trata de tratamiento a los síntomas, sin comprender las causas fundamentales subyacentes. El resultado ha sido un aumento excesivo de los costos de electricidad a la economía, al punto de que la incertidumbre sobre el futuro del sector es una barrera sobresaliente a la inversión extranjera…
La última receta sintomática del FMI negociada con el Gobierno es “hay mucho fraude, criminalicemos el fraude,” quedando limitada también hasta los medidores. En realidad la nueva receta es consecuente con los pilares sintomáticos 2 y 3, para reducir la presión excesiva que surte el pilar 1 para tratar de satisfacer la receta de aumento del CRI (Cash Recovery Index – Indice de Recuperación de Efectivo).
Ahora bien, la receta del CRI y la estructura de la capitalización, que separa el mercado minorista (la distribución y comercialización a los clientes regulados) del mercado mayorista, crean un grave problema a la operación a mínimo costo del sistema conjunto bajo condiciones de racionamiento. En efecto, la receta CRI a las distribuidoras comercializadoras pretende optimizar el mercado minorista del sistema de manera independiente del sistema en conjunto, con una administración unilateral de la demanda sin tomar en cuenta el impacto que produce el racionamiento en el poder adquisitivo de los afectados que son la gran mayoría.
Mientras los consultores contratados por el Organismo Coordinador para la evaluación de los procesos del mercado eléctrico dominicano recomiendan en su borrador de informe “representar adecuadamente la acción de los distribuidores…,” pasan por alto que esta es la mayor debilidad de sub-optimización del sector eléctrico, porque es incompatible con la operación a mínimo costo del sistema conjunto que dichos consultores recomiendan y que correctamente incluye los costos de racionamiento. En efecto, los consultores expresan que “[O]tra de las características que diferencia a la República Dominicana es la falta de optimización conjunta de los recursos.”
Estamos de acuerdo también con los consultores cuando afirman “[L]os modelos y modelización del mercado deberían tener en cuenta la realidad de la República Dominicana.” Lamentablemente, en el Organismo Coordinador hicieron caso omiso a mi sugerencia de la nota Re: Solicitud de Dispensa Parte 3, donde sugería revisar las bases del concurso porque “El caso dominicano es muy particular en que se opera en excesiva situación de desabastecimiento. Esas normativas fueron diseñadas para sistemas adaptados y el nuestro está totalmente desadaptado.” Esta desadaptación es debida principalmente al racionamiento impuesto por la receta del FMI.
Finalmente, por el “plazo fatal” de 10 días, cobra mucha urgencia que “funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos,”como lo son decididamente ustedes tres, pongan atención a la nota eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores.
LD: Hora Bajar Humos FMI
Editorial del Listín Diario del 22 de julio, 2007: Es hora de bajarle los humos al FMI
El Fondo Monetario Internacional está llegando a límites insoportables, en el afán de imponerle a la economía del país sus dañinas camisas de fuerza.
La presión que están ejerciendo sus representantes aquí, apoltronados en el Banco Central, se asemeja a la que desembozadamente, en el plano político, nos impusieron en el pasado los pro-cónsules del imperio.
Esta vez han puesto un plazo fatal a la Cámara de Diputados para que apruebe la ley de electricidad, bajo el chantaje de que si no lo hace en diez días, su Directorio no podrá abocarse a conocer un plan para la continuidad de su acuerdo con nuestro país.
Responsablemente, el presidente de la Cámara de Diputados ha rechazado que le coloquen este cuchillo en la garganta a ese cuerpo legislativo, una postura que muy pocos se atreven a asumir desde el Estado frente al todopoderoso agente financiero y de negocios que es el FMI.
Lamentablemente, otras instancias nacionales se han sometido a todas las restricciones que implanta ese organismo, y esta es la hora en que ni la pobreza ha disminuido ni se le da respiro al pueblo para alcanzar un mínimo de vida decente.
Al FMI solo le importa prestar y cobrar lo que presta, sin comprometerse con los traumáticos efectos que sus medidas provocan en el poder adquisitivo del pueblo.
A menudo se ha hecho de la vista gorda para soltar plata a sabiendas de que persisten debilidades y entuertos en el Estado, y esa es la razón por la cual tiene una fama funesta en varios países de la América Latina que probaron sus infuncionales recetas.
Hace falta que funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos, asuman su rol de defensa de nuestros intereses, sin dobleces y sin posturas sumisas o dubitativas frente a las desmesuradas exigencias del FMI.
El Fondo Monetario Internacional está llegando a límites insoportables, en el afán de imponerle a la economía del país sus dañinas camisas de fuerza.
La presión que están ejerciendo sus representantes aquí, apoltronados en el Banco Central, se asemeja a la que desembozadamente, en el plano político, nos impusieron en el pasado los pro-cónsules del imperio.
Esta vez han puesto un plazo fatal a la Cámara de Diputados para que apruebe la ley de electricidad, bajo el chantaje de que si no lo hace en diez días, su Directorio no podrá abocarse a conocer un plan para la continuidad de su acuerdo con nuestro país.
Responsablemente, el presidente de la Cámara de Diputados ha rechazado que le coloquen este cuchillo en la garganta a ese cuerpo legislativo, una postura que muy pocos se atreven a asumir desde el Estado frente al todopoderoso agente financiero y de negocios que es el FMI.
Lamentablemente, otras instancias nacionales se han sometido a todas las restricciones que implanta ese organismo, y esta es la hora en que ni la pobreza ha disminuido ni se le da respiro al pueblo para alcanzar un mínimo de vida decente.
Al FMI solo le importa prestar y cobrar lo que presta, sin comprometerse con los traumáticos efectos que sus medidas provocan en el poder adquisitivo del pueblo.
A menudo se ha hecho de la vista gorda para soltar plata a sabiendas de que persisten debilidades y entuertos en el Estado, y esa es la razón por la cual tiene una fama funesta en varios países de la América Latina que probaron sus infuncionales recetas.
Hace falta que funcionarios y dirigentes de la sociedad, con los pantalones bien puestos, asuman su rol de defensa de nuestros intereses, sin dobleces y sin posturas sumisas o dubitativas frente a las desmesuradas exigencias del FMI.
viernes, julio 20, 2007
Criminalizar Robo es Insuficiente
Como se puede ver en la noticia PIDEN REFORMA A LEY DE ELECTRICIDAD - Detectan fraudes eléctricos en empresas reciben servicio de EdeEste y Edesur, el director del Programa Nacional de Apoyo a la Eliminación del Fraude Eléctrico (PAEF), coronel Delis del Pilar Hernández Peña, ofreció declaraciones a favor de la reforma para criminalizar el fraude de electricidad. A continuación esta la respuesta que le ofrece el GMH:
Las leyes no se promulgan para estarlas cambiando a cada rato. En el GMH estamos de acuerdo que es necesario criminalizar el fraude. No obstante, el fraude de electricidad es otro síntoma que se pretende enfrentar. Lo que se necesita es una solución definitiva que nazca de un diálogo con un objeto común. Al respecto, hemos redactado la nota LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente, la cual enviamos con esta otra nota eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores. Pulsen por favor los enlaces rojos para leerlas.
Un extracto de la primera nota expresa: "...'Pensemos en una electricidad que habilite el máximo valor al cliente.' La explicación pretende desviar la atención del diálogo sobre precios menores sin tomar en cuenta la calidad del servicio. Si la calidad del servicio fuese garantizada las 24 horas del día contra una compensación cuando no se cumpla la calidad, el diálogo estuviese bien sustentado."
Las leyes no se promulgan para estarlas cambiando a cada rato. En el GMH estamos de acuerdo que es necesario criminalizar el fraude. No obstante, el fraude de electricidad es otro síntoma que se pretende enfrentar. Lo que se necesita es una solución definitiva que nazca de un diálogo con un objeto común. Al respecto, hemos redactado la nota LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente, la cual enviamos con esta otra nota eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores. Pulsen por favor los enlaces rojos para leerlas.
Un extracto de la primera nota expresa: "...'Pensemos en una electricidad que habilite el máximo valor al cliente.' La explicación pretende desviar la atención del diálogo sobre precios menores sin tomar en cuenta la calidad del servicio. Si la calidad del servicio fuese garantizada las 24 horas del día contra una compensación cuando no se cumpla la calidad, el diálogo estuviese bien sustentado."
eMail Enviado: LGE - Mensaje Urgente a Legisladores
Estimados y estimadas líderes,
Según informa la prensa, hoy se vence el plazo para remitir la modificación a la LGE para cumplir con el FMI y lograr que el Directorio lo ponga en su agenda para el 27 de este mes.
Si no se hace un maratón hoy o el FMI acepta una entrega el lunes o el martes, tendremos un plazo de dos meses para reorientar el escenario de dicha modificación.
En todo caso, hemos preparado el mensaje que aparece en la nota LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente para todos los interesados y en especial de manera urgente para los legisladores.
Si usted conoce a un legislador, envíele esta nota a la mayor brevedad. Si no conoce a ningún legislador, asegúrese identificar a una persona relacionada que sí conozca uno y remítale la nota con la misma brevedad.
Sumemos todos para enfrentar el flagelo de la crisis de electricidmogdbvad.
Saludos muy cordiales,
José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD
Según informa la prensa, hoy se vence el plazo para remitir la modificación a la LGE para cumplir con el FMI y lograr que el Directorio lo ponga en su agenda para el 27 de este mes.
Si no se hace un maratón hoy o el FMI acepta una entrega el lunes o el martes, tendremos un plazo de dos meses para reorientar el escenario de dicha modificación.
En todo caso, hemos preparado el mensaje que aparece en la nota LGE - Acordemos una Visión Contundente para todos los interesados y en especial de manera urgente para los legisladores.
Si usted conoce a un legislador, envíele esta nota a la mayor brevedad. Si no conoce a ningún legislador, asegúrese identificar a una persona relacionada que sí conozca uno y remítale la nota con la misma brevedad.
Sumemos todos para enfrentar el flagelo de la crisis de electricidmogdbvad.
Saludos muy cordiales,
José Antonio Vanderhorst Silverio, PhD
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